Introduction

            Relations between Greece and Turkey have a rich history marked by interchanging periods of stability and tension.  The first problems in the relations between the two neighbours may be traced back to the time of the Greek war of independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s and even perhaps before that, to the Ottoman Turkish conquest of then Byzantine Greece.  Relations between Greece and Turkey reached a low point in the early part of the 20^th century which led to armed conflict.  A short period of rapprochement in the 1930s gave way to the return of a troubled relationship in the 1960s.  The 1974 debacle in Cyprus started a new period of on and off intense bilateral relations with disagreements on previously forgotten issues.  The two neighbours reached the brink of war twice, in 1987 and in 1996, putting bilateral arguments above their common NATO membership and bypassing the effects that it would have on Turkey’s future in the European Union (EU).

            The events which have marked the relations of the modern states of Greece and Turkey have had a profound effect in the shaping of foreign policies by both Greek and Turkish governments.  Moreover, the problems which have thwarted Greek-Turkish relations in the past thirty years have become a leading factor in shaping Greece’s position on Turkey’s future within the European Union.  This paper will therefore attempt to portray the shift of Greece’s policy towards the possibility of Turkey’s accession to the EU since the time of the official Turkish application to the EU’s predecessor, the European Community (EC).  Additionally, the interchanging effect of the EU decisions on Greek-Turkish relations and Greek-Turkish relations on EU decisions will be explained.  Several events and occurrences along with the change of governments in both countries have played a role in the shift of Greek policy which occurred due to the circumstances which appeared in the mid and late 1990s.  The analysis of these events will reveal the reasons of how and why the policy change occurred in Greece’s policy since the time of the Turkish application to the EC/EU in 1987.  That is the shift from being Turkey’s stumbling block in its European aspirations to becoming one of Turkey’s most ardent supporters within the European Union. 

            The historical aspect of Greek-Turkish relations is important to understand because the issues which have separated the neighbours from stable and friendly relations for many times in the last three decades have affected Greece’s position towards a possible Turkish accession to the EU.  There are four main issues which at times have seemed like an insurmountable hurdle for Greece and Turkey to overcome.  Consequently, Greece’s approach to reaching a solution with Turkey over these issues has shaped Greek policy towards EU-Turkey relations.  Although Greek policy on these issues has changed since Turkey’s application for EU membership, they have nevertheless still remained a priority for Greece, which seeks viable solutions for these problems with its neighbour.

            The most central of these four issues is the lack of agreement on the Cyprus problem.  Greece and Turkey disagree and have always disagreed about the events of 1974, with Turkey claiming that its military presence was an intervention on behalf of the Turkish-Cypriots and Greece proclaiming that it was a Turkish invasion on the island of Cyprus.[1]  Ever since 1974, all subsequent governments of Greece and Turkey have failed to reach a viable solution (along with the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots) on reuniting the island.  Little ground has been made on reaching a solution, although it has often seemed that during some periods a solution would be possible.  Consequently, the lack of a resolution to the problem has lead both Greece and Turkey to pursue a policy towards securing peace and prosperity for the respective Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus.  These policies have sometimes led to tension and often served as a stumbling block to the improvement of relations.

            The other three issues concern the extension of the territorial seas, the continental shelf and airspace over the Aegean Sea.  Although Cyprus is very important for both Greece and Turkey, the Aegean Sea has been the issue which nearly led the two neighbours to two wars in the post 1974 period.  Before the events in Cyprus in 1974, most of these problems were not explicitly emphasized between Greece and Turkey.  However, in the post-1974 era they have become a recurring problem in bilateral relations.  The extension of the territorial waters concentrates on the fact that under international law, Greece has the right to extend its territorial waters from six nautical miles to twelve nautical miles, therefore controlling most of the Aegean Sea.  Turkey of course objects to such a move and has threatened Greece over the implementation of such a measure.  The position of both governments will be further explained in chapter 1 with the details of the conventions regarding the territorial waters.

            The continental shelf dispute has also been arduous and is a very complicated matter which has often impeded Greek-Turkish rapprochement.  Greece claims that the jurisdiction of most of the Aegean Sea continental shelf is Greek because so many of its islands are situated in the Aegean Sea.  It therefore concludes that it retains jurisdiction as a matter of security for the Greek islands.  On the other hand, Turkey objects, claiming that Greece is attempting to control all of the Aegean Sea area and further believes that the continental shelf should be controlled more equally since the Aegean continental shelf is a natural extension of the western Turkish mainland (Anatolia).[2]  Attempts to solve this contentious issue have also failed and no agreement has been reached since this problem became more important after 1974.  Attempts to reach a solution through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague have also failed.

            Finally, there is the problem over the Greek airspace, the so called Athens FIR (Flight Information Region).  Greece claims a ten mile airspace which Turkey has failed to recognize.  Under the Athens FIR, Greece controls most of the air traffic over the Aegean Sea region.  As a result, Greece has demands that it should be notified of any military exercises and flights by Turkish aircraft within the Athens FIR.  Since Turkey does not recognize Greece’s claim to airspace jurisdiction, it freely allows its military aircraft (jets) to fly into the Athens FIR without getting clearance from Athens.[3]  This has become a regular daily event with the Greek governments claiming that Turkey is violating Greek airspace and with Turkish governments claiming that they have the right to fly freely in the region.  The Greek airspace violations by Turkey, as the Greek government proclaims, often escalate in number before or after major decisions regarding Greek-Turkish bilateral relations.  Finally, other problems include items such as the demilitarisation of Greek islands close to mainland Turkey which has been imposed by international conventions and other minor issues have appeared many times but have been put aside or forgotten.

            All of the issues mentioned above have played a key role in Greece’s position regarding Turkey’s path towards membership in the European Union.  These issues have been the reason behind the progression or the blocking of Turkey’s EU application from 1987 on.  Greece has used the absence of a resolution of these problems in its reasoning for compiling its policy towards the EU-Turkey relationship.  As this paper will show, the prospect of the resolution of these problems, the changing governments in Greece and Turkey as well as the effectiveness of the positions, has changed Greek attitudes towards the Turkish EU application over the past decade and a half.   

Chapter 1.

Greece’s Early Position on Turkey’s EC (EU) Application: 1987-1995

Introduction

            Relations between Greece and Turkey were not experiencing their best period at the time of Turkey’s official application for membership in the European Community (EC, now the European Union-EU).  The application was submitted after yet another crisis between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea.  Consequently, from 1987 to 1995, Greece continued a policy towards Turkey’s European prospects similar to the ones it adopted in the 1980s and in previous EC-Turkey related issues.  The policy of the isolationism of Turkey from Europe and the use of the veto to block any advancement of EC-Turkey relations did not aid the ailing Greek-Turkish bilateral relations.  It rather added to the spirit of conflict and tension which escalated in certain periods between 1987 and 1995.  A bright spot in terms of rapprochement in 1988 and an intensification of dialogue in 1990-1991 was short lived and did not have any long lasting results for the future.  The EU-Turkey Customs Union agreement seemed to be a positive step in relations between Greece and Turkey, but did not yet instigate a shift in the Greek policy towards Turkish prospects for joining the European Union (previously European Community).

1.1 The Turkish Application to the EC: Crisis & Rapprochement

            Relations between Greece and Turkey had been intense with a lot of finger pointing and minimal cooperation in the 1980s.  Moreover, in 1987 the two countries reached the brink of war for the first time since the events of Cyprus in 1974.  Considering that both Greece and Turkey are members of NATO, it seemed absurd that two members of the Alliance found it so easy to reach the gates of war despite being part of an organization which in theory was meant to secure peace between its members.  The events of March 1987 added more Greek opposition to Turkey’s official application for membership in the European Community (EC), which immediately followed the tensions in the Aegean Sea.

            The crisis of March 1987 emphasized the disagreement between Greece and Turkey over the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea.  The conflict was the result of not having reached an agreement over the borders and jurisdiction of areas of the Aegean Sea continental shelf. Consequently, when the Turkish government learned that the government of Greece was about to start an oil-exploration mission in the disputed area (outside its territorial jurisdiction)[4], it sent out its own oil exploration vessel.  The move was seen as a threat over Greek territory by the PASOK government and Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou.  The Greek Ministry of Defence reacted by sending navy vessels to the area where the Turks were conducting their oil exploration and threatened to retaliate militarily if any oil drilling would occur.[5]  The tensions were very high and Greece and Turkey came very close to armed conflict after several verbal threats and the concentration of military forces in the Aegean Sea.  Fortunately, with the intervention of NATO’s Secretary General, Lord Carrington, a war was avoided and the southern flank of NATO’s military alliance was kept intact.[6]  The attempts by both Greece and Turkey to each reiterate their respective national positions on the issue of the continental shelf led the two neighbours close to the prospect of war, as well as to a further deterioration of bilateral relations.  The event displayed the non-existence of a bilateral dialogue between Papandreou’s government in Greece and Ozal’s government in Turkey.

            Turkey officially submitted its application for membership in the European Community (EC) just a few days after the end of the crisis.  The timing was unfortunate, since strained relations with Greece were not well received by EC members and it was an overwhelming certainty that the application would not get a warm welcome by several countries and especially by Greece.  The Greek government’s position about the official application to the EC was negative.  This coincided with the other Greek positions on any Turkey-EC cooperation, such as the strengthening of Turkey’s Association Agreement with the EC and the further funding assistance towards Turkey.  It was the Greek government’s inherent belief and especially that of Prime Minister Papandreou, that Turkish accession to the European Community would not lead to the resolution of Greek-Turkish bilateral problems.  On the contrary, Papandreou’s government believed that Turkey’s entry to the EC would only bring more problems to the Community and would slow down the European integration project.[7]  Nevertheless, the European Community (through the European Commission), did not consider the merits of Turkey’s application until it was ready to make some conclusions regarding the country’s political and economic standards.

            The situation seemed dismal after the 1987 crisis and the submission of Turkey’s EC application.  Greek Prime Minister Papandreou received criticism at home of being too tough on his stance towards Turkey and not making an effort for a dialogue process.  Turkish Prime Minister Ozal was also criticized for the fact that his actions had nearly led Turkey to war with Greece at a time when Turkey was about to submit its application for accession to the EC.  One of Prime Minister Ozal’s main political goals was to achieve success by having Turkey accede to the European Community.  However, this would have been impossible without Greece’s support, since the Greek national veto in the EC would thwart any possible future Turkish accession to the Community.  Considering the reasons of both political leaders and the fact that there was no other way out of the crisis, the two neighbouring governments decided to restart bilateral contacts.

            In early 1988, Greece and Turkey ordered their respective ambassadors to begin contacts for the instigation of bilateral talks which would eventually lead to the beginning of a rapprochement between the two nations.  Contacts were exchanged and a meeting was scheduled between Papandreou and Ozal at the annual World Economic Forum meeting in Davos Switzerland.[8]  The two prime ministers agreed to meet at the forum to discuss a way to introduce mechanisms in order to prevent the possibility of war between Greece and Turkey, the so called “no war” policy.[9]  In Davos, the two leaders discussed the bilateral problems but reached no solution because as stated, it was premature for solutions at such an early stage of contacts.  The Greek delegation concluded that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, was the only way to solve bilateral disputes (i.e. Aegean and airspace), but the Turkish officials did not agree with this proposal.

            The results of the Davos meeting (referred as to the Davos Process 1988) were the formation of new economic and political measures which would provide cooperation between Greece and Turkey.  The measures were proactive and seen as a good way to ease tensions between the two neighbours.  A “red line” was created, that is an open telephone line between Papandreou and Ozal in order to be able to directly contact each other to avoid any possible future conflict and to prevent reaching the brink of war like in 1987.[10]  Furthermore, two agreements, labelled the Papoulias-Yilmaz Agreements, named after Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias and Turkish Foreign Minister Yilmaz, were signed in May and September 1988.  The May 1988 agreement included the adoption of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) which would avoid military interference, protect national territories and which would provide information on military exercises.[11]  The September 1988 agreement provided further rules for the avoidance of naval and airspace accidents in order to prevent any sort of military confrontation.[12]  Although the agreements seemed like a step in the positive direction, they did not receive the necessary positive approval in Greece and Turkey.  The Greek public was suspicious of any act of Turkish goodwill and the opposition parties in Greece proclaimed their worries about the future of Greek-Turkish relations.[13]

            Despite the rapprochement efforts of the Davos Process, the Greek government and Prime Minister Papandreou did not change their stance towards Turkey’s prospects for joining the European Community.  The Greek government stood firm on its policy that a resolution on the Cyprus problem had to be reached in order for Greece to consider the idea of Turkey joining the EC.  Furthermore, because of the problems in Cyprus, Greece was willing to block any sort of EC funding to Turkey.  Besides, as Prime Minister Papandreou said in the Greek Parliament, Turkey’s accession to the EC was not foreseeable in the near future and would occur beyond the year 2000.[14]  The Greek government lobbied with its EC counterparts to accept the Greek insertion that an improvement in the dialogue over the Cyprus problem with Turkey should be linked with the advancement of Turkey’s EC application.  Although this was unsatisfactory for Turkey, it served as the basis for Greece’s policy towards Turkey’s EC application.  The PASOK government of Papandreou and the governments that followed wanted to use Greek membership in the EC to force Turkey to cooperate on resolving the Cyprus problem as an incentive for the improvement of EC-Turkey decisions.  If no cooperation would come from the Turkish side, then Greece would use its national veto in the EC to block progression of the Turkish application.  By following this policy, Greece believed that sooner or later, a breakthrough would come in the outstanding issues with its neighbour.  Otherwise, it would lead to Turkey’s isolation from Europe, something which no Turkish government envisaged.

1.2 The First European “No” and the New Greek Government’s Policy

            Greek Prime Minister Papandreou and Turkish Prime Minister Ozal met again in June 1988 and the committees they had formed met several times in 1988 and 1989.  However, by the end of 1989 the Davos Process came to an end.  Papandreou was facing political problems in Greece with his involvement in a scandal and his health was also failing.  Ozal on the other hand was elected President of Turkey and he was also facing domestic challenges.  Consequently, by the autumn of 1989, the Davos Process and the rapprochement efforts came to an end, with few solid results and no substantial progress on any of the major bilateral issues.  Besides, the process had faced negative criticism by opposition parties in both Greece and Turkey.  In the months before the release of the European Commission’s report on the Turkish application to the European Community (EC), Turkish officials pleaded with Greece not to use its position within the EC to block Turkish aspirations for joining the Community.  The absence of the Greek hurdle, would according to Turkey, help normalise Greek-Turkish relations.[15]  However, Greece did not have to intervene in order to block Turkey’s application at this moment in time.

            On December 20, 1989, the European Commission decided to issue its opinion in a report regarding Turkey’s application to the European Community (EC).  The Commission had spent two years studying the economic, political and overall national situation in Turkey before it released its opinion.  In the report, the European Commission stated that Turkey was not ready to start accession negotiations because it did not fulfil the Community’s economic and political requirements and many adjustments had to be made before any negotiations could commence.[16]  Furthermore, the Commission believed that the Community was not yet ready to cope with the economic, social and political problems which Turkish membership would bring and outlined the problems in its report.  The report was released at a time when Greece was going through an extended election period and Turkey had just sworn in a new president.[17]  This added another element to the halt of the rapprochement process between Greece and Turkey.  No Greek veto was necessary to stop Turkish progress in the EC, since the Commission announced that it was far too early to advance the application.  Nevertheless, Turkey felt that it was being isolated from Europe and it predicted Greece’s negative role in the future.[18]  Perhaps the climate in late 1989 and the end of the Davos Process led to a sense of distrust between Greece and Turkey after a short period of rapprochement.

            New Democracy (conservatives) finally won the majority in the April 1990 elections and returned to power in Greece for the first time since 1981.  The elongated electoral campaign stalled Greek-Turkish relations and as a result, there was a status quo from late 1989 until the spring of 1990.  New Democracy was able to oust Papandreou’s PASOK (socialist) party, but only gained a minor seat majority in the Greek parliament.  The new Prime Minister, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, promised to end the hard line stance towards Turkey, taken by his predecessor, Andreas Papandreou.  The news was well received by now Turkish President Ozal, who had maintained friendly relations with Mitsotakis in the 1980s while Ozal was Prime Minister of Turkey.[19]  Furthermore, Prime Minister Mitsotakis was keen on using the available resources to improve Greek-Turkish relations but also make Greece’s role in Europe more assertive and gain support for the foreign policy he would implement.

            Soon after the electoral win of 1990, the new Greek government began the process to restart the bilateral dialogue with Turkey and to work towards a resolution to the Cyprus problem.  However, the government in Turkey, headed by Prime Minister Abkulut was weak and Mitsotakis worried what the response would be from the Turkish side.[20]  The new Greek government was willing to better use its position in the European Community, as it knew that Turkey would need its support to gain an agreement in the Turkey-EC Customs Union, something which had been envisaged to come into force by 1995, as mentioned in the EC-Turkey Association Agreement.  Therefore, from 1990 to 1991, Greece pushed strongly for a dialogue with Turkey on bilateral issues and for a continuation of the rapprochement that had halted in 1989 after the Davos Process ended.  The Greek government believed that the EC incentive would lead to concessions by Turkey and to a possible resolution on Cyprus and other issues of disagreement.  However, the unstable political situation in Turkey made it difficult for the Greek officials involved in this process.  The Turkish government wanted cooperation on Turkey’s EC application before considering the dialogue with Greece. 

            The Greek government’s policy of using the EC as a pressure tool to bring Turkey back to the negotiating table over the Cyprus issue was immediately implemented.  In the June 25-26, 1990 European Council meeting, the members of the European Community agreed that the “Cyprus problem affects EC-Turkey relations.”[21]  This was a success for the new Greek government as it implemented its policy of using the EC tool better than the previous government.  This was the first time that the European Community mentioned the obstacle of the Cyprus problem and other bilateral issues between Greece and Turkey as an obstacle for EC-Turkey relations.  Of course, this was not appreciated by the Turkish government as it saw that Greece was willing to isolate Turkey from Europe if it did not change its position on the outstanding issues that were problematic in Greek-Turkish relations.  Greece knew that it would be difficult to gain cooperation and results from Turkey immediately and therefore began to consider the implementation of blocking any kind of EC-Turkey relationship advancement if its demands were not met.

            Besides the EC tool, Greece wanted to really push the efforts for reaching a solution to the Cyprus problem.  In 1990, Cyprus submitted its own application for membership in the European Community and Greece wanted to instigate a new round of talks for a permanent solution to the island’s problem.  However, it also commented that the Cyprus problem should not become an obstacle in the island’s future accession to the EC, something which all subsequent Greek governments adopted as part of their foreign policy.  In the summer of 1990, a series of high level meetings between Greek and Turkish government officials began for the first time since the failure of the Davos Process.[22]  The officials discussed the possible resolutions for Cyprus and took into consideration reports released by the United Nations, the central player in the resolution of the Cyprus problem.  The Turkish government realized that it had to make some sort of effort in order to limit the amount of Greek opposition to its EC application.  However, the efforts were facing fierce opposition from the Turkish Cypriot community, vis-à-vis its President, Rauf Denktash, who was not willing to make any concessions but rather advocated the international recognition of an independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.[23]  Consequently, the talks moved with a very slow pace and with great difficulty.

            Greece was successful in pressuring Turkey to cooperate on the Cyprus problem by involving the United Nations and receiving positive support from the United States and many European countries. In early 1991, it tried to convince the European Community to play a more proactive role in pushing United Nations initiatives on the negotiating table.  In this perspective, Turkey would really be pressured to comply because of international pressure.  Furthermore, in 1991 Greece vetoed any further funding assistance by the European Community towards Turkey.  This was done to once again prove that the Greek government was serious about using the Cyprus problem as a stumbling block to Turkey’s EC aspirations.[24]  However, the Persian Gulf War in Iraq diverted Turkey’s attention from the Cyprus problem and the efforts slowed down in the subsequent months.

            After the end of the Persian Gulf War, Turkey emerged with a new sense of strength and self-perception.  This was seen as a negative sign for Greece as it was understood that Turkey would be less cooperative on bilateral issues and on the Cyprus problem.  This was confirmed by provocative statements, such as that of Turkish President Ozal, who claimed that the Dodecanese Islands, which are very close to the south-western Turkish mainland, should had never been conceded by Italy to Greece after World War II.[25]  This statement was played down by the Greek government, but it still proved the point that Turkish provocations would become a difficulty in reaching any sort of concessions in bilateral negotiations.  The bilateral negotiations and contacts over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea continental shelf continued throughout the summer of 1991.

            The climax of the bilateral dialogue that had been instigated by the Greek government in 1990 came in Paris in September of 1991.  Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis met with Turkish Prime Minister Yilmaz to discuss all outstanding Greek-Turkish issues.  The Greek government hoped that it would be able to reach a consensus on the items of disagreement.  A possible resolution on Cyprus could have cleared the way for Turkey’s EC application, at least in terms of the Greek veto.  Unfortunately, at the September meeting, Greece and Turkey were not able to make any ground on the disagreements which separated the two sides on the sensitive political issues, such as the Aegean Sea continental shelf.  Furthermore, previous signs of Turkish concessions towards the resolution of the Cyprus problem were not confirmed and thus the one year effort of solving the long-lasting issue separating the two communities on the island came to a halt.  Prime Minister Mitsotakis and the Greek government left Paris with disappointment over the results.  It seemed that another round of rapprochement and dialogue had come to an end with no advancement on the issues vital to Greece’s foreign policy.

            The year ended with no substantial progress on the Cyprus problem or any other Greek-Turkish issues.  Prime Minister Mitsotakis had reiterated after his meeting with Prime Minister Yilmaz that:

“Greece will under no circumstance change its policy and will block any Turkish attempt to join Europe as long as the Cyprus issue is still open.  This is a clear Greek position which the Turkish government knows very well.”[26]

It became clear after the Paris meeting that there would be great difficulty on reaching a solution for Cyprus.  That would in effect mean the enforcement of Greece’s policy to block any EC-Turkey relations. After the Paris meeting, Suleyman Demirel replaced Mesut Yilmaz as Prime Minister of Turkey.  After early contacts with the Greek government, a meeting was set up for the Greek and Turkish prime ministers to meet in Davos, Switzerland, at the World Economic Forum (the so called Davos II meeting).

            The meeting in Davos took place on February 1, 1992 in the midst of a year that brought many changes in Europe.  The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Balkan problems put much strain on international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Community tried to take some sort of common approach to the new situation in Europe.  Nevertheless, the Greek government was not ready to give up its efforts on the problematic issues with Turkey.  Despite once again receiving negative press from the leftist parties in Greece, Prime Minister Mitsotakis headed to Davos to make one last solid attempt to gain concessions from Turkey for all outstanding matters. 

The Greek Prime Minister outlined his goals prior to leaving for Switzerland and proclaimed that he would not back down on any of Greece’s demands.  Furthermore, he would keep the Cyprus problem related to the EC-Turkey relations as an incentive for Turkey to back down from its rigid stance on the problem.[27]  However, to large Greek disappointment, the Davos meeting did not yield any serious solutions nor did talks proceed beyond the agreement to respect of international treaties and agreements.  Turkish Prime Minister Demirel was not willing to further negotiations on Cyprus or any other matter and the talks ended with no surprising results.  By the end of February 1992, it seemed that the Greek government was giving up its hopes of reaching any solution on Greek-Turkish bilateral problems and the two year intense effort came to an end.  The Greek government had to turn its attention away from Turkey and to other domestic and international problems which became the prevalent issue at the time.[28]

1.3 The Western European Union (WEU) and the Casus Belli

            The Greek government was also involved in procedures to provide a more secure future for the country in the midst of the bilateral meetings with Turkey in 1991 and 1992.  The Western European Union (WEU) was created in 1954 (from the original idea of the 1948 Brussels Treaty) and had as members the six original members of the European Community plus the UK.  Its goal was to provide a common European defence but being itself a difficult concept, the WEU institution was often marginalized in the years after its creation.  Nevertheless, with the European Community’s initiative to continue integration and with the discussions in the new Maastricht Treaty for European defence, the WEU became an important issue for Europe once again.  Not willing to be excluded from the project, Greece applied for membership in February 1987.[29]  Considering that in 1987, a war had almost started with Turkey in the Aegean, Greece pushed its application with its European counterparts in the 1990s.  This move would bring Greece more involvement in European institutions, something which it believed it could use as leverage against Turkey in the bilateral problems.  Moreover, it was believed by Greek officials that membership would include the right to use Article V (5) of the Treaty of Brussels.  The article proclaimed that if a member of the WEU was attacked, then all other members should provide assistance to the member state which was attacked.[30]  Consequently, the Greek government believed that the treaty would secure Greece from any potential military attack by Turkey.  A possible accession of Greece to the WEU would signal further Turkish isolation in Europe and Greece believed that along with its EC membership it would convince Turkey to make more concessions on the negotiating table.

            At the discussions over the Maastricht Treaty of the European Community in 1991, it was decided that the Western European Union (WEU) would be absorbed by the European Community (and later the European Union).  The EC considered the fact that a possible Greek membership could mean that Greece could invoke Article V of the Treaty of Brussels.  As a result, the European Community decided to include a clause in the treaty which would not allow Article V to be invoked by members of the WEU against other WEU members or NATO members.[31]  Although Greece was admitted to the WEU, it lost much interest in the project since Article V limited the use of the Brussels Treaty as a security cushion against Turkey, Greece’s reason for wanting to become a WEU member.  The WEU was eventually absorbed by the European Union (the EC’s name after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty) and became part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  In later years, the descendent of the WEU, the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy), would return to haunt Greek-Turkish relations and tensions.

            The end of the Greek-Turkish bilateral dialogue in 1992 and the problem over the name issue with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) severely weakened the government of Konstantinos Mitsotakis in Greece.  The resignation of Foreign Minister Antonios Samaras and his departure from the New Democracy party along with other party members of parliament (MPs) led to early elections in Greece in October 1993.  The PASOK (socialists) won the election and Andreas Papandreou returned to the role of Prime Minister of Greece.  This signalled the end of the rapprochement attempts with Turkey and the slowing down of the dialogue.  Papandreou was known for his tougher stance towards Turkey compared to Mitsotakis.  Furthermore, in 1993 the European Union accepted Cyprus’ application for membership in the Union, something which angered both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots because the application had been submitted on behalf of the whole island by the Greek-Cypriot administration.  This event made negotiations on the resolution on the Cyprus problem and other outstanding issues very difficult.  Additionally, Greece continued to use its vetoes in the EC/EU for funding (i.e. the 4^th Financial Protocol) towards Turkey, which added further strains to the relations.

            With Papandreou back in leadership in Greece, the improvement of EU-Turkey relations seemed bleak.  Furthermore, Papandreou was willing to use the Greek veto in the European Council to block the EU-Turkey Customs Union agreement which was scheduled to come in effect in 1995.  In 1994, an act taken by Greece through the Greek Parliament instigated the return to tense relations with Turkey.  This time, the disagreement came in the extension of the territorial water limits in the Aegean Sea, interrelated to the Aegean Sea continental shelf dispute.  The original United Nations Law of the Sea provided countries with an extension of territorial seas of up to six nautical miles.  However, in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, the limit was set up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline of a state’s territory.[32]  The Convention cleared the way for Greece to extend its territorial waters from six to twelve nautical miles, something which was not approved by Turkey because in effect, it would mean that Greece would control most of the shipping traffic in the Aegean Sea and would make it more difficult for Turkish ships to navigate freely.  Consequently, Turkey did not sign the Convention Law in 1982, but Greece did.

            By 1994, Greece had not proceeded to the extension of the territorial waters in the Aegean Sea despite having the option to do so under the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.  However, in an attempt to protect Greek interests and security in the Aegean Sea for the thousands of Greek islands, the government pushed for ratification of the Convention in the Greek Parliament.  This would clear the way for the government to extend the nation’s territorial waters when it wished to do so.  On June 1, 1994, the Greek Parliament ratified the Convention despite previous statements by Turkey towards Greece to not proceed with this measure.  In a response to the ratification by the Greek Parliament, the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted a resolution which allowed the Turkish government to take all steps necessary, including military action, in order to protect Turkish interests in the Aegean Sea.[33]  This was termed as the casus belli for Turkey, as any move by Greece in effectively extending its territorial waters in the Aegean Sea could be used as justification by Turkey for a military response.  The casus belli added a lot of new tension to Greek-Turkish relations and gave further reasons for the Greek government to block the furthering of EU-Turkey relations.  In its perspective, Greece believed that Turkey’s casus belli proved that EU-Turkey relations could not be improved since Turkey was returning to a period of threats rather than negotiation on the bilateral problems that the two countries shared.

1.4 The EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement

            After the events of the summer of 1994, a new tense situation was evident between Greece and Turkey which strained bilateral relations and consequently meant further isolationism for Turkey from its EU aspirations.  In 1993 and 1994, Greece had vetoed the progress of reaching an agreement on the EU-Turkey Customs Union in retaliation to Turkey’s inability to negotiate on Cyprus and the other bilateral problems with Greece.  However, in 1994/1995, the European Union was preparing for a new round of enlargement, this time adding Austria, Sweden and Finland as new members of the Union.  The Greek government, knowing that the EU had already accepted Cyprus’ application for membership, wanted to secure a date for the beginning of accession negotiations for the island.  Since no solution had been reached over the Cyprus problem, Greece saw this move as necessary to bring Cyprus closer to the EU.  This move further angered Turkey, who found it unacceptable for the EU to consider negotiating with Cyprus without prior reaching a permanent resolution over the island’s problem.  Therefore in 1995, Greece had two goals in its foreign policy.  The first was to proceed with Cyprus’ application for EU membership and the second was to block the EU-Customs Union from coming in effect in 1995/1996.

            As negotiations continued between the European Union and Turkey over the contents of the Customs Union, Greece continued to block its advancement in the European Council using its national veto.  Concurrently, Greece pushed the idea of proceeding with a date for accession negotiations for Cyprus with its counterparts in the European Council.  However, the heads of state of several countries did not view this as positive development because they did not want to negotiate EU membership terms without first resolving the problem in Cyprus.  Difficult negotiations took place in the European Council meetings and in other EU-Greece official meetings over removing the blocking point in the EU-Turkey Customs Union.  Finally, on March 6, 1995, Greece decided to lift its veto towards the EU-Turkey Customs Union agreement.[34]  The Greek government took this decision in exchange for agreement on one of its major foreign policy goals.  The European Union (Council and Commission) agreed that in exchange for the removal of the Greek veto on the Customs Union, accession negotiations between the EU and Cyprus would begin in March 1998.[35]  This mutual exchange between Greece and the EU secured the Greek government’s goal to have Cyprus included in the next round of enlargement accession negotiations.

            The Greek government felt that the lifting of its veto on the EU-Turkey Customs Union agreement would improve the strained relations with Turkey after the events of 1994.  Additionally, the Greek government believed that Turkey would view the lifting of its veto as an act of goodwill and perhaps would reciprocate this decision by returning to the negotiating table to discuss bilateral issues.  Perhaps this view was too optimistic because Turkey did not appreciate the exchange Greece had made to begin Cyprus’ EU accession negotiations (EU would negotiate with the Greek-Cypriot administration only).  Nevertheless, Greek officials believed that better days were about come in its relations with Turkey because the Customs Union agreement would be warmly welcomed in Turkey and would divert attention from further raising tensions in the Aegean Sea.

Conclusion

            Greece’s position on Turkey’s future in the European Community (European Union) in the late 1980s and early 1990s was based on the idea that the process of Turkey’s accession was a matter that would be discussed at a later time, beyond the year 2000.  Therefore, although Greece officially said that it did not want to block Turkey’s European aspirations, it used its EC membership to pressure Turkey into reaching agreements over Cyprus and the other bilateral problems.  From 1987 to 1995, Greece used all the possible vetoes it had in the European Council to block funding and assistance to Turkey and until 1995, to block Turkey’s EU Customs Union.  The Greek government’s belief that by using its veto as an incentive for agreement on Cyprus ultimately failed because by 1995, very little solid progress had been made on resolving the thirty year old problem. 

Additionally, the two periods of rapprochement or détente, in 1988-1989 and 1990-1992 were short lived and did not help change Greece’s position toward the Turkey/Europe relationship because both periods were instigated by personal figures and did not receive much public support in either Turkey or Greece.  Finally, the attempts by Greece to provide more security for itself against Turkey, firstly through the Western European Union and secondly by the extension of the territorial waters in the Aegean, only resulted in more tension-building with its neighbour.  By the end of 1995, arguments were once again being raised over the issues in the Aegean Sea, putting an end in the Greek government’s hope that the Customs Union would improve Greek-Turkish relations.  A new period of crisis was about to dawn which would prove to Greek politicians that the position which Greece had adopted towards Turkey’s EU future was perhaps not as effective as they had thought.

Chapter 2.

Period of Crisis 1996 – 1999

Introduction

            Greece expected its relations with Turkey to improve after the lifting of its veto in the EU-Turkey Customs Union.  Furthermore, the retirement of Andreas Papandreou from the position of Prime Minister in Greece in 1996 complemented the spirit of change for the ailing Greek-Turkish relations.  The new prime minister and president of PASOK, Kostas Simitis, promised to introduce a new approach to Greece’s foreign policy towards Turkey.  A reforming socialist, Simitis decided to drop much of Papandreou’s hard-line socialist ideas, including those towards Turkey.  He presented his ideas for the “Europeanization” of many of Greece’s policies, including foreign policy and economics.  However, the new socialist government of Prime Minister Simitis was tested early on in its relations with Turkey by the crisis over the Imia (Kardak) islets in 1996 and later on with the Cyprus missile problem and the Öcalan Affair.  It seemed as though the three year period of crisis had provided overwhelming reasons for Greece to continue its policy of blocking the advancement of EU-Turkey relations. By February 1999, Greek-Turkish relations had reached a decade long low point and the situation seemed dismal for Turkey’s EU application.   

2.1  1996 Imia (Kardak) Crisis

On January 18, 1996 socialist (PASOK) Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou resigned from his position as a result of ailing health problems.  Kostas Simitis was then appointed prime minister after PASOK held internal party elections and he took office on January 22, 1996.  Simitis was generally considered to be a more modern socialist than his predecessor and had a political agenda that included the “Europeanization”[36] of Greece’s foreign policy which would meet the standards of the European Union.  His eventual success in realizing his vision for rapprochement with Turkey has been characterized as the “great realignment” of Greece’s relations with Turkey.[37]  However, when Simitis took over in 1996 he was immediately faced with one of the most challenging events of the 1990s in the country’s relations with Turkey.  The events that took place in January of 1996 served as a stumbling block for the rapprochement ideas and nearly led to war with Turkey.  It seemed as if these events would only strengthen the arguments of those who opposed Turkey’s recognition as a candidate state for EU accession.

            The Imia Crisis took place despite a show of goodwill by Greece towards Turkey in the previous months.  In March 1995, Greece lifted its veto towards the customs union between Turkey and the European Union in exchange for the start of accession negotiations for Cyprus.  Contrary to the Greek government’s expectations, Turkey did not appreciate the exchange which Greece had made to clear the way for the EU-Turkey Customs Union. Turkey, under the leadership of Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, began to dispute the Greek government’s willingness to expand its territorial waters in the Aegean Sea islands.  In December 1995 and leading to January 1996, Turkey officially disputed the sovereignty of the Imia (Kardak) islets off the coast of Turkey, (see maps of the area in Appendix 1) claiming that they did not belong to Greece but were “grey areas” in the Aegean Sea[38].  It was the first time that Turkey questioned the sovereignty of islets in the Dodecanese islands because as it claimed, previous agreements were not ratified by the Turkish National Assembly and was “not registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations”[39].  This statement eventually led Turkish Prime Minister Çiller and Foreign Affairs Minister Gonensay to claim that between 1.000 and 3.000 islets and rocks in the Aegean could not be recognized as being Greek and therefore could also be characterized as “grey areas”.

            On January 28, 1996, six days into the Simitis premiership, the Imia (Kardak) Crisis reached its peak.  After the mayor of nearby Kalymnos island raised a Greek flag on one of the Imia islets, Turkish journalists responded by removing it and raising a Turkish flag in its place.  The Greeks responded by hoisting the Greek flag again and thus marked the beginning of an escalated crisis.  Turkish and Greek naval forces were immediately sent to the area and the scenes which were viewed on television both in Greece and Turkey aroused support for a military confrontation between the two countries.  Simitis was not in favour of further provoking the Turks and decided to move towards a de-escalation of the crisis.  At the same time the United States stepped in and convinced both sides to withdraw all military forces from the area.  The US wanted to avoid a military confrontation between two NATO members at all costs.  On January 31, 1996, Greece and Turkey agreed to remove all military personnel from the area and refrain from any military action. Thus a potential disaster to Greek-Turkish relations was avoided.

            The European Union also denounced the events in Imia through a text adopted in the European Parliament.  On February 15, 1999 the parliament adopted a text by majority, warning Turkey to abstain from similar incidents against Greece, a member of the EU.  The text reiterated that the Imia islets are part of Greece and therefore part of the European Union’s external borders.  The text also mentioned that the parliament was “gravely concerned” by Turkey’s violation and infringement upon Greece’s sovereignty[40].  The acknowledgement by the European Parliament of the events that took place in Imia and the statement that the islets belonged to Greece put more pressure on Turkey and also portrayed Greece’s influence within the EU, something which Turkey was worried about in the path towards the Luxembourg Summit.  The Greek government had once again succeeded in involving an institution of the European Union in its relations with Turkey.

            Following the Imia Crisis both Greek and Turkish governments decided to refrain from similar actions which nearly led to a full scale confrontation in the Aegean.  The Greek government asserted that any territorial claims should be brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  The Turkish government at first did not respond, but on June 9, 1996 Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz (who replaced Çiller after the Imia crisis) agreed that all “grey areas” should be brought forth to the ICJ[41].  Although the Greek government supported the resolution of bilateral problems through the ICJ, it did not agree with the “grey areas” because they questioned the sovereignty of Greek islands and islets in the Aegean Sea. 

            It was clearly evident in late 1996 and early 1997 that the Imia Crisis would affect Turkey’s path towards the European Union.  The 1995 Customs Union agreement served as a precedent for the improvement of relations between Greece and Turkey.  However, by March 1996, it was widely accepted that the political confrontation over Imia could have negative effects on the upcoming European Councils which would consider the fate of Turkey’s application for membership in the European Union.  The government of Kostas Simitis reasserted its position that it was “the Greek wish for Turkey to be a part of European integration rather than excluded from it”.[42]  Consequently, it was clear to see that the Greek government did not want its vision for rapprochement with Turkey to be hampered by confrontations and verbal arguments with Turkey, such as the Imia Crisis.  The rest of 1996 ensued with few developments but with the tensions still high from the events which marked the early months of 1996.

2.2  The Cyprus Missile Problem, the Madrid Declaration and the 1997 Luxembourg Summit

2.2.1 The Cyprus Missile Crisis

            The Cyprus Missile Crisis, which became the new problem in Greek-Turkish relations in 1997, played an important role in the decisions taken by the Greek government in the path towards the Luxembourg European Council Summit of December 1997.  Despite experiencing a period of relative calmness after the events of Imia in 1996, the Greek and Turkish governments restarted their bickering, this time over the important island of Cyprus.  This new crisis followed the Imia crisis after a relatively short period of time and increased the tensions between Greece and Turkey.  The Greek government’s wish to eventually restart rapprochement efforts with its neighbour were made more difficult with the new situation.  Additionally, the crisis further discredited Turkey in many member states of the European Union, who did not approve of Turkey’s disagreements with Greece.

            Fears of airspace defence superiority by Turkey over Cyprus led the government of the Republic of Cyprus (the Greek-Cypriot administration) to pursue more effective ways of securing the island’s security.  In January 1997, the Cypriot government signed a deal with a Russian firm for the order of S-300PMU-1 missiles to be installed within the area controlled by the Greek Cypriots.  The order of the missiles also received backing from the Greek government, which was weary of Turkish threats and wanted to provide more security for Cyprus as it prepared to join the European Union.[43]  Immediately upon the announcement of the missile order, the Turkish government, through President Demirel and Prime Minister Erbakan began a verbal counteroffensive emphasizing the point that such actions would destabilize the security of the region and only stir a military response by Turkey.  Initially, the Greek Ministry of Defence replied with its own warning over Turkish military threats.  However, Prime Minister Simitis intervened in the days that followed, once again emphasizing the need for a calm approach in the relations with Turkey.[44] Nevertheless, the statements added further tensions in Greek-Turkish relations, emphasizing the disagreements over Cyprus and other sensitive bilateral issues.

            In the months that followed, the Cypriot government continued to claim that it would go ahead with the installation of the S-300 missiles in Cyprus.  The Russian government confirmed the order and the reports that they would be installed in Cyprus.  Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots called out for the help of Turkey because they feared that this would cause major instability in the island.  The UN and the United States tried to mediate between the four sides in order to avoid the installation of the missiles but all talks consequently failed.  Despite verbal warnings by the US and the UK, the Turkish government did not back down from its tough stance on the matter.[45] On the contrary, it continued its policy without carefully considering the repercussions it could have on its EU-membership application

            By September 1997, three months before the Luxembourg Summit, provocations and threats between Greece and Turkey had reached their peak.  Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash dismissed all talks with the Greek Cypriot government and even suggested war if the EU allowed Cyprus to become a full member.  The Greek government, seeking to avoid more provocations in the path towards the Luxembourg Summit, decided not to let such statements bear much effect on its policy.  By that time, Greece was seeking to once again stabilize its relations with Turkey and prove that it supported its neighbour’s path towards European integration.  For a moment, the Cyprus missile problem was put off to the side, while Greece and Turkey turned their attention towards the European Council Summit.

            The Luxembourg Summit unfortunately played a negative effect on the Cyprus Missile Crisis.  The EU’s decision not to include Turkey on the list of candidate countries and to proceed with Cyprus’ application had a substantial toll on the missile problem.[46]  In January 1998, Cyprus and Russia re-emphasized that the order and installation of the missiles would go on as scheduled.  In the months that followed, third countries, such the US, Italy, the UK and others tried to start a dialogue between Greece, Turkey, the Turkish-Cypriots and the Greek-Cypriots in order to avert the increasing pressure that was building in Cyprus.  These attempts ultimately failed and the threats over a military conflict continued to be hinted by the foreign ministers of both Greece and Turkey. 

            Finally in December 1998, the government of the Republic of Cyprus announced that its order for the Russian S-300PMU-1 missiles would be installed on the island of Crete in order to avoid any more problems in the region.  This came as a result of the overwhelming importance put by Turkey on the effect that the installation of the missiles would have on Greek-Turkish and Greek-Cypriot-Turkish relations.  The Greek-Cypriot administration realized that Turkey was serious about its war threats and its statement that it would possibly go ahead with the annexation of northern Cyprus (controlled by the Turkish Cypriots).[47]  Greece supported the decisions of the Greek-Cypriot government, adopting the view that a de-escalation of the tension could provide a basis for the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations.  However, the Greek government was worried by Turkey’s opposition to Cyprus’ possible EU accession and the Turkish government’s ideas to further integrate the Turkish-Cypriot controlled area to the mainland Turkish Republic.

2.2.2 The NATO Summit & 1997 Luxembourg European Council Summit

Despite the ongoing Cyprus missile problem, Greece and Turkey did make some attempts to solve bilateral issues in 1997, thanks to the help offered by third parties who wanted to aid in the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations. Furthermore, the year also witnessed the attempt by the Greek government to introduce a policy which would show more visible support for Turkey’s EU application.  Although the Imia crisis of the previous year had made that very difficult, it was Greek Prime Minister Simitis’ goal to alter Greece’s position towards Turkey’s EU prospects by adopting a more flexible approach than his predecessor, Andreas Papandreou. 

In January 1997, the Netherlands took over the rotating presidency of the European Union.  In agreement with the United States, who had intervened in the Imia Crisis the year before, the Dutch EU Presidency proposed the formation of a “committee of experts” to study the problems which thwarted Greek-Turkish relations and to draft possible solutions for these problems[48].  This was an idea agreed upon by all EU members in order to provide a spirit of cooperation among Greece and Turkey but also to show the importance of easing Greek-Turkish tensions before the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997.  Although Greek Prime Minister Simitis fully supported the idea of involving third parties in its relations with Turkey, his foreign minister, Theodoros Pangalos did no give his full approval and questioned the involvement of the US and NATO.

            Besides the European Union, other international players also tried to soothe the ailing Greek-Turkish relations.  Following the EU’s proposal to solve bilateral problems between Greece and Turkey, the United States decided to also take a more proactive role in the issue.  The United States was also acting in its own interest because it has always been a proponent of Turkish membership in the European Union.  It therefore wanted to see a resolution of Greek-Turkish issues, which at the time stood as an obstacle in the advancement of Turkey’s application to the EU.  Consequently, US President Bill Clinton assigned the task to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.  She would mediate talks between Greek Prime Minister Simitis and Turkish President Demirel at the NATO Madrid Summit in July 1997[49].  The talks were hailed a success as more signs of a return to dialogue between the two sides appeared to emerge after the end of the NATO Summit.  Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos suggested that the Imia problem as well as other territorial shelf questions by Turkey should be resolved in the International Court of Justice.[50]  Turkey did not fully agree with this suggestion, but rather hinted towards more of a dialogue between the two countries in order to solve outstanding issues.

            The results of the NATO Madrid Summit were positive for both Greece and Turkey in the period after the Imia crisis.  The Greek government wanted begin to shift its policy towards providing a more supportive stance on Turkey’s EU prospects and Turkey was willing to ease tensions with Greece in order to repair its tainted image in the EU which resulted after the Imia crisis.  However, both governments’ goals were difficult at a time when the Cyprus missile problem was emerging as a new crisis in Greek-Turkish relations.  Nevertheless, Greece and Turkey agreed in Madrid in 1997 to abstain from using military action against each other and to respect the national rights of both nations.  Furthermore, both governments agreed to increase the involvement of NATO’s role in improving bilateral relations, since both countries are members of the alliance, and tensions between them hurt not only themselves but also the strength of the alliance in its southern periphery.  All of these points were included in the Madrid Declaration of 1997, which also was meant to establish a “hot line”, a direct line between the prime ministers of both countries, which would in effect prevent the possibility of a military conflict.[51]  The declaration seemed similar to previous agreements which had not been implemented.  However, it was believed that this declaration would be more substantial with Turkey’s wish to join the EU and Greece’s willingness to ease tension

            Turkey was determined to be recognized as an EU candidate state by December 1997.  It knew that in order to achieve this, it had to rely on the removal of Greece’s veto in the European Council and the goodwill of the Greek prime minister and minister of foreign affairs.  However, there was a new escalating crisis that was developing in Cyprus over the delivery of Russian S-300PMU-1 missiles to the Greek Cypriot government.  The events that occurred in Cyprus in 1997 reaffirmed the problems between Greece and Turkey and served as a negative stigma on the upcoming Luxembourg Summit.  Nevertheless, Prime Minister Simitis declared that he was determined that the crisis in Cyprus would not alter Greece’s position to aid Turkey move along the path towards European integration.

            One major problem that occurred in the weeks leading up to the Luxembourg Summit was that of a formulating idea of the Luxembourg Presidency of the EU, the European Conference.  This conference would occur sometime in the months following the Luxembourg Summit and would include the EU’s 15 members, the 10 candidate states and Turkey.  The Greek government remained uncertain about this idea from the onset.  Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos declared that in order for Turkey to participate in the European Conference, it should, like all other participating countries, adopt the principles of democracy, respect human rights, and show clear progress in the attempt to resolve regional problems (i.e. with Greece through the International Court of Justice).[52]  The statement by Greece’s foreign minister hinted the position which the Greek government would adopt at the Luxembourg European Council Summit.  Greece believed that Turkey should eventually become a member of the EU, but first it would have to fulfil the criteria and respect the rights of the members (i.e. Greece).

            The Greek government knew well that it had to approach the Luxembourg Summit with very careful steps and decisions in order not to further aggravate its relations with Turkey.  On one hand, it had to demonstrate that it clearly believed in Turkey’s prospects within the European Union in the future.  On the other hand, it had to keep a strong stance on resolving outstanding issues with Turkey in Cyprus and the Aegean in compliance with its national interests[53].  By bringing up the issue of human rights and the principles of democracy, Greece was able to get the support of other EU member states in declaring that Turkey could not be optimally “ready” to be a candidate until it fulfilled certain criteria (i.e. the Copenhagen Criteria).  Furthermore, Greece and the EU made it clear that religion would not play a factor in deciding the candidacy status of Turkey.  The EU Presidency, following Greece’s proposal, declared that it was not a “Christian Club” and religion did not and should not play a mitigating factor in considering a country’s candidacy, such as Turkey (overwhelmingly Muslim state).[54]  Both Greek Prime Minister Simitis and Foreign Minister Pangalos understood they had to take a position that would not portray Greece as the stumbling block to Turkey’s EU application.

            The Luxembourg European Council Summit took place in December 12-13, 1997.  The European Council was preoccupied with the enlargement process and the opening up of accession negotiations with the remaining candidate states.  Turkey attended the summit hoping to earn the much sought after candidate state status.  Cyprus was also present at the summit, expecting to be officially informed of the date for the commencement of its accession negotiations with the EU.  After tense meetings and discussions over the issue of the Turkish application, the EU leaders decided to postpone the approval of Turkey as an EU candidate state.  The result was agreed upon by most EU member states and was not the result of a sole Greek veto like in previous cases of blocking EU-Turkey relations.

  The end of the European Council Summit of December 1997 confirmed Turkey’s exclusion from the next round of enlargement and its failure to gain candidate member status.  The European Union “confirmed Turkey’s eligibility for accession to the European Union”.[55]  However, the EU also decided that Turkey was not ready to become a candidate country because it did not fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria, such as full application of the principles of democracy and the respect of human rights.  Furthermore, the European Union was not satisfied by Turkey’s political and economic reforms, but did however invite Turkey to the European Conference, despite Greece’s initial disapproval.[56] This meant that the EU could not consider Turkey as a candidate until it felt that substantial progress had been made on those issues. 

The Greek delegation left the Luxembourg European Council Summit fairly satisfied with the results.  It welcomed the EU’s decision to formally open accession negotiations with Cyprus, something which Greece had pushed for in the previous year in order to provide a secure future for the island.[57]  Furthermore, the Greek government felt satisfied with the position it took towards Turkey’s EU application.  That is the idea that it would fully support Turkey’s accession once it could fulfil the criteria and take a more proactive approach to solving bilateral issues with Greece.  The denial of Turkey’s recognition as a candidate state left the Turkish government with a sense of bitterness and eager to restart its “threats and ultimatums” towards Greece.[58]  The Turkish government blamed Greece for not fully supporting its candidacy and for pushing for the accession of Cyprus to the EU in order to diplomatically overpower Turkey.  Consequently, the Turkish government decided to boycott the European Conference of the EU member and candidate states plus Turkey and to threaten to annex northern Cyprus to the Turkish mainland if the EU continued the process of Cyprus’ accession to the Union.[59]  The result was problematic for EU-Turkey relations and the Turkish government pondered whether it was still beneficial to pursue EU membership.

            Greek-Turkish relations suffered in the aftermath of the Luxembourg Summit through the missile crisis in Cyprus.  Despite the threats and arguments over the crisis in Cyprus, the socialist Greek government was still open to dialogue with its Turkish counterparts.  In 1998, Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem attempted to open up a new series of dialogue through cooperation with his Greek counterpart, Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos.  Both men knew well that this would be a good attempt in the eyes of the EU counterparts, especially after the Turkish disappointment over the outcome of the Luxembourg Summit.  As previously mentioned, the Greek government favoured settling all territorial claims and arguments with Turkey at the International Court of Justice.  On the contrary, the Turkish government favoured a bilateral dialogue to settle outstanding issues because it did not recognize the full jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over the Aegean Sea issues.  Turkish Foreign Minister Cem therefore came up with a series of proposals to solve bilateral problems with Greece.  As Ekavi Athanassopoulou suggests, this was perhaps because in times of crisis, countries are encouraged to solve issues to prevent the intensification of problems.[60]

            The proposals of Foreign Minister Cem were sent to Athens on February 12, 1998 with hopes that the Greek government would agree to work on these ideas.  The proposal’s major point called for Greece and Turkey to officially adopt and implement the Madrid Declaration which was agreed by Greece, Turkey and the United States.  The adoption of this declaration would prevent any possible war between the two countries and also serve as the ground for improving the strained relations between the two countries after the Imia and Cyprus missile crises.  The Cem proposals also included the idea of forming a group of “wise men” composed of politicians, administrators, professors and experts in the field of Greek-Turkish relations to study ways of improving the relations between the two countries and also to suggest ways to solve the problems in the Aegean Sea region.[61]  Furthermore, Cem also proposed better collaboration with NATO in resolving issues, especially since both Greece and Turkey are NATO members. 

            Foreign Minister Cem’s proposals were well thought out but drew little attention both in Greece and Turkey.  Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos insisted that all issues in the Aegean should be resolved in the International Court of Justice and not through dialogue.  Pangalos pointed out that the Greek government would not change its stance on this matter and that dialogue could not solve the Turkish claim areas in the Aegean Sea, such as the Imia islets.  The refusal for dialogue by the Greek government ended the Cem proposals.  Moreover, the proposals were mostly ignored by Turkish Prime Minister Yilmaz and later on Prime Minister Ecevit who spent most of their attention on the crisis over the Russian missiles in Cyprus.  Consequently, the Cem proposals were put back in the drawer a few months after they were composed.  They would only resurface in 1999, when the two governments appeared more prepared to discuss the problems which caused the crises of the mid to late 1990s.

            The months that led up to and followed the Luxembourg Summit can be considered to be transitional periods in Greece’s position towards Turkey’s EU application.  Unlike previous years, Greece did not use its veto power to block the advancement of EU-Turkey relations.  On the contrary, at the Luxembourg Summit, a majority of EU members agreed to not give Turkey candidate status.  It was therefore not Greece holding up the improvement of Turkey’s involvement with the EU, but rather Turkey’s inability to fulfil the criteria set out for all candidate countries.  The Luxembourg Summit took place in the midst of the Cyprus missile problem and only a short period of time after the Imia crisis.  The Greek government could not make any radical changes to its position because of the situation in its relations with Turkey and because such a move would not have been accepted by PASOK party members or by the Greek public at the time.

            Greek Prime Minister Simitis wanted to provide a setting which would provide initiatives for Greek-Turkish dialogue.  That was his reasoning behind engaging the Greek government delegation to support Turkey’s aspiration towards the European Union.  However, Turkey’s disapproval of the Luxembourg Summit’s decisions did not provide any room for dialogue between Greece and Turkey.  The two governments’ attention returned to the crisis in Cyprus which escalated in the months that followed.  Turkey continued to blame Greece for thwarting its European progress and the period of crisis continued in the months that followed the 1997 Summit.  As such, it was premature to talk of an attempt to alter Greece’s policy towards Turkey’s EU application.  The crisis left little manoeuvring for the Greek government in its policy towards Turkey and ended Prime Minister Simitis’ goal to lower military expenditures, since the crisis with Turkey demanded more funding for national security purposes.

2.3 The Final Crisis: The Öcalan Affair

A few months after the end of the Cyprus Missile Crisis, Greece and Turkey became embroiled in a new dispute, this time over PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.  PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) was lead by Öcalan who fought against the Turkish government with violence and terrorist acts in order to get more rights and possibly independence for the Kurdish population in Turkey.  The war between the PKK and Turkey had lasted for many years and Öcalan was one of the most sought after men by the Turkish government who was eager to arrest him.  In January 1999, the press reported that Öcalan was being protected by the Greek government and that he had even spent time in Greece, hiding from Turkish authorities.  This of course resulted in enraging the Turkish government and thus providing the basis for a new diplomatic conflict between Greece and Turkey, a negative start for the year of the Helsinki European Council Summit.

            Abdullah Öcalan fled Turkey in 1998 to avoid arrest by Turkish authorities.  His trip’s aim was to find a country where he could claim asylum and find protection from the Turkish government.  After failing to find such a place in Italy and Russia, Öcalan went to Greece, with the help of individuals involved in Greek politics and business.  With the help of his Greek friends, Öcalan was flown to the Greek island of Corfu.  The Greek government was not officially aware of this event; however conflicting claims say that government officials were secretly aware of Öcalan’s whereabouts.  When Prime Minister Simitis and Foreign Minister Pangalos were informed, they immediately sought to keep Öcalan’s whereabouts a secret and find a country which would give the Kurdish leader asylum.  Both men knew that a leak in the press would cause a major crisis with Turkey who was searching for Ocalan.

            When the government was informed of Öcalan’s presence in Corfu, Prime Minister Simitis assigned Foreign Minister Pangalos with the responsibility of finding a solution to the problem.  After consulting with Öcalan, it was decided that the Greek government would provide a safe have for Öcalan at the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya until a solution could be found.[62]  When the Turkish authorities learned about Öcalan’s whereabouts, they set out to have the PKK leader arrested in Kenya.  On February 15, 1999, Abdullah Öcalan was arrested on his way to the Nairobi airport in a car which had been arranged to take him to the airport in order to flee to another country.  The Turkish authorities then flew Öcalan to Turkey where he would go under trial for his terrorist acts against the Turkish state.

            In the following days, the press reported of the events which took place in Greece regarding Öcalan.  The Turkish government was enraged with Greece’s stance on the matter.  As Ziya Onis mentions, Greece’s actions with Öcalan were “interpreted as a sign of direct interference by Greece in Turkey’s domestic politics”.[63]  Turkish government officials blamed Greece of supporting terrorism through the harbouring of the PKK leader and providing support for PKK operatives, something which Turkey had blamed Greece for in the past as well.  The Greek government claimed that it had not known that Öcalan was coming to Greece and that when it was informed, it tried to deal with the situation in such a way as to not provide reasons for a new crisis with Turkey.  The decision proved wrong and the crisis over PKK leader Öcalan proved to be the finishing touch on the three year period of crisis which had begun in 1996 over the Imia islets. 

            The Öcalan affair aroused political sentiments in both Greece and Europe.  The international press commented Greece’s role in attempting to find asylum for wanted terrorists like Öcalan while in Greece, political parties and the public commented on the government’s role and its failure to improve relations with Turkey since taking over in 1996.  Foreign Minister Pangalos explained his decisions in the Greek Parliament, defending his decision to attempt to find a country which would grant asylum to Öcalan.[64]  The opposition parties, led by New Democracy President, Konstantinos Karamanlis, and Synaspismos President, Nikos Konstantopoulos, condemned the Greek government’s inability to respond more positively to the situation it found itself in.  Furthermore, both leaders blamed Prime Minister Simitis and Foreign Minister Pangalos for not considering the repercussions of their actions on Greek-Turkish relations and on Greece’s image in the European Union.[65]  Other politicians connected the events of the Öcalan affair with Turkey’s EU future and the distrust which had been built between Greece and Turkey.

            The result of the Ocalan affair was the further deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations just 10 months before the Helsinki Summit.  The relations had already been tested by the Cyprus Missile Crisis and the results of the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, which initially caused Turkey to isolate itself from Europe and blame Greece for the failure of the EU’s acceptance of Turkey as a candidate country.  Furthermore, Greece’s image in Europe and the world suffered a decisive blow because of the involvement of politicians in the Öcalan affair.  Foreign Minister Pangalos resigned because of the role he played in the affair and his inability to stabilize relations with Turkey.  In his place, Prime Minister Simitis chose George Papandreou.  Papandreou was the son of Greece’s former Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, and was considered to be a more moderate politician who would seek a better approach towards rapprochement with Turkey.  The good relations between Simitis and Papandreou would, in Simitis’ vision, provide a team for revamping the image of Greece in world politics and especially in the European Union[66].  Consequently, the Öcalan affair brought about changes in the Greek government and the urgency to seek solutions for coming out of the crisis with Turkey.

Conclusion

            The Öcalan Affair ended a three year period of deteriorating relations between Greece and Turkey.  During that time, some efforts for stability and the improvement of bilateral relations were made.  However, the Greek government’s stance of improving relations with Turkey and advocating its neighbour’s place within the EU was tested by the Imia Crisis, the Cyprus Missile Crisis and the Öcalan Affair.  These events played their role in influencing Greece’s position on Turkey’s EU prospects, each in its own way.  The Imia Crisis and the Cyprus Missile Crisis postponed Prime Minister Simitis’ vision for rapprochement with Turkey and arms reduction because they proved the need for more security for Greece and they clearly displayed the instability in Greek-Turkish relations which did not provide an ample setting for a friendly bilateral dialogue on outstanding issues.

            Greece’s policy towards Turkey’s EU application can at best be described as transitional during the period of crisis.  While Prime Minister did drop much of the hard-line ideas of his predecessor, he was not able to implement his policy of engaging Turkey in rapprochement efforts.  Neither was he able to truly shift Greece’s position in the European Council Summits.  The only success came in ending the period of serving as Turkey’s only stumbling block in its EU aspirations. The blocking of Turkey’s EU application in 1997 came as a result of agreement of the majority of EU member states and not of Greece’s veto.  Despite this fact and Greece’s proclamation that it wanted to support Turkey’s European path once it fulfilled the EU criteria, did not stop Turkey from blaming Greece for its failure in gaining EU candidate status.

            By February 1999, the situation was grave and dismal for Greece and Turkey.  It seemed difficult at the time that any shift in Greece’s policy towards the EU-Turkey relations could come anytime in the near future, after the elongated period of crisis with Turkey.  However, as Greek politicians realized, the only way out of the deadlock was through a shift in the policy towards Turkey.  Any party in power in Greece would have realized that maintaining the current policy of tension and disagreement with Turkey rather than active engagement in dialogue and rapprochement would have been disastrous.  The Öcalan Affair brought internal changes in the Greek government and started a period of alternative approaches to Greek-Turkish and EU-Turkey relations.

Chapter 3.

From Crisis to Rapprochement: The Helsinki Summit 1999

Introduction

            The Imia Crisis, the Cyprus Missile Crisis and the Öcalan Affair were the events which strained Greek-Turkish relations in a three year period of crisis.  By the end of February 1999, the relations between the two neighbours had reached a new low point and Turkey’s vision of obtaining Greece’s support in the Helsinki European Council seemed very unlikely.  Nevertheless, the decision by leaders in both countries to restart the path of rapprochement seemed logical as there was no other road to follow in order to bring stability back to the region.  The rapprochement which began to re-emerge in the spring of 1999 was strengthened by two unfortunate events: the earthquakes of Turkey and Greece in August and September 1999.  The compassion and help which both countries contributed to one another strengthened the spirit of rapprochement and prepared the important shift in Greece’s