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The Indian and Pakistani Diaspora in the U.S.:
Interest Groups, American Politics and Policy Process

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Introduction

The United States has always been a nation of immigrants where people from every region of the world have come to begin a new life.

Who are these immigrants? Why did they decide to come? How well have they adjusted to this new land? What has been the general reaction to these immigrants? Numerous studies about earlier waves of immigrants, i.e. the Irish, Germans, Jews, Italians and Poles have assiduously been published, but relatively little has been written about those arriving since the passage of the 1965-Immigration Act.¹

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the Asian Indian² and Pakistani American community has asserted itself over the last 50 years and how the coming of age of both diaspora communities has contributed to its infiltration in mainstream American politics. Moreover, to what extent have these diaspora communities been able to steer and guide U.S. foreign policy as to favor India or Pakistan? Do Indian and Pakistani Americans play a role in improving respectively India-U.S. or Pakistan-U.S. relations? Have these minority groups been able to 'capture' foreign policy, i.e. control policy toward a foreign nation such that the result is variance with the policy preferences of the majority of the Americans?

As we advance into the 21st century more people will be on the move. Already, the result is a world where the demographic and political maps diverge. Only a small minority of the world's states conforms to the nationalist ideal of a nation state - one culture one state. Most states are multi-cultural, home to diasporic communities, some of which have been long established, while others are much more recent. How are governments to react to this phenomenon, which although not new in itself, has gained much greater visibility since the end of the Cold War and in the context of globalization? Countries have benefited from continuing links with the diasporic communities that their emigrants established in a new

¹ Leonard, K.I., 1997

² I will use the terms Asian Indian, Indian American and Indo-American interchangeably. These three terms all indicate people of Indian (as from South Asia, not to be confused with Native Americans) origin in the U.S.

country. With the development of the global economy, these countries of origin have been able to look to these outreach communities as trading partners, sources of foreign investment, and also as diplomatic 'friends at court'. Unlike immigrants hundred years ago, the new diasporas can live in the U.S. and genuinely retain their political and affective connections with India or Pakistan. Frequent trips to the subcontinent, phone calls, daily internet use, periodic visits to South Asian stores to buy magazines, videos, newspapers...are all means to keep in touch with the events in India or Pakistan.

This thesis developed from the paper *The Indian American community in the U.S.: a catalyst for U.S.-India relations?*, that I wrote in the Spring of 2004 for Dr. Saeed Shafqat's course *International Politics of South Asia*. The paper examined to what extent the bipartisan U.S. Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, established in the House of Representatives in 1993, has been able to influence, steer or guide U.S. politics in favor of India. Additionally, it highlighted the role that the Indian American community has been playing in lobbying legislators on Capitol Hill and looked at the way this community has been trying to convert their overall financial successes into a political clout.

When a Congressional Caucus on Pakistan and Pakistani Americans in the U.S. House of Representatives was established in the summer of 2004, we decided it would be interesting to look at the Pakistani American side of the question and make a comparison between the two diaspora groups. This is how the idea for this thesis came into being.

It is obvious that the India Caucus and Pakistan Caucus -as they will be named from now on- do not operate in some sort of vacuum but are influenced by contextual circumstances. To set the stage, Chapter 1 presents a brief description of the Indian and Pakistani community in the U.S. and gives some historical background of South Asian migration to the U.S. Chapter 2 looks at the ways the Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans have been organizing themselves. I compiled a catalogue of the most prevalent Indian and Pakistan immigrant organizations at the federal level. The agendas of political,

religious and professional associations specifically were examined because they display overt as well as covert political agendas. These immigrant associations are important because research has proved that participation in immigrants associations often becomes a first step in gaining full political participation in the U.S.³ Additionally, Chapter 2 also gazes at other means of political participation employed by the Indian and Pakistani Americans.

Chapter 3 and 4 describe the ways the India and Pakistan Caucus came into being and how both diaspora communities were more than instrumental in these processes. Since both caucuses are not officially recognized⁴ but more informal groups of members of Congress with shared interests in specific issues regarding India or Pakistan and their diaspora communities in the U.S., it was hard to find consistent, coherent and uniform resources about it. Consequently, I was forced to use primarily newspaper articles that mention the caucuses. In addition, very few scholars have been analyzing the impact the India Caucus and the Pakistan Caucus have been able to exert on U.S. politics and foreign policy; mainly - I figure - because they are very recent phenomena and precisely because of their informal nature. In contrast, the Jewish lobby in the U.S. has received much more scholarly attention.

In the course of my research, I realized the best way to investigate the caucuses' influence on U.S. politics, was to trace all the names of the congressmen aligned with the caucuses, subsequently delve into the congressional records and trace which caucus members participated in congressional hearings concerning India or Pakistan and voted pro or contra issues about India or Pakistan. In Chapter 5, I tested the voting behavior of caucus members by means of conducting a sample survey on 8 different congressional resolutions. Chapter 6 is a follow up in which I identify the issues of concern to both diaspora communities and analyze the nature of matters of importance to them. Again, I used articles published in community newspapers and looked at the activism of some of the immigrant associations.

³ De la Garza, R.O., Hazan, M., 2003

⁴ There is only one officially recognized caucus, i.e. the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control established by law in 1985.

This thesis would not be complete if I had not presented the highlights of U.S.-India and U.S.-Pakistan ties. Chapter 7 presents U.S.-India relations from the 1980s onwards and Chapter 8 U.S.-Pakistan ties from Pakistan's inception in 1947 till 2004.

Chapter 9 deals with the relationship between India and Israel and the role of the Jewish and Indian community in the U.S. has played in enhancing those ties. I incorporated this chapter because I believe this development will gain much importance in U.S. ethnic (and foreign) politics over the next few years.

Not only Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans have tried to influence U.S. foreign policy, but also the Indian and Pakistani nation-state have recently discovered the benefits their diasporas can bring to the countries. Consequently, the states have been actively reaching out to their diaspora communities in the U.S. with the hope of improving Indo-U.S. or Pakistan-U.S. relations. In Chapter 10, I discuss some of the methods that Indian and Pakistani government have deployed to reach this goal.

The concluding chapter looks at future prospects in Indo-U.S. and Pakistan-U.S. relations and after a general assessment of the political activity and influence of the Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans in U.S. politics is made.

Much of my research is based on the analysis of articles that appeared in Indian American newspapers such as *India Abroad*, *India - West* and *The Times of India*. I acknowledge that there is a lack of use of Pakistani American resources. Pakistani Americans are not yet as efficiently organized as their Indian counterparts. While Indian Americans have a couple of national ethnic newspapers and journals with high standards of journalism and production, Pakistani Americans do not. Additionally, I believe there is an enormous lack in scholarly research about the Pakistani Americans. Whereas many books on Indian Americans have been published over the last two decades, Pakistani Americans are largely ignored. They are incorporated in works about South Asian Americans but in these cases often overshadowed by a focus on Indian Americans. This to say I am guilty of doing the same and

tend to focus a little more on the Indian American community than on the Pakistani American.

Last but not least I want to specify own position in this research. I am a European - more specifically Belgian- graduate student at Columbia University enrolled in a South Asian studies program. I am not American but came to the U.S. to study here. My connection and fascination with South Asia has its origins into several trips to the subcontinent (to India, Pakistan as well as Nepal) and the fact that I have a master's degree in Oriental Languages and Cultures of the Ghent University in Belgium. My fascination with immigrants and diasporas grew out of a curiosity of how people deal with their mother countries once they have left them behind. Drawing all my interests together has resulted in several papers on the South Asian diaspora in the U.S. and hence in this thesis. I do not have Indian or Pakistani roots and can thus be considered to be a complete outsider in this project, i.e. an European examining South Asian minority politics in the U.S. Simultaneously, I believe my position has enabled me to look at the central question of this work from a unbiased point of view.

1. The Indian and Pakistani diaspora in the United States

1.1 The Indian diaspora in the United States

The Asian Indian⁵ or Indian American community is currently one of the fastest growing groups in the U.S. In 1980 there were about 387,223 Asian Indians, in 1985 525,000 and by 1990 815,447.⁶ From 1980 to 1990, the Indian American population grew with 111%. While the increase may look small when measured against the 819% increase for Cambodians, it is impressive when compared with the 4% increase in non-Hispanic whites or 13% increase among blacks.⁷

Indian immigration to the U.S. jumped over 29% in the fiscal year from 1995 to 1996. India ranked third after Mexico and the Philippines as the country of origin for U.S. immigration. In 1996, Indians had more family-sponsored immigration than any other country except Mexico. They also ranked second among all countries in employment-based preferences behind China. In the category of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, India was in the 5th place behind Mexico, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, and mainland China. In some states such as New Jersey, Indians were the number one immigrant group in 1996. In Illinois and Texas, they formed the third largest newcomer group, while Pakistanis were on the 8th place in Texas. In California, Indians were the 5th largest immigrant group and in New York they formed the 7th largest portion of new immigrants.⁸

The 2000 U.S. Census indicated that the U.S. population counted 281.4 million on April 1, 2000. Of the total, 11.9 million, or 4.2%, reported Asian. The term Asian refers to people having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the

⁵ The ethnic category or label 'Asian Indian' is a term that requires some explanation. It is uniquely American. People of the South Asian subcontinent historically known as India think of themselves as 'Indians'. The misnomer 'Indians' ascribed to the Native American population of North America by early explorers necessitated a more specific term for Indians in India - Asian Indians - in order to distinguish the two populations. (Arpana, S. ; 2000, p.3; Mogelonsky, M., Aug 1995, p.34; Mohapatra, M.K., Mohanty, A. & C0, 2003, p. 98)

⁶ Mohammad-Arif, A., 2000, p. 33

⁷ Mogelonsky, M., Aug 1995, p. 34; Weiner, M., 1990, p. 245

⁸ Springer, R., May 2, 1997

Indian subcontinent.⁹ The Chinese form the largest group among Asians directly followed by Filipinos and Asian Indians.¹⁰

The 2000 Census illustrated an increase of 105.87% in the Asian Indian American population from 1990 to 2000, coming down to 1.678 million.¹¹ About 1.7 million people reported only Asian Indian and an additional 0.2 million reported Asian Indian in combination with one or more other races or Asian groups. A total of 1.9 million people reported Asian Indian alone or in combination with at least one other race or Asian group.¹² The percentage of Asian Indian in the U.S. population comes down to 0.68%. This growth is the highest among all Asian origins groups. California has the largest concentration of Indo-Americans, followed by New York, New Jersey, Texas and Illinois. Other states with a sizeable Indian community are Florida, Pennsylvania and Washington DC.¹³

The latest estimates indicate another phenomenal growth in the Asian Indian population. Whereas in 2000 there were about 1.9 million Asian Indians, the numbers of the 2003 American Community Survey displays an average of 2,226,585 Asian Indians.¹⁴

Almost 28% of all Asian Indian Americans were born in the U.S.; another 29.04% have become naturalized citizens. So, 56.11% of the Asian Indians are U.S. citizens. Almost 97% of the Asian Indians lives in urban areas.¹⁵

The Asian Indian American is relatively young. Nearly two-thirds of the Indian American community is 35 years old and younger.¹⁶ They have also attained a higher level of education than the general population. Indian American children tend to start school earlier than children in the general population. However, it is stated that Indian American women

⁹ Barnes, J.S., Bennett, C.E., 2002, p. 1

¹⁰ *Id.*, p. 7-8

¹¹ <http://www.census.gov>; <http://www.iacfp.org>

¹² Mohammad-Arif, A., 2000, p. 7-9; Dumm, C., Jain, N., August 2004, p. 2

¹³ *Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian diaspora*, December 2001, p. 169

¹⁴ *2003 American Community Survey Summary Tables*, U.S. Census Bureau

¹⁵ Dumm, C., Jain, N., August 2004, p. 2

¹⁶ *Id.*, p. 4-5

generally do not attain the same high level of educational attainment as Indian American men.¹⁷

The unemployment rate for the Indian American community is lower than the unemployment rate for the general population. While the median household income, as well per capita income, in the Indian American community is higher than the norm, it should be noted that there are significant pockets of poverty within the community. Additionally, Indian Americans receive a significantly lower share of public assistance than the general population. This trend could mean a lack of knowledge about available programs and a lack of desire on the part of the community to apply for public assistance.¹⁸

1.2. The Pakistani diaspora in the United States

The Pakistani population in the U.S. is much smaller, but has been growing faster than the Indian.¹⁹ In 1980, the Pakistani population numbered officially 40,000, in 1985 75,000 and in 1990 93,663.²⁰ In 1996, comparing immigration in the U.S. from other countries, Pakistan was ranked in the 20th place. In 1995, Pakistan was 18th in the ranking by country of origin. And from 1995 to 1996, Pakistanis rose from 4,856 to 5,402 in family-sponsored preferences and more than doubled (from 725 to 1,694) in employment-based preferences.²¹

In 2000, the Pakistani American population totaled 201,309. People reporting as 'only Pakistani' counted for 164,628 and as 'Pakistani in combination with one or more other races or Asian groups' for 39,681.²² The 2003 numbers of the American Community Survey report an average of 183,508 Pakistani Americans with a lower bound number of 156,406 and a higher bound of 210, 610.²³

¹⁷ *Id.*, p. 6

¹⁸ *Id.*, p. 7

¹⁹ Mogelonsky, M., Aug 1995, p. 34; Weiner, M., 1990, p. 245

²⁰ Mohammad-Arif, A., 2000, p. 33

²¹ Springer, R., May 2, 1997

²² Barnes, J.S., Bennett, C.E., 2002, p. 7-9

²³ 2003 American Community Survey Summary Tables

I should point out that since 1980 there has been a specific category of Asian Indian in the census classification, but Pakistani immigrants are still classified as 'other Asian'.²⁴ Additionally, Pakistan did not exist before 1947, so immigrants born before these dates, especially those who did not arrive directly from those countries, can find it difficult to define themselves. Furthermore, some immigrants arrived via East Africa, Guyana, England or Canada and since the census asks about the country of origin of one's ancestors, some of those whose parents were born in the previous named places will tend to name these countries as their country of origin. Last of all, some cases are especially complicated because of political events in the Indian subcontinent. Some Kashmiri Muslims, for example, refuse to give either India or Pakistan as their country of origin and prefer to write "Kashmir".²⁵

The 2000 U.S. Census also provides a category that shows the ancestry of the U.S. population. According to this list, there are 1,546,703 persons of Asian Indian ancestry and 253,193 of Pakistani descent. The data indicating Pakistani descent does not converge with the latest 2003 estimations. This might be explained as follows: ancestry is a broad concept that can mean different things to different people. The ancestry groups listed on the table of the 2000 U.S. Census were self-identified. The Census Bureau defines ancestry as a person's ethnic origin, heritage, descent, or "roots", which may reflect their place of birth, place of birth of parents or ancestors, and ethnic identities that have evolved within the U.S. Consequently, many respondents listed more than area of ancestry; the sum of the persons reporting the ancestry was greater than the total U.S. population.²⁶

²⁴ Kurien, P., 2003, p. 267

²⁵ Mohammad-Arif, A., 2000, p. 32-33

²⁶ *Ancestry: 2000*, U.S. Census Bureau

1.3 Historical background of the South Asian diaspora in the United States

Immigration from South Asia to the U.S. has occurred during two contrasting periods in U.S. history. The immigration patterns of Indian and Pakistani immigrants in the U.S. must be placed in a broader context of Asian migration to the U.S.²⁷

The early phase (which started around the end of the 19th century) consisted largely of male immigrants coming from the British Indian province Punjab. They came predominantly from farming backgrounds and worked in agriculture in California. These Punjabi men came at the end of a series of Asian migrations to the West Coast. However, as a result of some severely discriminating immigration laws towards Asian immigrants²⁸, this early phase ended around 1924.²⁹

The second phase of South Asian immigration in the U.S. started after 1965 when the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Act came into being. This phase occurred in a significantly different American context. It is on these post-1965 immigrants that this thesis will concentrate.

Whereas pre-1965 South Asian immigrants in the U.S. were largely coming from a rural background, the post-1965 immigrants are often referred to as the "brain drain-generation". These immigrants differed greatly from the ones of the first phase, both in their place of origin as well as in their socio-economic characteristics. First of all, the Indian immigrants now came from all over India³⁰ and only half of the Pakistani immigrants came from the Punjab.³¹ Currently all the languages, as well as the different religions of the subcontinent are represented among the South Asians in the U.S.³² Secondly, among Asian Indians in the work force in 1990, 30 % were employed in professional specialty occupations,

²⁷ Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 39-40

²⁸ cf. Lowe, L., 1996; Chan, S., 1991; Takaki, R., 1989 (1998)

²⁹ Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 39-40; Takaki, R., 1989 (1998), p. 63; Chan, S., 1991, p. 55; Kitano, H., Daniels, R., 2001, p. 232

³⁰ Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 70-71; Weiner, M., 1990, p. 247

³¹ Takaki, R., 1989 (1998), p. 445

³² Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 70-71; Weiner, M., 1990, p. 247

compared with 13 % of all U.S. employees. Twenty percent of foreign-born Indian professionals are physicians, 26% are engineers, and 12% post-secondary teachers.³³ As of the 1990 Census, 71% of Indians have college or post-graduate degrees, making them the most highly educated of any ethnic group in the U.S.³⁴ Also; the post-1965 Pakistani newcomers were highly educated professionals.³⁵ Both immigrant communities constitute a very affluent community and are - largely because of their employment in industrial and service sectors of the economy - more concentrated in metropolitan areas than the general U.S. population. The steady stream of Indian and Pakistani immigrants is constituted mostly out of students coming to the U.S. for a higher education.³⁶

However, their professional and material advancements have not made these two South Asian communities in the U.S. complacent. Commensurate with their success in life, they now want to play an active role in American politics. They realize that without this they can neither protect their rights as a minority nor safeguard their interests or ensure their security against other competitive or less privileged groups. The leaders and opinion-makers of the Asian Indian communities (and to a certain extent also of the Pakistani American) are therefore, now engaged in educating their community to actively participate in American politics.³⁷

Citizenship is an important issue for these immigrants. Many immigrants have family networks, financial interests and political commitments that span two nations. Since the earlier generations of immigrants saw themselves as economic migrants coming to the U.S for educational purposes or better employment opportunities, obtaining U.S. citizenship was

³³ Mogelonsky, M., Aug 1995, p. 35; Cohen, S.P., 2001, p.116, p. 288

³⁴ Alba, R., Nee, V., 2003, p. 210

³⁵ Takaki, R., 1989 (1998), p. 445

³⁶ Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 70-71; Mogelonsky, M., Aug 1995, p. 35; Cohen, S.P., 2001, p.116, p. 288; Jha, N.K., 2003, p.169; Springer, R., November 23, 2000

³⁷ Jha, N.K., 2003, p. 165

often not taking into consideration. Many immigrants cherished the plan to return³⁸ and had thus no immediate reason to opt for U.S. citizenship.³⁹

Since the mid-1980's gradual changes started to take place. Indian and Pakistani families are now more strongly rooted in the U.S. The first generation produced a second one and realizes that its children will not return to India or Pakistan. The benefits of citizenship are quite clear: citizens are in a much stronger position than non-citizens to challenge existing laws and practices, mobilize public opinion and initiate new laws. Moreover, there is a desire to help the homelands by changing U.S. policies, i.e. influencing the U.S government to be more pro-India or pro-Pakistan. This kind of influence requires funding and support for the major political parties. Indian and Pakistani interests must be protected and local, state and federal political representatives are simply more responsive to voters.⁴⁰

³⁸ This plan is always referred to as "the myth of return". (Lessinger, J., 2003, p. 173; Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 76)

³⁹ Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 70-71

⁴⁰ Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 70-71

2. The participation of Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans in U.S. politics

2.1. Immigrant associations

Rangaswamy (2000) writes: "The process of rediscovery for Indian immigrants involves digging into their own national consciousness and retrieving a repository of knowledge accumulated not only during their own lifetimes but generations past. It means drawing upon myths and legends, folklore and history. It also means getting organized because unless they act as a group they cannot hold on for long either the outward symbols of their identity such as language, food, and dress, or their inner, mental symbols such as their morality, religion and family values. Institutions thus both reflect and shape a complex sense of identity, which must be created anew by immigrant if he or she is to survive the immigrant experience."⁴¹

What Rangaswamy is saying is that the formation of organizations or institutions for the Indian immigrant community is essential for its survival in a new environment. The same argument can be used for the Pakistani immigrants in the U.S. The very first organizations set up by immigrants are usually meant to organize cultural or religious events. Initially - Prashad (2000a) argues- the *desi* sundered the world into two: the outside world, the world of the workplace, is a world of capital that must be exploited as much as possible, and the inside world, the world of home is a world of culture that must be protected and cherished.⁴² The identities of South Asians were marked by their entering an implicit social contract with a racist policy by making a pledge to work hard but to retain a social life somewhat removed from the society of the U.S.⁴³ However, the lived experience taught them this was not enough. Unemployment, job discrimination, hate crimes, police brutality, lack of access to adequate health care, poverty and overt racism have become everyday experiences. These lasting experiences resulted in the mushrooming of political initiatives, both organized and informal,

⁴¹ Rangaswamy, D., 2000, p. 217

⁴² Prashad, V., 2000, p. 104

⁴³ Mahmud, T., 2001

to build solidarities sometimes with similarly placed non-desi communities, and to design strategies to protect economic, political, and human rights of vulnerable sections of desis.⁴⁴ Thus, with the coming of age of immigrant groups a growing need for political organizations started to simmer. Rangaswamy (2000) makes a similar argument and states that the excuse for political inaction that held good in the early years of immigration became obsolete in the 1990s. The early argument was that Indians had no real problems. As an economically successful group, they had no need to fight political battles; the theory was that only the poor or those on the fringes of society needed to get politically organized. With the growth and thus heightened visibility of the Indian community a host of problems such as job discrimination, racial attacks, and restrictive immigration laws have arisen.⁴⁵

There are generally two kind of political organizations among immigrant groups: those who believe that the immigrants should get more involved in the politics of the homeland and make a contribution to the survival of their own ideals in the home country, and those who believe that they should get more involved in local politics and be part of mainstream America. A third group believes that an informed immigrant should be knowledgeable and active in both areas. First-generation immigrants usually maintain ties to a national community of origin, which are kept alive in memory by the desire to return. However, the longer immigrants stay in the U.S., the greater the tension between the home country and host country. The problem is that loyalties to different territorial political communities are often perceived as irreconcilable.⁴⁶

The "myth of return" can directly affect people's political involvement in the U.S. It has further implications for migrants' organizational and political life.⁴⁷ Jones-Correa (1998) talks about the in-between-politics of (in this case Latino) immigrants and considers this

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Rangaswamy, D., 2000, p. 296

⁴⁶ Jones-Correa, M., 1998, p. 5

⁴⁷ *Id.*, p. 100-101

phenomenon as an incentive for immigrants to lobby for dual citizenship in order they can lower the costs of participation in the two states.⁴⁸

Rangaswamy (2000) in his research on the Asian Indians in Chicago claims that politically active groups lack community-wide support. They operate with a small set of committed individuals who often feel they are up against a brick wall but continue to work because of their faith in their cause.⁴⁹ Ranjit Ganguly, the founder member of the Indo-American Democratic Organization (cf. 2.2.2.), proclaimed that getting Indians interested in political issues is hard. He lamented: "Indians are only keen on cultural extravaganzas, they are not interested in issue-oriented politics. In fact, to most Indians here politics is a dirty word. They don't realize that if you don't organize politically, you don't exist, at least in the eyes of the government."⁵⁰ However Prashad (2000b) claims the reason why immigrants tend to keep away from U.S. politics is because they don't feel entirely enfranchised perhaps because of the undertow of anti-immigrant sentiment. In many cases, the gesture to keep away from the political life comes from the fear that their participation may fuel more anti-immigrant sentiment. He claims that the dynamic forces fueling Indian political participation in the U.S. come from the second generation whose affective ties to the subcontinent are not so great as those of their parents.⁵¹

2.2. South Asian American, Indian American and Pakistani American organizations

Indians and Pakistani in the U.S. have been organizing themselves in many different ways. Some establish South Asian organizations what means that everybody from the South Asian subcontinent (i.e. India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, the Maldives and Bhutan) can join the organization. However, it has been stated more than once that these organizations are more Indian than South Asian in the sense that Indians make up for the large bulk of the members and thus Indian concerns receive greater attention so that Pakistani,

⁴⁸ *Id.*, p. 152

⁴⁹ Rangaswamy, D., 2000, p. 291

⁵⁰ *Id.*, p. 294

⁵¹ Prashad, V., September 30, 2000

Bengali, or other concerns are glossed over. Kurien (2003) states that the South Asian term is often just another term for Indian and could lead to a further exclusion of the voices and concerns of non-Indian South Asian groups. The flipside of South Asian coalitions that are truly all inclusive, is that they are not without cost in that while they might increase influence over American domestic policy, they might decrease influence over American foreign policy. Pan-ethnic coalitions should keep away from foreign policy issues altogether in order to avoid dissent within the group.⁵²

Kurien's article *To be or not to be South Asian* (2003) examines the way Indian Americans enter the public sphere in the U.S. by means of mobilizing around a South Asian (i.e. secular, multi-religious and multi-cultural) or a pan-Hindu or Indic (i.e. Hindu-centric) identity.⁵³

The South Asian organizations tend to characterize themselves as progressive and argue that there are many cultural similarities between individuals of South Asian background and that they face common concerns in the U.S. These associations also stress that they are forward-looking and targeting the second and later generations.⁵⁴

The Hindu or Indic groups describe themselves as proud Hindus and patriotic Indians trying to build community solidarity and on the basis of an identity and culture that is thousands of years old. Their definition of solidarity includes Buddhists, Sikhs, Jains (since their religions are "indigenous to India"), but excludes Indian Muslims and Christians.⁵⁵

It is obvious that the incentive for Indian and Pakistani expatriates to form organizations have their origins in regional, religious, cultural, national as well political affiliations and this ultimately results in an amalgam of many different immigrant

⁵² Kurien, P., 2003, p. 283

⁵³ *Id.*, p. 263

⁵⁴ Kurien, P., 2003, p. 264

⁵⁵ *Id.*, p. 265-7

associations. As Shukla (2003) has pointed out: "The nations of diaspora are heterogeneous and composed of many contradictory fragments."⁵⁶

Additionally, it is necessary to realize that the establishment of groups, organizations or associations is a situational response to the politics of recognition of American multiculturalism. The politics of recognition has its basis in three matters. First, since social, economic and political resources are distributed on the basis of ethnicity in the U.S. as a multicultural society, there is pressure on individuals to organize into ethnic groups. Second, ethnic categorization generally is mobilizing by virtue of national origin or on the basis of allegiance to the homeland tends to be viewed as politically threatening. Thus, immigrants mobilizing among ethnic lines have to be careful to emphasize and demonstrate their loyalty to the U.S. Third; race remains an important principle of classification in the U.S. that does not always fit with the official ethnic categories of American society.⁵⁷

I tried to compile a list of the different 'pure' (meaning those organizations that target expatriates from a certain country and not a region) Indian American and Pakistani American organizations on the *federal* level in the U.S. Many semi-influential organizations merely operate at the local or state level and that many of the federal organizations have chapters in different states of the country.

For the purpose of my project I am highlighting those organizations that hold political aspirations. Compiling a catalogue of all religious or cultural Indian American and Pakistani American organizations in the U.S. would be a long-term project and goes beyond the scope of my research. I do point to some local, religious organizations that have been studied extensively because of their transnational links with political parties such as the BJP in the Indian subcontinent.

It is also necessary to realize that political activism of diaspora groups occurs on different levels. First there is the local level: the main goal is to make life comfortable in the

⁵⁶ Shukla, S., 2003, p. 13

⁵⁷ Kurien, P., 2003, p. 276

area where one lives. Second and third: diaspora groups fight respectively for state and federal causes. These three levels are part of domestic politics in the U.S.

Political activism at the fourth level encompasses matters that affect the homeland. It takes up the challenge to steer (to a certain extent) U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis one's mother country and attempts to make actual changes in the politics and policies of the mother country. We could say that this level of activism belongs to the sphere of international or even transnational politics. Nonetheless, Rangaswamy asserts: "Though Indians in Chicago are interested in the happenings in the homeland, there are very few issues exciting enough for them to become aggressively involved. One reason why Indians are complacent is that they are generally supportive of the government in India and seek to work in cooperation with it rather than trying to change it from the outside."⁵⁸ My research proved that some of the Asian Indian and Pakistani American organizations have aspirations to enforce changes in their home country while others try to find a place in the politics of their host country.

It is quite hard to delineate all these organizations because most of them have simultaneously political, professional, and social as well as economic incentives. For example, an organization is hardly ever purely political and holds often simultaneously an economic agenda. Some of the organizations also traverse the borders of the U.S. and represent, for example, the whole of North America.

2.2.1. South Asian American organizations

A. Organizations with political motives and goals

South Asian American organizations with political motivations tend to apply the name "South Asian" because they want to show that their loyalties are not split with a foreign government. Being perceived as a patriotic American is an important motivation for politically active Indian Americans or Pakistani Americans adopting a South Asian identity.⁵⁹ These are the kind of organizations who want to show that they do not have split loyalties and

⁵⁸ Rangwaswamy, D., 2000. p. 298

⁵⁹ Kurien, P., 2003, p. 271

are working towards integration in the U.S. society. Disloyalty towards the American nation-state on the behalf of new immigrants is a great concern to writers such as Huntington (2004) who blame the new immigrants for investing more in their home countries than host countries.

The concept of South Asianness became more widespread in the post 9/11-period because to the American bigot Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis, Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs all look the same. Many victims of racism became conscious they had much more in common than they previously had realized and consequently decided to form associations along regional instead of national lines.⁶⁰ However, many immigrants or first-generation Indian Americans believe that the label 'South Asian' ignores the powerful religious and national histories of the separate countries of South Asia.⁶¹

♣ *South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow (SAALT)*

SAALT was originally formed as the Indian American Leadership Center in February 2000 and became a South Asian American organization in 2001 to broaden its scope. It is a national non-profit organization dedicated to ensuring the full and equal participation by South Asians in the civic and political life of the U.S. It focuses on domestic issues of concern to the South Asian American community such as immigration, discrimination, hate crimes, and civil rights.⁶² They say not to be interested in the geopolitics of the South Asian subcontinent.⁶³

♣ *The Subcontinental Institute*

The Subcontinental Institute is a registered non-profit educational corporation that seeks to provide a forum for the development of South Asian American political identity utilizing educational and literary activities of benefit to subscribers and the general public. This non-partisan organization is committed to enabling the expression of South Asian

⁶⁰ Kurien, P., 2003, p. 273; Srikanth, R., 1999/2000, p. 69

⁶¹ Srikanth, R., 1999/2000, p. 69

⁶² <http://www.saalt.org/aboutus.htm>

⁶³ Kurien, P., 2003, p. 269

American political identity that is inclusive and representative of the various perspectives on issues that affect the South Asian American community.⁶⁴ Different from SAALT, this organization does not avoid foreign policy issues. It publishes and distributes a journal targeted at politically active South Asians and policy-makers in Washington.⁶⁵

2.2.2. Indian American organizations

A. Organizations with political motives and goals

♣ *U.S.-India Political Action Committee (USINPAC)*

USINPAC's mission is to impact policy on issues of concern to the Indian American community in the U.S. It provides bipartisan support to candidates for federal, state and local office who support the issues that are important to the Indian American community. These issues include: strengthening U.S.-India bilateral relations in defense, trade, and business, promoting a fair and balanced policy on immigration, ensuring protection from hate-crimes, advocating for appointments of Indian Americans in the executive and judicial branches of the government, ensuring equal protection under the law, and protection of rights and advocating for issues such as small business. It also supports financially candidates for public office, on a bipartisan basis, who proactively address the concerns of the Indian American community, and makes an effort to create a platform that enables entry of Indian Americans in the political process.⁶⁶ It also wants to serve as watch dog for inaccuracies and bias in media coverage about India or Indians in the U.S.⁶⁷ Additionally, USINPAC has built strong alliances with the leading Jewish American organizations.⁶⁸ It is therefore patterned after the highly effective Israeli lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).⁶⁹

In the election campaign of 2004 USINPAC endorsed selected candidates for the U.S. Congress based on their stand on issues affecting Indian Americans and U.S.-India relations.

⁶⁴ <http://www.thesubcontinental.org/public/index.jsp>

⁶⁵ Kurien, P., 2003, p. 269

⁶⁶ <http://www.usinpac.com/>

⁶⁷ Aggarwal, Y., October 15, 2004

⁶⁸ <http://www.usinpac.com/>

⁶⁹ Aggarwal, Y., October 15, 2004

The organization believes that the next generation of pro-India leaders actively seeking to advance the cause of U.S.-India relations will likely emerge from college campuses in the U.S. and therefore they seek to get Indian American students at colleges actively involved in USINPAC.⁷⁰

♣ *Indian American Center for Political Awareness (IACFPA)*

The IACPA was founded in 1994⁷¹ by the publishers of *India Abroad*, the largest circulating Indian American newspaper in the U.S. In the fall of 1996, the Center established a full-time office in the nation's capital to expand and enhance its activities, becoming one of the only professionally staffed Indian American organizations serving the community nationwide. Its mission is to increase awareness and public understanding of the concerns of the Indian American community and encourage participation by the Indian American community in the American democracy.⁷²

♣ *Indian American Forum for Political Education (IAFPE)*

The IAFPE better known as the FORUM, is the oldest and largest Indian American organization for political education in the country and is nationally recognized for its outstanding work in political empowerment process.

The Forum, established in 1982, has 27 state chapters across the nation. It is a dynamic and growing organization that has helped educate the Indian American community to participate as full partners in American democracy.⁷³

Its mission is to empower Indian Americans politically by raising civic consciousness and increasing participation in community affairs and the mainstream political process, to promote voter registration and encourage Indian Americans to exercise their rights to vote and to run for public office, to identify issues of concern to Indian Americans and pursue

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ An other source mentions that the IACPA was founded in 1993 (Nurnberger, R., February 21, 1997).

⁷² Nurnberger, R., February 21, 1997; <http://www.iacfpa.org/>

⁷³ <http://www.iafpe-ne.org/about.asp>

<http://www.iafpe.org/php/showPressDetails.php?linkid=7&newsid=1>

solutions within the political system, and to facilitate and promote ongoing Indo-U.S. relations.⁷⁴

It also promotes an internship program wherein interns will spend 6-10 weeks working in the office of a congressman or senator at the state or federal level, at a non-government agency, or for political parties. Past interns have worked at the Office of the Attorney General, the White House, Congress, the State House and the Indian Embassy and in various governmental agencies such as the Department of Energy.⁷⁵ A history of their political accomplishments can be found on their website.⁷⁶

♣ *National Association of Americans of Indian Descent (NAAID)*

This organization is supposed to be exclusively political but I could hardly find any resources about it, neither have they a website in contrast to all other associations.

The NAAID only represents naturalized citizens of Indian descent and concentrates on fielding and funding candidates for political office.⁷⁷

♣ *Association of Indians in America (AIA)*

The AIA is a non-profit organization known as the oldest national association of Asian Indians in America, founded on August 20, 1967 and incorporated in 1971 a non-political and non-partisan organization. AIA was granted the IRS tax-exempt status in January 1973.⁷⁸

Its objectives are to concern itself with the social welfare of the Indians who have decided to live in the U.S. and help them become a part of the mainstream of American life, to facilitate participation by the membership of AIA and others in the development and progress of India and involvement of members of the association in American community life

⁷⁴ <http://www.iafpe.org/>

⁷⁵ <http://www.iafpe-ne.org/internship.asp>

⁷⁶ <http://www.iafpe.org/>; <http://www.iafpe.org/php/showForums.php?linkid=1>

⁷⁷ Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 89-90; Mohapatra, M.K., Mohanty, A. & Co, 2003 p. 21-22

⁷⁸ <http://www.namasthenri.com/associations/aia.html>; <http://www.aia-dc.org/>; Rangaswamy, P., 2000, p. 224

through charitable, educational and cultural activities. It has branches in several U.S. states, such as in New York⁷⁹ and Washington D.C.⁸⁰

It was moreover this association that pushed in the 1970s for the registration of the category of "Asian Indian" in the U.S. Census as a way to identify the Indians in the country and make them more visible.⁸¹ The association wrote in 1975 to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission that "Indians are different in appearance; they are equally dark-skinned as other non-white individuals and are, therefore, subject to the same prejudices."⁸²

♣ *Federation of Indian Associations (FIA)*

The FIA is a Fremont based umbrella non-profit organization. It consists of over 40 member organizations. It was founded in 1983.⁸³ Over the last 21 years, the Federation has continued to work with its member organizations on various community-based initiatives and has emphasized that its members should continue to remain engaged in every aspect of the community. Its objectives are to provide a forum for the community to communicate among themselves, to represent the common interests and goals of the communities in which they reside, to help shape public policy through active participation in the public process, to participate collectively in local charitable and humanitarian causes, to protect the civil and human rights of individuals, to widen opportunities within the business and professional fields and to forge links with other community based organizations.⁸⁴

As the AIA it has several branches in different states like Ohio⁸⁵ and North Carolina.⁸⁶

⁷⁹ cf. <http://www.aianewyork.org/>

⁸⁰ <http://www.namasthenri.com/associations/aia.html>; <http://www.aia-dc.org/>; <http://www.aia-dc.org/>

⁸¹ Shukla, S., 2003, p. 60 and 66; Rangaswamy, P., 2000, p. 224

⁸² Lal, V., 1999, p. 44

⁸³ <http://www.fia-ohio.org/about.asp>

⁸⁴ <http://www.fiaonline.org/index.php>

⁸⁵ <http://www.fia-ohio.org/about.asp>

⁸⁶ <http://www.fiaonline.org/index.php>

♣ *National Federation of Indian American Associations (NFIA)*

The NFIA is a non-profit organization that was established in 1980 with the aims to unify the diverse Indian American communities by coordinating and promoting the activities of its member associations.⁸⁷ Its priorities are to advocate and create awareness related to immigration, visa, and hate-crime issues, to participate in politics by providing opportunities to individuals, to cater U.S.-India relations on the political, economic, social and cultural level and to address issues affecting seniors, women and youth in the diaspora.⁸⁸

The NFIA is headed by Niraj Baxi who in January 2003 described that the future initiatives NFIA would like to pursue in the economic spheres to enhance U.S.-India economic relations are: tourism and hospitality industry, health care industry infrastructure i.e. hospital, pharmaceutical, nursing and other allied areas, service industry sector of insurance, banking, housing and urban development, bio-technology and bio-informatics, environmental sciences, and infrastructure building.⁸⁹

The organization also organizes fund raisings for politicians active in dealing with Indian American matters. This organization mobilized the Indian community in 1987 with apparent success to persuade the Congress to withdraw the sale of sophisticated AWACS planes to Pakistan.⁹⁰

♣ *Indo-American Democratic Organization Inc. (IADO)*

The IADO was founded in Chicago in 1980. Its mission is to lobby on behalf of the Indian American community on issues such as immigration, affirmative action, education, social security, healthcare reform and hate crimes. The goal is also to get more Indian Americans to participate in the political process from voting to running for office. They have been successful in registering thousands of Indian Americans to vote, conducted candidates forums during elections years, worked on numerous campaigns for candidates running for

⁸⁷ <http://www.nfai.net>

⁸⁸ http://www.nfia.net/indian_community.htm

⁸⁹ <http://www.nfia.net/Delhi%20Press%20Release.html>

⁹⁰ Lal, V., 1999, p. 45

local, state, and federal office, led campaigns against media stereotypes, and formed partnerships with Asian American and other communities on various issues such as hate crimes, affirmative action, and glass ceiling issues.⁹¹

IADO was started in Chicago when members of the Indian community realized that no matter how active they were socially and culturally as a group, City Hall wouldn't pay any attention to them unless they were a political body. IADO was thus formed to gain legitimacy and recognition in the host society.⁹²

Membership in IADO has grown to five hundred over the years, but is still far short of representing the strength of the community. Its merits lies in the fact that it has forced people to sit up and take notice of Indians as an ethnic group. They have worked on several issues with different groups, teaming up with the Latin American community for voter registration, with the African-American community on affirmative action and discrimination, and with other Asians on the issue on the fair representation of civic bodies.⁹³ It supports independent candidates and those who run on a bipartisan basis, if they are Indian American.⁹⁴

♣ *Forum of Indian Leftists (FOIL)*

The FOIL describes itself as a sort of clearinghouse for Indian radicals in the U.S., Canada and England. It is a place to share information, offer support, and encourage fellow Indians to write in the open media on issues pertaining to Indians overseas and India itself, and help build projects that make their radical politics more material. These Indians felt it was time to come together and take common positions and intervene on political matters. Its mission is quite broad and takes up matters such as combating the IMF/World Bank/MNC onslaught against the Indian workers and peasants, opposing the saffron wave across India, England and North America, and preventing conservative middle class politics from shaping

⁹¹ <http://www.iado.org/>

⁹² Rangaswamy, P., 2000, p. 294

⁹³ *Id.*, p. 294-295

⁹⁴ *Id.*, p. 296

the politics of the entire community. The forum publishes a magazine Ghadar that is "aimed at providing a forum for a conversation within the left for clarifying/pushing our thinking further".⁹⁵

B. Organizations formed along religious lines

Religion and religious institutions have often been described as playing a role in the process of ethnic formation. In American society religion has been viewed as the most legitimate basis for community formation and expression since maintaining a religious identification is not politically threatening to an American identity. Huntington (2004) however, would claim the opposite. He argued that new immigrants organizing around a religious identity indeed form a threat to the "American creed" that is in its origins pure Anglo-Saxon protestant. And consequently, new immigrants fuel the erosion of American politics.⁹⁶

♣ Indian Muslim Council - USA (IMC-USA)

The Indian Muslim Council - USA was launched on August 15th 2002⁹⁷, accepting fully the symbolic significance of the day in Indian history and pledging to ensure the independence of people and institutions from ideologies such as Hindutva-fascism, by safeguarding the common values that bind the world's two largest secular democracies, India and the U.S.⁹⁸

Its objectives are five-fold: (1) to promote the common values of pluralism, tolerance, and respect for human rights that form the basis of the world's two largest secular democracies - the U.S. and India, (2) to work towards increasing inter-faith and inter-community understanding in the U.S., with particular focus on the Indian diaspora with a view to safeguard individuals and societal institutions from infiltration by divisive and hate-filled ideologies, (3) to provide a platform for increasing education and awareness about

⁹⁵ <http://www.proxsa.org/resources/foil/foilpg.html>

⁹⁶ Huntington, S., 2004, p. 94

⁹⁷ India and Pakistan became independent on August 15, 1947.

⁹⁸ <http://www.imc-usa.org/cgi-bin/cfm/whoweare.cfm>

issues of interest to the Indian community in the U.S., (4) to build alliances and relationships with all individuals and groups who share our basic values, in order to work together to achieve the above objectives, and (5) to provide a responsible voice for the Indian Muslim diaspora in the U.S. in their quest for all of the above objectives.⁹⁹

♣ *Federation of Hindu Associations (FHA)*

The FHA are independent, regional, American organizations but interlinked with the Vishwa Hindu Parishad of America (VHPA)¹⁰⁰ and the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (HSS) in a variety of informal ways.¹⁰¹ The FHA are based in Southern California and have been trying to influence American foreign and domestic policy by assiduously wooing politicians in an attempt to communicate their ideas regarding Indian society and politics and an Indian American identity. On top of that, the FHA has allied with far-right Jewish and Christian groups.¹⁰²

The FHA was formed in 1993 in the wake of the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya and was one of the first umbrella organizations to be based in the U.S. In the first few years of operation, the FHA refused to get themselves registered as a religious organization and thus obtain tax-exempt status since that would have meant that they would not be able to promote an overt political agenda. Under pressures from donors they registered themselves but this overall did not change their platform much.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ <http://www.imc-usa.org/cgi-bin/cfm/objectives.cfm>

¹⁰⁰ An other important umbrella organization that can be ranked under the same category is The Overseas Friends of the BJP. This association was set up in New York in 1991 to disseminate party ideology. The BJP-VHP combine as it is referred to in the Indian press is a powerful mouthpiece because it has a large following within the Indian business community and top professionals in both Canada and the U.S. The active BJP-VHP membership in North America is said to exceed twenty thousand. Some of the party's objectives, such as developing a common civil code and reserving the right to develop nuclear weapons for self-defense, have strong appeal for those who want a strong and united India. Overseas Friends of the BJP makes arrangements for visits of party leaders to the U.S. They ensure that they get a chance to meet U.S. government representatives such as state governors, congressional leaders and State Department officials. After the Babri Masjid incident, BJP party leaders toured the U.S. and Canada, and the Caribbean "to acquaint people in the West with crucial facts about Ayodhya." (Rangaswamy, D., 2000, p. 299)

¹⁰¹ Kurien, P., 2003, p. 270

¹⁰² *Id.*, p. 272-3

¹⁰³ *Id.*, p. 268-9

Many Hindu groupings in the U.S. - especially in the wake of 9/11 - have made it clear that there is a big difference between Hinduism and Islam in order to differentiate them from Muslims and Arabs. Hindus - and to an extent also Sikhs - demand not to be called Asians and lumped with Muslims.¹⁰⁴ This movement is in some way the counter-movement of the South Asian organizations that realized after 9/11 that Americans did not make distinctions between South Asian Muslims, Hindus or Sikhs.

The Hindutva (Hinduness) ideology has become an important center around which many Indians from a Hindu background coalesce in their effort to obtain recognition and resources as American ethnics and to counter their relative invisibility within American society. This explains the glorification of Hinduism as well as their anti-Muslim agenda.¹⁰⁵

It is important to emphasize that the composition, platform and goals of this organization is not representative of the average Hindu immigrant in the U.S.¹⁰⁶

♣ *The American Federation of Muslims from India (AFMI)*

The AFMI is a national organization formed in Washington in 1989 as a social service association dedicated to the uplifting of Muslims in India. They promote secularism and communal harmony and support underprivileged groups in India.¹⁰⁷

They also sponsor visits of prominent Indian politicians and public personalities who support their platform. AFMI also works with other organizations such as the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) or Indian Muslim Relief Council (IMRC) to stay in regular contact with legislators and has become a significant political lobby group in Washington. For example, in 1995 several AFMI members were invited to the White House to meet State Department officials and attend a reception hosted by Mrs. Hillary Clinton.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ *Id.*, p. 274-5

¹⁰⁵ *Id.*, p. 281

¹⁰⁶ *Id.*, p. 264

¹⁰⁷ <http://www.afmi.org/aboutafmi.cfm>

¹⁰⁸ Kurien, P., 2001, p. 270

In the same way as the FHA cannot be considered as representative for every Indian Hindu immigrant, the composition, platform and goals of AFMI is not representative of every Indian Muslim in the U.S.¹⁰⁹

C. Organizations formed along professional lines

Most of the professional organizations were formed in the 1980s when Indians realized they needed to go beyond informal networking in order to further their career and business interests. They also saw that by coming together as professionals, they could contribute to the welfare of India by transferring their technological expertise and material resources such as hi-tech equipment through organized channels. The growing conservative climate in the U.S. in the 1980s alarmed many Indians who felt they had to band together and network among themselves in order to be professionally successful. These organizations cut across linguistic, regional and religious lines, giving Indians a chance to meet on purely professional grounds.¹¹⁰ Also, Lal (1999) believes the impetus for the formation of Asian Indian professional organizations can be attributed to the discrimination that immigrants faced which acquired some urgency in the early 1980s. He describes how the tightening of laws governing the admission of doctors from overseas into the American medical profession was an incentive for Indian doctors to form the American Association of Physicians from India.¹¹¹

♣ *American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin (AAPI)*

This must be one of the most influential professional Asian Indian organizations in the U.S. It boasts a membership of 35,000 physicians and has been active in several arenas for over twenty years. It regularly hosts fund raisings for politicians on the local, state as well as federal level and has consequently been able to influence quite a number of legislators, probably more than any of the political organizations.

¹⁰⁹ *Id.*, p. 264

¹¹⁰ Rangwaswamy, D., 2000, p. 301

¹¹¹ Lal, V., 1999, p. 45

Its mission is to serve as a forum to facilitate and enable Indian American physicians to excel in patient care, teaching and research, and to pursue their aspirations in professional and community affairs.

Its headquarters are located in Chicago but they also have an office in Washington, DC where AAPI is recognized as a strong voice in the healthcare legislation and policy arena.¹¹² They strongly believe in "giving back to the community" and actively do this through the AAIP Charitable Foundation. This commitment extends back to India, as well as to a variety of local projects led by member associations here in the U.S.¹¹³

The AAIP has been quite successful in lobbying congressmen and as early as 1985 it already agitated against proposed legislation that would have cut deeply Medicare funding to hospitals employing doctors with foreign medical degrees.¹¹⁴ The AAIP's most spectacular coup must have been when it managed to get President Clinton to be the featured speaker at its 13th annual convention held in Chicago in July 1995. It was the first time ever that a sitting president had addressed an Indian professional organization. Notwithstanding the controversy over the fact that the President did make a quick, easy and substantial addition to his campaign coffers at the expense of the Indian community, his presence at the AAIP 1995 had a symbolic significance for all Indians, and for Indian physicians in particular. It showed that Indians had made the transition from an "invisible model minority" to an organized, visible group with problems that they could address through political involvement.¹¹⁵

In April 2004, Rep. Frank Pallone, an active India Caucus member, even introduced a resolution in the House honoring "the contributions to the U.S. made by the AAIP and its constituency of 38,000 physicians and 12,000 medical students and residents". House Resolution 579 lauded the AAIP "for its commitment to improving access to quality,

¹¹² <http://www.aapiusa.net/legislative.htm>

¹¹³ <http://www.aapiusa.org/aapi.nsf>

¹¹⁴ Lal, V., 1999, p. 45

¹¹⁵ Rangaswamy, D., 2000, p. 303

affordable healthcare and to enhancing awareness and action on issues affecting Indian American health."¹¹⁶

And last but not least, Congress provided AAIP in 2003 with a grant of \$500,000 to launch a pioneering study of diseases disproportionately affecting Americans of Asian Indian descent. Moreover, this was the first time in the history of Congress that a specialty organization representing an ethnic minority has been provided "such a substantial grant".¹¹⁷

♣ *Indo-American Chamber of Commerce (IACC)*

The IACC calls itself India's only bi-lateral Chamber of Commerce with the U.S. It is focused on promoting trade, highlighting opportunities and acting as a catalyst for developing economic growth between the two nations.

It was formally inaugurated on October 28, 1968 by Chester Bowles, the then U.S. ambassador to India. IACC has played a dynamic role in adding stimulus to business relations between India and the U.S.A. Today, there are more than 2600 members and over 300 joint venture companies (between India and the U.S.) that have enrolled with them and they have signed 7 prestigious MOU's (Memory of Understanding) with U.S.-based Chambers of Commerce.¹¹⁸

♣ *Network of Indian Professionals (NetIP)*

The NetIP is a professional, not for profit organization dedicated to the overall achievement and advancement of South Asian American professionals in the communities in which they live and work through professional development, political participation, cultural enrichment, community service, and social interaction.¹¹⁹

It was established in Chicago in 1990. Since then, it has expanded to include almost 5,000 members in most major metropolitan areas across North America. Currently, NetIP has

¹¹⁶ Haniffa, A., April 9, 2004 (a)

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ <http://www.indous.org/aboutus.php>

¹¹⁹ <http://www.netip.org/html/quarterlythemes.html>

large chapters in Chicago, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, DC, Atlanta, Dallas, Houston, Pittsburgh, Los Angeles and San Francisco.¹²⁰

The mission of the NetIP is to meet the needs of all Indian professionals as they grow in their personal and professional lives. Among their professional, cultural and community awareness program, the organization holds also a political agenda and strives to educate its membership about the political process in the U.S., at the local, state and federal level. NetIP hosts forums where members can hear about current issues in the news from experts, and discuss amongst themselves what is occurring in the world. NetIP also hosts meetings with elected officials to understand what they are doing to assist the professional community.¹²¹

The association recently hosted a "political luncheon" that they announced with the catchy phrase "Get energized for the upcoming election by meeting two local South Asian elected officials." These two officials were Sanjay T. Tailor, a judge in Cook County Circuit Court and Pramod C. Shah, Niles Township Collector. The three questions raised were: "Are South Asians ready to enter the political realm and is the political world ready for us?" "Why is it important for South Asians to be represented in U.S. government and what are our challenges as an ethnic group?" and "What steps should one take if they wish to hold an elected position in the future?"¹²² The interesting aspect about these questions is that they address the South Asian community and not the Indian community in the U.S.

Kurien (2003) has pointed out that this organization is quite progressive and despite its name encourages broader entrepreneurship among South Asian Americans (as can be read in its mission statement).¹²³ More broadly, NetIP is understood as a social space to meet other young Indians, and particularly dating and marriage prospects.¹²⁴

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² *Political Luncheon - Two Final Days to Register*, October 26, 2004

¹²³ Kurien, P., 2003, p. 268

¹²⁴ Shukla, S., 2003, p. 234

2.2.3. Pakistani American organizations

A. Organizations with political motives and goals

♣ *National Council of Pakistani Americans (NCPA)*

The vision of the NCPA is to develop an organization in Washington that serves Pakistani-Americans and other common Pakistani organizations by sharing resources for lobbying, media relations, and civil rights campaigns.¹²⁵

NCPA is incorporated in the District of Columbia as a non-profit corporation with the purpose to “provide a national structure within which Pakistani Americans may express and act upon their shared concerns, promote, encourage and foster better understanding in the U.S., of political, economic, and cultural interests of the community, and encourage and foster the common good and general welfare of the people of the U.S.”¹²⁶

Its goals are (1) to educate and encourage Pakistani-Americans to partake in the American political process, (2) to enhance and progress the empowerment of Pakistani-Americans at all levels of American political process, (3) to educate and impact American policy makers on issues concerning to Pakistani-Americans and simultaneously contribute positively on the local, national level politics, and back in Pakistan, (4) to present true Pakistani traditions, values, history and culture to America and the West, (5) to improve the image of Pakistan and Pakistani-Americans by working with the media, think tanks, NGO organizations, and universities, (6) to strive for assurance of basic human and civil rights of all Americans and all Pakistani-Americans and (7) to strive with fellow Americans to eliminate in American society any vestiges of discrimination or intolerance on the basis of race, sex, religion, and ethnicity.¹²⁷ On its website is a link showing people how to "web-lobby" congressmen and senators.

¹²⁵ <http://www.ncpa.info/>

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

The association itself is meant to be strictly bipartisan and will not be endorsing candidates. The immediate objectives are facilitating fundraisings for local, state and federal elected officials, registering voters and encouraging Pakistani Americans to become candidates.¹²⁸

♣ *Pakistan American Public Affairs Committee (PAKPAC)*

PAKPAC is a nationwide, membership based, non-profit lobbying organization registered with the U.S. Federal Government. PAKPAC's mission includes advancement and strengthening of U.S.-Pakistan relations. It is organized to be a unified voice on issues and concerns common to the Pakistani American community. PAKPAC's focus includes an active environment to foster greater political and civic engagement amongst the Pakistani Americans.

PAKPAC is also concentrates on collaborating with other regional and national Pakistani American organizations to ensue increased efficacy and reduced duplication of the stated goals. PAKPAC along with affiliates is working to serve as a watchdog for inaccuracies and bias in media coverage about Pakistan and Pakistani Americans. They are also involved in educating media groups, journalists, politicians, academicians and members of think tanks about views of concern and importance to the Pakistani American community.¹²⁹

♣ *Pakistan American Liaison Center Political Action Committee (PALC-PAC)*

PALC-PAC seeks to politically mobilize the Pakistani American community through educational outreach initiatives, social networking and community organizations. Its website provides a list of all the members of the Pakistan Caucus in the U.S. Congress and also spurs members to take action when it comes to certain proposed resolutions and bills.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ *Pakistani Americans organize politically*, May 21, 2004

¹²⁹ <http://www.pakpac.net/>

¹³⁰ <http://www.pal.us/>

♣ *Association of Pakistani Professionals (AOPP)*

AOPP is an independent group making an effort to act as a bridge between the people of the U.S. and Pakistan - to help Pakistanis to understand the American perspective and to help Americans to understand Pakistan and South Asia. AOPP stands for a progressive and democratic Pakistan and endeavors to support liberal and progressive forces in Pakistan and discourage religious extremism in Pakistan. AOPP endeavors to ensure Americans (policy-making and media) that the majority of Pakistanis are moderate and progressive people and Pakistan needs America's help and support.¹³¹ Its website displays examples of how to write to congressmen and senators asking them to vote for or against certain bills.

♣ *Pakistani American Congress (PAC), Organization of Pakistani Americans*

PAC (Washington, DC.) is a nation-wide umbrella entity of Pakistani Americans and Pakistani Organizations in North America in effect since 1990. PAC is incorporated as a non-profit, non-religious and non-partisan premier community organization. It is a catalyst of social, educational and political activities, which promote the interests and protect the civil rights and liberties.¹³²

Delegates of the Pakistani American Congress also visit Pakistan where they have had meetings with President Musharraf, governors and generals and participate in discussions on Pakistan Television networks.¹³³

B. Organizations formed along religious lines

It seems that most of the Pakistani Muslims join Islamic associations that serve as umbrella organizations for Muslims of many different countries. An article in The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs published in 2000 pointed out that the barriers to American Muslims' political cohesiveness are largely internal, due to the American Muslim community's multiculturalism. The American Muslim community has been very successful in

¹³¹ <http://www.aopp.org/>

¹³² <http://www.pacus.org/main-page.html>

¹³³ Ahmad, C.N., 2002

building Islamic institutions like mosques, Islamic centers and schools etc. However, in the arena of politics it has not yet enjoyed victories. In 2000, the barriers were assumed to be largely internal.¹³⁴ We can assume that in a post 9/11 context, this is no longer the case.

One of these internal barriers was the inability of the community to prioritize its political goals and evolve a widely accepted short list of political goals. This is a consequence of the fact that American Muslims come from many parts of the world and with the growth of the American Muslim community over the last few decades many subgroups have emerged. The biggest two subgroups represent Muslims from Arab countries and from South Asia. Each subgroup attempts to organize around its own goals rather than any overall goal of the Muslim community.¹³⁵

The same article exclaims that the best-organized group is the Pakistani American one. They are supposed to have as many political action committees as all the rest of the American Muslim community. The article states: "While on pure Islamic issues, such as building mosques or Islamic schools, Pakistanis remain an integral part of the general American Muslim community, on political issues they have charted their own separate territory."¹³⁶

C. Organizations formed along professional lines

♣ *Association of Pakistani Physicians in North-America (APPNA)*

APPNA is a non-profit organization formally incorporated in August 1977 and organized for educational and scientific purposes, including for such purposes, distributions to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations.¹³⁷

Its other aims and objectives are: to support medical education and research, to advance the interests of medicine and medical organizations, to foster scientific development and education in the field of medicine for the purpose of improving the quality of medicine

¹³⁴ Khan, M., 2000

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ <http://www.appna.org/objectives/>

and delivery of better health care, without regard to race, color, creed, sex or age, to facilitate a greater and better understanding and relations amongst Pakistani physicians and between them and the people of North America, to support the efforts of those who would preserve, protect and enhance the reputation and services of the medical profession in general and Pakistani physicians in particular, to assist newly arriving Pakistani physicians in orientation and adjustment, to institute ways and means to cooperate with other medical organizations in North America, to encourage medical education and delivery of better health care in Pakistan, specifically by arranging for donation of medical literature, medical supplies, and by arranging lecture tours, medical conferences, and seminars in Pakistan, to participate in medical relief and other charitable activities both in Pakistan and in North America.¹³⁸

♣ *U.S.-Pakistan Business Council (USPBC)*

The U.S.- Pakistan Business Council is an integral component of the South Asia Affairs Department at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The Council was formally inaugurated at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on September 30, 2002. The primary role of the USPBC is to foster a greater awareness of business opportunities in Pakistan, and to further increase U.S. foreign direct investment in Pakistan. The Council brings together Pakistani and American business leaders for constructive discussions of business conditions and policy related issues. The Council provides a forum for dialogue on key economic, commercial and other relevant issues of interest to American companies doing or planning to do business in Pakistan.¹³⁹

♣ *Pakistan International Chamber of Commerce Inc. (PICC)*

PICC is an internationally active non-profit, non-political and pro-business entity founded in the year 2000. PICC represents businesses, institutions and organization of different nature and sizes. PICC keeps an eye on the international economy as well as the changing legislation in Washington and Islamabad that could hurt Pakistani business. It also

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ <http://www.uschamber.org/>

surveys government's action and policies related to business and business environment. PICC is dedicated to facilitating trade and industry with a focus on economic development in Pakistan, helping Pakistani communities living in the U.S. and other countries. PICC is the first and only business organization of its kind outside Pakistan that promotes direct dialogue on bilateral economic issues between the Pakistani business community and business sectors of other nations.¹⁴⁰

♣ *Pakistan American Business Association (PABA)*

PABA, an independent, non-profit organization established in 1986 under U.S. and Virginia laws, is located in Burke, Virginia. The association serves the professional, educational, career development and networking needs of entrepreneurs, proprietors, executives and professionals, provides special business services to the business community, promotes trade and investment opportunities in the U.S., Pakistan and other countries, advances common business interests of the Association's members and offers business education and information to enhance the business management, marketing and computer skills of its members.¹⁴¹

♣ *Pakistani American Business Executive Association (PABE)*

PABE is an organization of business leaders from Pakistan and the U.S. that seeks to foster and facilitate trade and investment between Pakistan and the U.S. as well as to mentor businesses new to the international market place. It is a non-profit business association working to promote business and economic growth in Pakistan and the U.S. It is not a social group or a political organization. Its members are key executives from a broad range of company sizes, from small entrepreneurial firms to large multinational corporations.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ <http://www.pakchamber.com/>

¹⁴¹ <http://www.pabausa.com/>

¹⁴² <http://www.pabe.org/>

♣ *Association of Pakistani Scientists and Engineers of North America (APSENA)*

APSENA's mission is formulated as follows: "initiate ways and means for fostering and encouraging cooperation with and among scientists and engineers of Pakistani origin in North America and their specialized organization to not only increase their contributions to science and technology in the U.S., but also to become the vehicle for successfully disseminating knowledge to the developing countries, particularly to the country of their origin."¹⁴³

♣ *Organization of Pakistani Entrepreneurs of North America (OPEN)*

OPEN was formed in 1998 by a group of Pakistani-American entrepreneurs and corporate executives with the aim of nurturing entrepreneurship in the nascent community. OPEN Inc., registered in the state of Massachusetts in the year 2000, is a non-profit organization with the charter to provide networking opportunities for Pakistani entrepreneurs and professionals in the high-tech industries. Its goals are: to facilitate and encourage the growth of Pakistani entrepreneurs in the technology field, to draw attention to and promote Pakistani hi-tech entrepreneurs within the greater technology community, to provide financing assistance and mentorship to enterprising individuals through programs such as the business plan competition and monthly business plan critiques, to develop ongoing events where technology professionals can meet and network with other influential individuals and to recognize accomplishments by Pakistani entrepreneurs and professionals in the technology field.¹⁴⁴

2.3. Assessment of the organizations

Despite the fact that many of the previously described organizations present themselves to be religious or professional, it is clear from the description of their goals that all of them in one way or another try to influence either domestic or foreign politics and policies

¹⁴³ <http://www.apsena.org/>

¹⁴⁴ <http://www.open-us.org/>

of the U.S. and/or domestic and foreign politics and policies of their mother countries. With the exception of SAALT, all hold transnational links with their home country.

I should stress that this list is *probably* not including *all* the Indian American and Pakistani American organizations on the federal level and my research was primarily conducted through the internet. Interestingly, if we exempt the religious associations, both diaspora communities have an equal number (12) of political and professional organizations. Indian Americans have a higher number of political associations (9) than the Pakistani Americans (3). This is not at all surprising because Indian Americans have been much longer politically active in the U.S. than Pakistani Americans. Pakistani Americans have a higher number of professional associations (5) than the Indian Americans (3). But - as I have indicated earlier - the demarcation between professional and political is not fixed and clear, so we could say that Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans have an equal number of organizations on the federal level.

Many articles about the funding of U.S. congressmen draw attention to the powerful role of ethnic contributions in American politics and the degree to which U.S. lawmakers, in catering to ethnic voting blocs, may become advocates for foreign powers. New groups of politically ethnics are emerging and they have learned over the course of decades that money is perhaps the fastest route to recognition. Moreover, many ethnic Americans have been drawn to the political process by a desire to influence U.S. policies affecting their homelands.¹⁴⁵ Ethnic lobbies have been playing a more visible role in policymaking. Increasingly, some observers fear, American foreign policy will be driven and often fragmented by the pressures of groups with intense interests. Even more so, ethnic lobbies are expected to shape American foreign policy abroad.¹⁴⁶

There are several ways these organizations gain recognition in the eyes of congressmen and senators. Naturally, the most sufficient tactic to make sure that your

¹⁴⁵ Morgan, D.; Merida, K., March 24, 1997; Greenberger, R.S.; Kuntz, P., May 19, 1998

¹⁴⁶ Lindsay, J.M., Winter 2002, p. 37

organization is being noticed, is to fund congressmen's and senators' political campaigns. Many organizations coordinate lavish fund raising parties. A number of the previously discussed associations are also Political Action Committees (PAC).¹⁴⁷

On the website [opensecrets.org](http://www.opensecrets.org), the website of the American government which enables you to track the funding of U.S. parties, senators and representatives, I found that only two of the above discussed Indo-American and Pakistani-American PACs made contributions in the past elections: the Indo-American USINPAC, and the Pakistani American Physicians PAC.

The summary data for the 2004 election indicate that the USINPAC donated money to federal candidates for the total sum of \$82,000 (according to the last report of October 13, 2004). Forty-seven percent of this money went to Democrats and 53% to Republicans. Forty-five thousand five hundred dollars of this money was given to 12 House candidates. Only three among the twelve were not a member of the India Caucus. Also among the Senate candidates-recipients were several members of the Senate India Caucus. It is important to stress that these figures only reflect sponsoring by the PAC of federal candidates. Contributions to this PAC from individual donors exceeded \$270,000. In the elections of 2002 this PAC only donated \$750 and all this money went to the Republicans. Two hundred and fifty dollars was given to a House India Caucus member. Again, contributions of individual donors to this PAC were much higher and totaled \$36,961.¹⁴⁸ I did not find out what was done with the remaining money. Do not forget that USINPAC was only founded in 2002.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ A PAC is a popular term for a political committee organized for the purpose of raising and spending money to elect and defeat candidates. Most PACs represent business, labor or ideological interests. PACs can donate \$5,000 to a candidate committee per election (primary, general or special). They can also give up to \$15,000 annually to any national party committee, and \$5,000 annually to any other PAC and may receive up to \$5,000 from any one individual, PAC or party committee per calendar year. A PAC must register with the FEC within 10 days of its formation, providing name and address for the PAC, its treasurer and any connected organizations. Affiliated PACs are treated as one donor for the purpose of contribution limits. (<http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacfaq.asp>)

¹⁴⁸ www.opensecrets.org

¹⁴⁹ http://www.usinpac.com/Content.asp?SEC_ID=27

Pakistan American Physicians PAC donated \$6000 (according to the last report of June 30, 2004) to federal candidates in the election of 2004. Eighty-three percent went to the Democrats and 17% to the Republicans. All sponsored House candidates are members of the Pakistan Caucus. The contributions of individual donors to this PAC reached \$24,878. Donations in the 2002 election totaled \$4700 of which 4% went to the Democrats and 96% to the Republicans. None of the current members of the Pakistan Caucus were recipients of any of this money. The contributions of individuals in 2002 reached \$33,600. In the 2000 elections this PAC donated \$2500 to the Democrats and the Republicans were granted nothing. One of the two recipients is a member of the India as well as Pakistan House Caucus. The contributions of individuals to this PAC totaled \$26,105. The 1998 summary data show that 56% of the donations went to the Democrats and 44% to the Republicans, coming to a total of \$4500. Again, none of the recipients are now a member of the Pakistan Caucus. Interestingly, the contributions of individuals made to this PAC reached an all time high of \$75,950.¹⁵⁰ Again, I do not know what happened with the remaining money.

What is interesting about these data is that they display the true bipartisan orientation of the Indo-American as well as the Pakistani-American community. During one election cycle they seem to favor Democrats, in the other they favor Republicans. Hathaway (2000 and 2001) indeed states that the Indian American community as a whole has avoided identification with either of the major political parties and has given generously to the Democrats as well as to the Republicans.¹⁵¹ This attitude is clear from these figures. Nevertheless, I was surprised that I was able to track only two organizations on the Opensecrets-website and had expected a far higher number.

Besides organizing fundraising parties, many of the Indian American, Pakistani American or pan-Asian professional associations are also actively reaching out to their Washington representatives. The American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin

¹⁵⁰ www.opensecrets.org (consulted on 10/27/2004)

¹⁵¹ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 24; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000

(AAPI), the Indian American Friendship Council, the Asian American Hotel Owners Association¹⁵², and similar groups host legislative conferences in Washington each year, which prominent U.S. lawmakers are invited to address.¹⁵³

It is noteworthy that not only Indian American or Pakistani American associations lobby congressmen but also American corporations actively lobby Congress for legislation favourable to India¹⁵⁴, especially around issues relating to working visas.¹⁵⁵ Organizations such as the Indian-owned National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM) has by means of donations lobbied the U.S. Senate to allow more outsourcing of jobs to India and more non-immigrant visa holders (i.e. H-1B work visas) to take jobs in the U.S. NASSCOM has also helped to organize trade delegations to India for members of the India Caucus.¹⁵⁶

2.4. Other means of political participation

Setting up and joining organizations with political incentives is only one way to participate politically in U.S. society. In fact, organizations do not function on the individual level but always require some degree of cooperation between individuals. Individual and semi-individual ways of political participation are voting, sponsoring political campaigns as an individual, establishing personal relations with elected officials, running for office and carrying out internships.

¹⁵² The Asian American Hotel Owners Association is relevant in this case because many Indian Americans are motel owners. Apparently the organization is now dominated by Gujarati Patels. (Leonard, K., 1997, p.95) Indians in the U.S. are believed to own close to 40% of all small motels (Kotkin, J., 1992, p.208) The 2004 summary data of the Asian American Hotel Owners association PAC indicate that \$5,000 was donated of which 20% went to the Democrats and 80% to the Republicans. Four thousand dollars was donated to the Indian American (recently elected) Republican Representative of Louisiana, Bobby Jindal.

¹⁵³ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 25; Romney, L., November 28, 1996, p. 1; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000; Lancaster, J., October 9, 1999; Shogren, E., October 29, 2000; Raghavan, B.S., February 2, 2001; Khare, R.S., 2002, p. 280

¹⁵⁴ Cohen, S.P., 2001, p. 289

¹⁵⁵ Datta-Ray, S.K., 2002, p. 281-383

¹⁵⁶ Sanchez, R., October 27, 2003; McKellar, H., March 2004

2.4.1. Voting

Putnam (2000) writes that voting is by a substantial margin the most common form of political action and it embodies the most fundamental democratic principle of equality. Not to vote is to withdraw from the political community. Moreover, voting is an instructive proxy measure of broader social change. Compared to demographically matched nonvoters, voters are more likely to be interested in politics, to give charity, to volunteer, to serve on juries, to attend community school board meetings, to participate in public demonstrations, and to cooperate with their fellow citizens on community affairs. It is sometimes hard to tell whether voting causes community engagement or vice versa, although some recent evidence suggests that the act of voting itself encourages volunteering and other forms of good citizenship. However, others state that it is incomplete and misleading to understand citizen participation solely through the vote.¹⁵⁷

The numbers indicating the voting behavior of Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans are but mere estimations, but nevertheless interesting to take a look at. According to the publication *Current Population Survey* of the U.S. Census Bureau, 37.75% of Indian Americans who are U.S. citizens of voting age voted in the 2002 election. Census data indicate that Indian Americans have generally had a lower voter registration rate than the general population. When registration in the general population averages between 66.5% and 79.9% of eligible people registered to vote, 55.8% to 65.5% of the eligible in the Indian American population is registered. However, in the years of a presidential election, voter registration as well as turnout in the general and in the Indian American community is higher.¹⁵⁸ Numbers of the 1990 Census show even a lower voter turnout, i.e. 30% of the Indian American community voted in the presidential election. From this 30% in 1990, roughly 10% of Indian Americans contributed to a political party or candidate, although half

¹⁵⁷ Putnam, R., 2000, p. 35

¹⁵⁸ Dumm, C., Jain, N., August 2004, p. 5

of those contributions were under \$100.¹⁵⁹ Another source, however, claims the opposite stating that despite the small number of the Indian American voters, it is generally agreed that they vote in high proportion to their total.¹⁶⁰

I hardly found any resources about the voting turnout of Pakistani Americans. However, it is believed that Pakistani Americans have become more politically active in the aftermath of 9/11. Rashad Khan an appointed member of the Pakistani American Democratic Committee in Northern Virginia and businessman to the Board of Supervisors Criminal Justice Advisory committee, exclaimed: "Nine-11 was a kind of jolt for Pakistani Americans that they have the right to vote." Other members of the same committee expected Pakistani Americans in the presidential election of 2004 to come to the polls for the first time. More numerical research should be carried out on the question of the voting behavior and turnout of Pakistani Americans.¹⁶¹

During the 2004 election campaigns the New California Media Company made a study of the voting behavior of Asian Americans in the 2004 presidential election. Chinese Americans represented the largest voting block among ethnic Asian voters, carrying about 26% of the Asian American vote. The Chinese were followed by the 20% of Indian American voters. The study proved that Asian Americans preferred Senator Kerry with the strongest support coming from the Chinese (58-23%) and the Indian Americans (53-14%). However, the study also revealed that the Asian Indians were by far the largest group of undecided voters (30%).¹⁶² Other sources mentioned that the Asian American population definitely lacks the political clout in order to be able to make a serious difference in election results.¹⁶³

When it comes to voting, one of the main obstacles is the question of citizenship. While many Indians (and probably Pakistanis too) are eligible, very few bother to enter the

¹⁵⁹ *The Indian American population*, IACPA

¹⁶⁰ Trunzo, J.D., *Pakistani/Indian-Americans Raise Political Visibility*

¹⁶¹ Husain, A., October 30, 2003

¹⁶² Lobe, J., *Asian Americans lean toward Kerry*

¹⁶³ Armas, G.C., July 19, 2004

naturalization process. If Indian Americans do get involved, it is often with a limited or no agenda; most fail to hold their elected representatives accountable, treating officials like celebrities rather than public servants.¹⁶⁴ Other observations concerning citizenship claim that the motives for naturalization among Indians are often related to family reunification benefits, scholarship benefits for college-going youth, and Social Security benefits for elderly. Voting is not the primary reason to become naturalized.¹⁶⁵ In order to exercise the most basic democratic right of voting, one must first become a citizen.

On November 5th, 2004 (right after the presidential elections) I received an email from the organization South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow (SAALT) applauding the efforts of South Asian Americans in the last elections. It stated that there had been an unprecedented level of interest and engagement in this election year which is a clear sign that the community understands the integral role of civic participation in addressing policy issues that impact the South Asian communities. It also said: "There can be no doubt that South Asians are ready, willing and able to contribute to and strengthen our democracy by raising critical issues, registering new voters, coming out to vote, and safeguarding the rights of new voters to cast ballots without intimidation."¹⁶⁶

2.4.2. Donating money as an individual

Apart from donating money to PACs (which usually ends up with political candidates), it is also possible to fund congressmen individually, i.e. without a PAC serving as an interlocutor. There is no way of finding out how much exactly the Indian American and Pakistani American individuals (or the community as a whole) is contributing, but the fact that the community newspapers such as *India Abroad* and *India Times* publish so many articles on the subject can serve as an indicator that both diaspora communities are very active in funding political candidates. Both Cohen (2001) and Khare (2002) have pointed out that

¹⁶⁴ *The Indian American population*, IACPA

¹⁶⁵ Rangaswamy, D., 2000, p. 295

¹⁶⁶ *SAALT statement: South Asians Emerge as Force in 2004 Elections*, November 5, 2004

Indian Americans have been translating their wealth and status into a political clout. Despite the fact that this has occurred over the last few years only, it has nevertheless become an important source of funding in House and Senate races.¹⁶⁷

Consequently, tapping into the financial clout of Indian Americans or Pakistani Americans has thus become an effective way for pro-India or pro-Pakistan congressmen to raise money for their campaigns. In the 1980's, Stephen Solarz was one of the rare lawmakers benefiting from these Indian-American funds.¹⁶⁸ Indian Americans raised \$4 million on behalf of political candidates for the 1992 election; six years later, this figure had almost doubled to more than \$7 million.¹⁶⁹ Senator Pressler for example, had in 1996 an ad placed in the community newspaper *India Abroad* in which he appealed for a "generous contribution for a friend of India".¹⁷⁰ This same newspaper regularly features brief articles by members of Congress. By providing this forum, the paper encourages congressional offices to address issues of concern to the Asian Indian American community and to go on record in favor of a close Indo-U.S. partnership. Legislators have found these articles a useful way to educate themselves and their constituents on domestic as well as foreign policy issues. Drafting the articles also forces Congress members and their staff to reflect upon these issues.¹⁷¹ In September 1996, President Clinton held a fund raising event in the Mayflower Hotel (New York) where he addressed a group of prominent Indian Americans. The event raised approximately \$400,000. Clinton lauded the ethnic group's achievements and the promise of better U.S.-India relations. He also vowed to focus more on South Asia if he would be re-elected. These kinds of events and statements reveal that American policy makers are

¹⁶⁷ Cohen, S.P., 2001, p. 288; Khare, R.S., 2002, p. 280

¹⁶⁸ Greenberger, R.S.; Kuntz, P., May 19, 1998

¹⁶⁹ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 24

¹⁷⁰ Morgan, D.; Merida, K., March 24, 1997

¹⁷¹ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 26; ; Shukla, S.R., 2003, p. 209; Nurnberger, R., February 24, 1995

recognizing a new reality, i.e. the rise of an affluent ethnic community that increasingly wants to make its influence in the political arena.¹⁷²

2.4.3. Establishing personal relations with elected officials

Individual participation can also be established through building up and maintaining relationships with elected officials. At a minimum, this means writing letters or calling officials to ensure that your opinions are included in the decision-making progress. Indian Americans have definitely recognized this method as is clear from the following two examples. In 1994, Indian Americans contacted the Clinton administration personally to support the nomination of Stephen Solarz as the next ambassador to India.¹⁷³ Another remarkable sign of their political engagement is evident in the next anecdote. After the Kargil insurgency, Asian Indian American computer professionals, urging a condemnation of Pakistani actions, organized an email campaign that startled congressional offices. One staff member reported receiving 400 e-mails in a 24-hour period. Although this congressional aide was irritated rather than persuaded by the messages, the potential impact of a mobilized and technologically savvy bloc of voters did not escape notice.¹⁷⁴ As far as the Pakistani American community is concerned, I did not find any sources mentioning these kinds of actions. I did read many speeches of Pakistani American community leaders who urged their communities to contact their legislators.

2.4.4. Running for office

One way for an ethnic community to increase its influence over Congress is to make sure that one of its own members gets elected as a representative or senator. In general this is a very slow and gradual process where a person starts out at the local level as a school board member or as a council member of the City Council to eventually end up as a representative in Congress. The record of Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans serving in U.S.

¹⁷² Greenberger, R.S.; Kuntz, P., May 19, 1998; Hiebert, M., March 23, 2000

¹⁷³ Nurnberger, R., March 25, 1994

¹⁷⁴ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 24; Lal, V., 2001, p. 189-190; Lancaster, J., October 9, 1999; Chanda, N., March 30, 2000

Congress is meager and practically non-existent. Up till the 2004 elections, there had only been one Indian American who had served in the U.S. House of Representatives. This man, Dalip Singh Saund, was elected as a judge of a court of justice in 1953 and thereafter to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1956. He was also appointed to the House of Foreign Affairs Committee.¹⁷⁵ Saund finally got his long awaited follower in the elections of 2004. An Indian American Republican of Louisiana, Bobby Jindal won a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives with 78.3% of the vote.¹⁷⁶

India Abroad regularly features articles about Indian Americans actively running for office, but (with the exception of Bobby Jindal) they have not been extremely successful and their success has been limited to winning seats in State Assemblies or in political committees.¹⁷⁷ By contrast, there are three Indians elected to the Canadian House of Commons and two British members of Parliament of Indian origin.¹⁷⁸

As far as the Pakistani American community is concerned, there has never been a Pakistani American representative or senator in U.S. Congress. In January 2004, the first Pakistani-born American became mayor of a New Jersey municipality and he is probably the first person to hold that post in the U.S.¹⁷⁹

In contrary to the Hispanics or Latinos in the U.S. who have organized themselves politically under a pan-ethnic umbrella and in doing this have been quite successful, the Indians' and Pakistanis' South Asian origin does not constitute a basis for cohesion among Indians and Pakistanis residing in the U.S. and consequently no South Asian candidate has been elected on that basis.

¹⁷⁵ Jha, N.K., 2003, p. 166; Shukla, S.R., 2003, p.148; Mohapatra, M.K., Mohanty, A. & Co, 2003, p.21; Srikanth, R., 1999/2000, p. 63

¹⁷⁶ *Indian American Candidate Election Summary*, November 3, 2004; Rajagopalam, S., November 3, 2004

¹⁷⁷ Nanda, T.K., November 16, 2001

¹⁷⁸ Rangaswamy, D., 2000, p. 291

¹⁷⁹ *Pakistani American Elected as Mayor of New Jersey Town*, January 23, 2003

2.4.5. Internships for the second generation

One of the main reasons why it is so hard to run successfully for Congress, is the hardship to defeat an incumbent, especially as the sitting member has such advantages as name, recognition, access to campaign funds, full-time staff dedicated to enhancing their reputations, experience in getting elected and putting together successful campaigns, and an ability to build support by providing services for individual constituents.¹⁸⁰

A way to ease this difficult undertaking is to spur the second generation of Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans to become politically active. Many members of Congress began their careers as interns or staff working for other political leaders. The next generation will probably also be much better educated than their parents or grandparents about the American political game and will know to a larger extent who their senators and representatives are.¹⁸¹ Consequently, a strategy of the IACPA has been to attract young (i.e. second generation) Indian Americans to carry out an internship at the office of a representative or senator. The IACPA program has been increasingly popular, according to an article in *India Abroad*. The title of the article *From one intern in 1995 to 15 in 2003, with an alumni of 115; The growing Indian-American community has come to understand the importance of setting and achieving political goals*, needs no further explanation. Second generation Indian Americans in their applications wrote statements such as "Although Indian Americans are becoming increasingly political active, I have long lamented the conspicuous absence of South Asians at the top of the American political sphere, and I am convinced that it is up to my generation to fill the void." and "By more representation on Capitol Hill and in state and local government, Indians in general would be helped... We must continue to discuss politics at Indian functions, encourage politicians to attend our events and mingle, have organizations work on lobbying Congress to further the Indian American agenda."¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Nurnberger, R., June 19, 2001

¹⁸¹ Putnam, R., 2000, p. 36

¹⁸² Nurnberger, R., July 25, 2003

Again, I did not run into Pakistani American organizations that are engaged in similar projects. Of course, that does not mean that these organizations do not exist. Nevertheless, the Indian American is very much engaged in advertising the IACPA's internship program as many articles in *India Abroad* mention the program and spur Indian American university students to apply.

2.5. Conclusion

The most effective and direct way of building up political influence as an ethnic community probably still remains lobbying congressmen for certain causes and simultaneously funding their campaigns. American legislators have clearly recognized the potential source of funds and have responded by sending increasing numbers of direct mail solicitations to the community. Many articles however, have pointed out that Indian Americans have been donating money too randomly without taken into account the congressman's voting history and stand on issues. A certain congressman has stated "Indian Americans are being taken for a ride by many members of Congress and political candidates." Apparently, officeholders and candidates routinely seek the funds from the community largely because many Indian Americans make campaign contributions without researching the records of the political candidate. Observers have commented that the obsession Indian Americans have for the "photo-op" makes them spend hundred of dollars merely for the privilege of having their picture taken with a prominent politician. No effort is made to develop a political, issue-oriented platform. Thus, other than requesting a photo with a politician, most Indian Americans rarely ask for anything in return for their funds. Most feel that the act of giving money is the end, and not the beginning, of their political involvement.¹⁸³

What is clear from my research is that the Indian diaspora communities in the U.S. have reached a point that they are much more efficiently organized than the Pakistani

¹⁸³ Nurnberger, R., October 25, 1996; Rangaswamy, D., 2000, p. 292

Americans. A major advantage of the Indian community is the prevalence of Indian American newspapers such as *India Abroad* and *News India* which are both available on paper and on the internet. As Benedict Anderson has pointed out in *Imagined Communities*, print-capitalism and print-languages provide a basis for national consciousness and connects fellow readers (who do not even know each other) in nationally imagined communities.¹⁸⁴ This exactly what *India Abroad* does with Indian Americans, it provides a forum for the diaspora community to communicate and to envision their specific community in the U.S.

In 2003, Stephen Cohen a fellow of the Brookings Institution, specified four tasks for the Pakistani American community. It is imperative to mobilize a learned Pakistani academic who is a professor at a renowned American university. This person could interact with various think tanks, congressmen, State Department officials, and researchers engaged in the study of South Asia. The second task involves the sponsoring of visits of American academics to Pakistan. The visit could offer the researchers an opportunity to share the Pakistani perception on various issues as well as to know the country and the people more intimately. Third, Pakistani Americans should be supportive of the education sector in Pakistan. Last and foremost, Pakistani Americans should serve as a bridge between the U.S. and Pakistan, lobby for Islamabad and project the national point of issues on crucial issues like Kashmir.¹⁸⁵

It appears to me that the Pakistani American communities have just started to organize politically and still have a long way to go reaching the point where Indian Americans are now. Where the Indian Americans send their first second generation member as an intern to Capitol Hill in 1995, the Pakistani Americans have just recently started thinking about doing the same. As Faiz Rehman, the PAL-C executive director stated in May 2004: "Our goals also include educating Pakistani Americans, especially, the young generation, in legislative affairs and public policy by creating a support network and

¹⁸⁴ Anderson, B., 1983 (1991), p. 44

¹⁸⁵ Faruqi, A.M., March 21, 2003

encouraging them to diversify their interests and adopt careers in non-traditional fields such as politics, journalism, and law."¹⁸⁶

Perhaps one of the strongest developments favoring India and Indian Americans or Pakistan and Pakistani Americans has been the birth of the India Caucus and Pakistan Caucus in U.S. Congress, which are presumed to take an active role in looking after the interests of India and respectively Pakistan on Capitol Hill. Both diaspora communities were more than instrumental in its creation.

¹⁸⁶ Hasan, K., May 31, 2004; Bughio, K.; June 22, 2004

4. Caucus on India and Indian Americans in the U.S. House of Representatives

The House Caucus on India and Indian Americans was established in February 1993¹⁸⁷ during the first Clinton administration. When Clinton came to power in 1993, Robin Raphel was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia. However, Raphel's 'mismanagement' regarding issues of the subcontinent annoyed numerous Asian Indians in the U.S. as well as abroad. Consequently, one of the prominent members of the Indian American Forum for Political Education, Kapil Sharma, pushed for the creation of a Congressional Caucus on India, along the lines of the Black Caucus that already existed in Congress. The idea was to educate Congress members on issues concerning India so that the Congress in turn could question the administration and influence American foreign policy towards India.¹⁸⁸

Initially, the Forum decided to target those representatives whose election constituency or district had a large Indian population. New Jersey was the state to get started. Three representatives were targeted, including Frank Pallone (D-NJ), who would become the first Democratic co-chairman of the Congressional India Caucus.¹⁸⁹

At its inception in 1993 the Caucus had only eight members.¹⁹⁰ Over the past ten years the India Caucus has rapidly grown to consist of 186¹⁹¹ members of Congress and is the largest country caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives.¹⁹²

Frank Pallone (D-NJ) and Bill McCollum¹⁹³ (R-FL) served as co-chairmen from 1993 until October 1998.¹⁹⁴ Gary Ackerman (D-NY) and James Greenwood (R-PA) who served from 1998 till 2000 succeeded them. In the 107th Congress (2000-2002), the co-chairmen

¹⁸⁷ Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001

¹⁸⁸ Diwanji, A.K., Sept. 18, 2002; Datta-Ray, S.K., 2002, p. 212-213

¹⁸⁹ Diwanji, A.K., Sept. 18, 2002

¹⁹⁰ Diwanji, A.K., Sept. 18, 2002; <http://joewilson.house.gov/Issues/Issue/?IssueID=105>

¹⁹¹ This number was last updated on June 18, 2004.

¹⁹² <http://joewilson.house.gov/Issues/Issue/?IssueID=105>

¹⁹³ Bill McCollum joined the Caucus because he was very critical about Pakistan's record on narcotics and terrorism (Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 504; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 40)

¹⁹⁴ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 28

were Jim McDermott (D-WA) and Ed Royce (R-CA). In the 108th Congress Joseph Crowley (D-NY)¹⁹⁵ and Joe Wilson (R-SC) carried out the roles of co-chairmen.¹⁹⁶

Invariably referred to as the India Caucus, the group promotes both Indo-U.S. relations and other issues of concern to the Indian American community. It is active on immigration issues¹⁹⁷, family reunification, and health care issues; and works against discrimination, hate crimes and glass ceilings.¹⁹⁸

Members¹⁹⁹: House India Caucus²⁰⁰

*(108th Congress elected in November 2002) (list updated June 18, 2004)
112 Democrats, 74 republicans, Total 186*

16% of its members (30/186) are also aligned with the Caucus on Pakistan and Pakistani Americans. Among these 30, 19 are Democrats and 11 Republicans.

19 members (18 Democrats, 1 Republican) are Jewish members of Congress who are known to be actively involved members of the India Caucus. This is more than half of the Jewish representatives (i.e. 26) in the House of Representatives²⁰¹. While there is no pro-Israel equivalent of the India Caucus, it is interesting to see how many Jewish members of the House are active leaders of the causes to enhance America's relations with both India and Israel.²⁰² Three (all Democrats) Jewish members of the India Caucus are also members of the Pakistan Caucus. (cf. Chapter 9)

Joseph Crowley, Co-Chairman
D-New York

Joe Wilson, Co-Chairman
R-South Carolina

Neil Abercrombie
D-Hawaii

Gary Ackerman
D-New York

JC

¹⁹⁵ Denton, W., February 4, 2002

¹⁹⁶ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 29; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000

<http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress/caucus/caucus.html>

<http://joewilson.house.gov/Issues/Issue/?IssueID=105>

<http://crowley.house.gov/biography/index.htm>

¹⁹⁷ To give an example: in 2000, forty Indian computer programmers were arrested in San Antonio. Consequently, the issue of racism and discrimination echoed among some of the Indian computer-consulting firms that employ Indian professionals on H-1B temporary work visas. The State Department was heavily pressured by the India Caucus to obtain a full report from the INS (Immigration and Nationalization Service). (Chandra, N., February 9, 2000)

¹⁹⁸ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 28

¹⁹⁹ ● : Democrats

● : Republicans

underlined: member of House India Caucus AND House Pakistan Caucus

JC ● : Jewish affiliation

²⁰⁰ <http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress/caucus/caucus.html>

²⁰¹ <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/jewcong108.html>

²⁰² Nurnberger, R., February 15, 2002

Robert Andrews
D-New Jersey

Brian Baird
D-Washington

Bob Beauprez
R-Colorado

Chris Bell
D-Texas

Howard Berman
D-California

Michael Bilirakis
R-Florida

Earl Blumenauer
D-Oregon

Kevin Brady
R-Texas

Henry Brown
R-South Carolina

Ginny Brown-Waite
R-Florida

Max Burns
R-Georgia

Chris Cannon
R-Utah

Lois Capps
D-California

Dennis Cardoza
D-California

Steve Chabot
R-Ohio

Jim Cooper
D-Tennessee

Barbara Cubin
R-Wyoming

Jim Davis
D-Florida

William Delahunt
D-Massachusetts

Jim DeMint
R-South Carolina

Lloyd Doggett

Joe Baca
D-California

J. Gresham Barrett
R-South Carolina

Xavier Becerra
D-California

Shelley Berkley
D-Nevada

JC **Judy Biggert**
R-Illinois

Rob Bishop
R-Utah

Rick Boucher
D-Virginia

Corrine Brown
D-Florida

Sherrod Brown
D-Ohio

Michael Burgess
R-Texas

Ken Calvert
R-California

Eric Cantor
R-Virginia

Michael Capuano
D-Massachusetts

Brad Carson
D-Oklahoma

Ben Chandler
D-Kentucky

Chris Cox
R-California

Danny Davis
D-Illinois

Peter DeFazio
D-Oregon

Peter Deutsch
D-Florida

Norm Dicks
D-Washington

Michael Doyle

JC

JC

JC

D-Texas

John Duncan, Jr.
R-Tennessee

Vernon Ehlers
R-Michigan

Phil English
R-Pennsylvania

Lane Evans
D-Illinois

Tom Feeney
R-Florida

Bob Filner
D-California

Randy Forbes
R-Virginia

Barney Frank
D-Massachusetts

Martin Frost
D-Texas

Richard Gephardt
D-Missouri

Phil Gingrey
R-Georgia

Bart Gordon
D-Tennessee

Gene Green
D-Texas

James Greenwood
R-Pennsylvania

Katherine Harris
R-Florida s

J.D. Hayworth
R-Arizona

Joseph Hoeffel
D-Pennsylvania

Darlene Hooley
D-Oregon

Steny Hoyer
D-Maryland

Steve Israel
D-New York

D-Pennsylvania

Jennifer Dunn
R-Washington

Eliot Engel
D-New York

Anna Eshoo
D-California

Eni Faleomavaega
D-American Samoa

Mike Ferguson
R-New Jersey

JC **Mark Foley**
R-Florida

Harold Ford
D-Tennessee

JC **Trent Franks**
R-Arizona

JC **Scott Garrett**
R-New Jersey

Paul Gillmor
R-Ohio

Bob Goodlatte
R-Virginia

Kay Granger
R-Texas

Mark Green
R-Wisconsin

Luis Gutierrez
D-Illinois

Alcee Hastings
D-Florida

Jeb Hensarling
R-Texas

Rush Holt
D-New Jersey

Mike/Michael Honda
D-California

Jay Inslee
D-Washington

JC **Sheila Jackson-Lee**
D-Texas

JC

Eddie Bernice Johnson
D-Texas

Paul Kanjorski
D-Pennsylvania

Sue Kelly
R-New York

Dale Kildee
D-Michigan

Peter King
R-New York

Joe Knollenberg
R-Michigan

Dennis Kucinich
D-Ohio

Nick Lampson
D-Texas

Rick Larsen
D-Washington

Barbara Lee
D-California

Jerry Lewis
R-California

John Linder
R-Georgia

Zoe Lofgren
D-California

Carolyn McCarthy
D-New York

Thaddeus McCotter
R-Michigan

Mike McIntyre
D-North Carolina

Denise Majette
D-Georgia

Donald Manzullo
R-Illinois

Martin Meehan
D-Massachusetts

Gregory Meeks
D-New York

Walter Jones
R-North Carolina

Marcy Kaptur
D-Ohio

Patrick Kennedy
D-Rhode Island

Ron Kind
D-Wisconsin

Mark Kirk
R-Illinois

Jim Kolbe
R-Arizona

Ray LaHood
R-Illinois

Tom Lantos
D-California

Steven LaTourette
R-Ohio

Sander Levin
D-Michigan

John Lewis
D-Georgia

Frank Lobiondo
R-New Jersey

Nita Lowey
D-New York

Karen McCarthy
D-Missouri

Jim McDermott
D-Washington

Michael McNulty
D-New York

Carolyn Maloney
D-New York

Jim Matheson
D-Utah

Kendrick Meek
D-Florida

Robert Menendez
D-New Jersey

JC (survivor Holocaust)

JC

JC

Juanita Millender-McDonald
D-California

Gary Miller
R-California

Alan Mollohan
D-West Virginia

Sue Myrick
R-North Carolina

Richard Neal
D-Massachusetts

Frank Pallone
D-New Jersey

Steve Pearce
R-New Mexico

Joseph Pitts
R-Pennsylvania

Deborah Pryce
R-Ohio

George Radanovich
R-California

Charles Rangel
D-New York

Steven Rothman
D-New Jersey

Tim Ryan
D-Ohio

Loretta Sanchez
D-California

Janice Schakowsky
D-Illinois

Robert Scott
D-Virginia

Pete Sessions
R-Texas

Adam Smith
D-Washington

Mark Souder
R-Indiana

Fortney "Pete" Stark
D-California

Mike Thompson

Brad Miller
D-North Carolina

Jeff Miller
R-Florida

Jim Moran
D-Virginia

Grace Napolitano
D-California

Bob Ney
R-Ohio

Donald Payne
D-New Jersey

Charles Pickering
R-Mississippi

David Price
D-North Carolina

Adam Putnam
R-Florida

Nick Rahall
D-West Virginia

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
R-Florida

JC **Edward Royce**
R-California

Linda Sanchez
D-California

Jim Saxton
R-New Jersey

JC **Adam Schiff**
D-California

Edward Schrock
R-Virginia

Brad Sherman
D-California

Hilda Solis
D-California

John Spratt
D-South Carolina

Cliff Stearns
R-Florida

John F. Tierney

JC

JC

D-California

Pat Toomey
R-Pennsylvania

Michael Turner
R-Ohio

Tom Udall
D-New Mexico

Chris Van Hollen
D-Maryland

David Vitter
R-Louisiana

Diane Watson
D-California

Anthony Weiner
D-New York

Robert Wexler
D-Florida

David Wu
D-Oregon

D-Massachusetts

Edolphus Towns
D-New York

Mark Udall
D-Colorado

Fred Upton
R-Michigan

Peter Visclosky
D-Indiana

James Walsh
R-New York

Melvin Watt
D-North Carolina

JC **Dave Weldon**
R-Florida

JC **Ed Whitfield**
R-Kentucky

Albert Wynn
D-Maryland

5. Caucus on Pakistan and Pakistani Americans in the U.S. House of Representatives

The Caucus on Pakistan and Pakistani Americans is of a much younger age than the India House Caucus. In fact, it was only just recently on May 27th 2004 that the Pakistani community in the U.S. initiated steps towards forming a Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill.²⁰³

The idea to form a group was conceived by a group of more than hundred Pakistani Americans from around the country who had gathered in Washington on February 28th, 2004.²⁰⁴ The caucus is formed and headed by U.S. lawmakers but receives support from the PAL-C which works on the Caucus' link to the community it represents.²⁰⁵ PAL-C urges the Pakistani Americans to make contributions to national campaigns through PAL-C PAC and will simultaneously make sure that "the impact of their contributions is profound and noticeable".²⁰⁶

The plan is to build a proactive bipartisan caucus that will create a strategic bridge between Pakistani-Americans and their representatives in the U.S. Congress. The Pakistan Caucus will maximize upon the strength of the Pakistani-American community and use it as a conduit in fostering a solid, long-term relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan. It is believed that the pursuit of policies that ensure a friendly U.S.-Pakistan relationship and an engaged and active Pakistani-American community will produce long-term advantages for both the U.S. and Pakistan.²⁰⁷

The Pakistan Caucus will serve the following objectives (as mentioned in the "Dear colleague"-letter of Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN) and Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) sent on July 9, 2004): to foster mutual respect, understanding and cooperation between Americans and Pakistanis in abroad range of fields, to improve and develop long term political and security relations between the U.S. and Pakistan, to enhance U.S.-Pakistan economic relations

²⁰³ *Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill formed, May 28th, 2004*

²⁰⁴ *Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill formed, May 28th, 2004; PAL-C PAC Launched, May 27, 2004*

²⁰⁵ *Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill formed, May 28th, 2004*

²⁰⁶ *PAL-C PAC Launched, May 27, 2004*

²⁰⁷ *The Establishment of the Congressional Pakistan Caucus at the US House of Representatives, September 17, 2004; <http://www.palc.us/index.php?id=49>*

and lend support to a bilateral Free Trade Agreement, to support and increase academic interaction between the U.S. and Pakistan, to support Pakistan's efforts towards socio-economic improvement and its drive toward human resource development, and to support the interests of the Pakistani-Americans and work for their integration into the mainstream American society.²⁰⁸ The initiative should also help to counter the "vicious" campaigns and attacks on Pakistan of the USINPAC.²⁰⁹

PAL-C registered a PAC in the first week of June with the Federal Election Commission in Washington to support and endorse public officials.²¹⁰ The Caucus was formally inaugurated on September 22nd, 2004 by President Musharraf addressing the inaugural session on the Hill. The President said: "This Caucus will help in building the image of our country in the U.S. and I am very happy to see this reality come true." He urged the Caucus members to visit Pakistan and have a better understanding "and remove misconceptions about our country". He also asked the Caucus members to highlight Pakistan's role in the war against terrorism and reminded them that so far Pakistan had arrested more than 600 terror suspects extraditing some to the U.S. Additionally; he congratulated the Pakistani community, particularly the PAL-C, which helped to form the Caucus. He reminded the Caucus members of the fact that Pakistan had played a key role in several conflicts wherein the U.S. was involved; "We also contributed a lot in the past, specially during the Cold War and the struggle for freedom in Afghanistan This is a long-term and broad-based relationship."²¹¹

The Republican co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus is Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN) and the Democratic co-chair is Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX). It should be noted that Rep. Jackson Lee is also a member of the House India Caucus. Rep. Jackson Lee said; "the establishment of the

²⁰⁸ *Join the Congressional Pakistan Caucus*, July 9, 2004; *The Establishment of the Congressional Pakistan Caucus at the US House of Representatives*, September 17, 2004

²⁰⁹ *Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill*, June 1st, 2004

²¹⁰ *Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill*, June 1st, 2004

²¹¹ *Musharraf calls for promoting Pakistan interests in US*, Sept 24th, 2004

Congressional Pakistan Caucus, which is an official entity of the U.S. Congress, is an historic event."²¹²

PAL-C believes that the establishment of the Pakistan Caucus will develop the values of citizenship and political participation in the Pakistani-American community through increased voter registration, campaign contributions, and lobbying activities. The Caucus will also enhance the standing of Pakistani-Americans in the U.S. political system, believing that Americans of Pakistani heritage are significantly underrepresented in the American political system.²¹³

Despite the fact that the Caucus was only formed in September 2004, Rep. Jackson Lee did not hesitate in November 2004 to designate it as a "phenomenal success". She used more symbolic rhetoric when exclaiming: "It was the famed civil rights leader and proud Muslim-American Malcolm X who said: "The future belongs to those who prepare for it today. That sentiment was proven true on Tuesday, November 2 when a record number of Muslim Americans went to the polls and voted."²¹⁴

Allegedly, an earlier informal Congressional Caucus on Pakistan and Pakistani Americans was formed in 1994 or 1993, but became defunct quite quickly. Dan Burton, at that point a ranking member of the International Relations Committee, was also then one of the co-chairmen. Apparently, Rep. Burton and also Rep. Robert Torricelli used to receive lavish campaign contributions from pro-Khalistani Sikhs, Pakistani Americans and Indian Americans who supported independence for Kashmir from India.²¹⁵ Moreover, after its dissolution a Kashmir-Pakistan Caucus led by Major Owens (D-NY) allegedly replaced it.²¹⁶ Unfortunately, I did not find more information about these caucuses.

²¹² *Congresswoman Sheila Lee Terms Congressional Pakistan Caucus an 'Historical Event'*, August 8, 2004

²¹³ *The Establishment of the Congressional Pakistan Caucus at the US House of Representatives*, September 17, 2004

²¹⁴ Bughio, K., November 19, 2004

²¹⁵ Haniffa, A., March 28, 2007

²¹⁶ Trunzo, J.D., *Pakistani/Indian-Americans Raise Political Visibility*; Haniffa, A., January 19, 2001

Members²¹⁷: House Pakistan Caucus²¹⁸

29 Democrats, 26 Republicans, Total 55

55% of its members (30/55) are also aligned with the Caucus on India and Indian Americans. Among these 30, 19 are Democrats and 11 Republicans. Three (all Democrats) members of the Pakistan Caucus are Jewish members of the House of Representatives and all three are also members of the India Caucus.

Dan Burton R 5th IN Co-chair

Todd Akin R - 2nd MO

Chris Bell D 25th TX

Judy Biggert R - 13th - IL

Ginny Brown-Waite R 5th FL

Howard Buck McKeon R 25th CA

Ben Chandler D 6th KY

Christopher Cox R 48th CA

Danny K. Davis D 7th IL

Martin Frost D 24th TX JC

Gene Green D 29th TX

Jeb Hensarling R 5th TX

Rush Holt D 12th NJ

Henry Hyde R 6th IL

Sam Johnson R 3rd TX

Dale Kildee D 5th MI

John B. Larson D 1st NY

Ed Markey D 7th MA

James McGovern D 4th MA

Gary Miller R 42nd CA

Major Owens D 11th NY

Joseph Pitts R 16th PA

Dana Rohrabacher R 46th CA

Linda Sanchez D 39th CA

Janice D. Schakowsky D 9th IL JC

Rob Simmons R 2nd CT

Fred Upton R 6th MI

Albert Wynn D 4th MD

Sheila Jackson Lee D 18th TX Co-chair

Joe Barton R - 6th -TX

Shelly, Berkley D - 1st - NY JC

Jeb Bradley R - 1st - NH

Sherwood Boehlert R 24th NY

Steve Chabot R 1st OH

John Conyers Jr. D 14th MI

Elijah Cummings D 7th MD

Thomas Davis R 11th VA

Charles Gonzalez D 29th TX

Kay Granger R 12th TX

Pete Hoekstra R 2nd MI

Michael Honda D 15th CA

Johnny Isakson R 6th GA

Marcy Kaptur D 29th OH

Peter King R 3rd NY

John Lewis D 9th GA

Karen McCarthy D 5th KS

Gregory Meeks D 6th NY

Solomon Ortiz D 27th TX

Nick Rahall D 3rd WV

Rick Renzi R 1st AZ

Bobby Rush D 1st IL

Loretta Sanchez D 47th CA

Pete Sessions R 32nd TX

Jim Turner D 2nd TX

Curt Weldon R 7th PA

²¹⁷ ● : Democrats

● : Republicans

underlined: member of House India Caucus AND House Pakistan Caucus

JC ● : Jewish affiliation

²¹⁸ <http://www.palc.us/index.php?id=49>

5. Voting behavior of India Caucus and Pakistan Caucus members: a sample survey

In order to examine (the sincerity of) the members' attachment to the India or Pakistan Caucus or both, I decided to look at the members' voting behavior. Are members of the India Caucus consistently voting pro-India when a resolution that might affect India is introduced in the House?²¹⁹ What is the voting behavior of those congressmen who are aligned with both caucuses? Do they have a preference for one of the two countries or do they just vote randomly? Do all members of the caucuses vote or are many not participating in the voting process? Why do some members decide to abstain? I tried to answer these questions by means of looking at eight very different resolutions.

The resolutions and the additional voting records of the congressmen used for this sample survey were retrieved from the U.S.-India Friendship Council website.²²⁰ The U.S.-India Friendship Council provides this information to spur Indian Americans to contact their representatives either to thank them for voting pro-India or either to encourage them to vote for India (when they did not previously). The Council does not provide voting records of every resolution passed in the House concerning India or Pakistan, but offers a selection of the one's that are deemed most valuable to the Indian American voters in the U.S. What I explicitly want to point out is that my selection of resolutions was not randomly: I presumed that those posted on the website are the one's that are essential to the Indian American community in the U.S., and therefore, I decided to use these. Unfortunately, I did not find a similar Pakistani American organization that provides the same sort of information. If this had been the case, I would also have analyzed that organization's selection of resolutions. Additionally, it would have enabled me to make a comparison between the resolutions selected by Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans and thus detect whether similar or dissimilar issues ignite the diaspora communities. This to say that I am not taking on an India-focused perspective, but that I was restricted by the sources available to approach this

²¹⁹ The same question can of course be posed about members of the Pakistan Caucus.

²²⁰ <http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress/votingrecord/votingrecord.html>

question from the perspective of both diaspora communities. So, I will try to approach the outcome of my analysis from a neutral point of view

I considered it necessary to tap into a wide range of resolutions since both the India and the Pakistan Caucus are believed to be active on many different issues ranging from improving U.S.-India, respectively U.S.-Pakistan ties to immigration-related matters concerning the Indian American or Pakistani American community in the U.S.

The eight selected resolutions all have a very different makeup and features. The earliest resolution dates from June 1999 and the most recent was passed in June 2004. I will deal with them chronologically. Effectively this means that the first four resolutions (#1-4) date from the 106th Congress (1998-2000), the fifth resolution (#5) was issued during the 107th Congress (2000-2002) and the final three resolutions (#6-8) were brought to the fore of the House during the 108th Congress (2002-2004). This led to a difficulty to determine the voting behavior of the members of the Pakistan Caucus. It was only very recently (i.e. May 27th, 2004) that the Pakistani American community in the U.S. initiated steps towards forming a Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill.²²¹ The Pakistani American Liaison Center (PAL-C) registered a Political Action Committee (PAC) with the Federal Election Commission in Washington to support and endorse public officials only in the first week of June 2004²²² and finally President Musharraf formally inaugurated the Caucus while addressing the inaugural session on the Hill on September 22nd, 2004.²²³ This means that none of the resolutions I deal with was passed after the *formal* launching of the Pakistan Caucus on the Hill. Nevertheless, I did decide to analyze the voting behavior of the Pakistan Caucus members using the resolutions that were passed before the formal launching of the Caucus. I have assumed that when a congressman decides to join a certain caucus, he or she does this out of his or her 'true' interests in the rationale the caucus defends (and not because it would render

²²¹ *Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill formed*, May 28th, 2004

²²² *Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill*, June 1st, 2004

²²³ *Musharraf calls for promoting Pakistan interests in US*, Sept 24th, 2004

him or her more votes from its constituents or a surplus in campaign funds). If there were any consistency in a congressman's (voting) behavior, he or she would have already been voting pro-Pakistan before the creation of the Pakistan Caucus. Therefore I did not consider this an unbridgeable research problem. I will thus analyze the *past* voting behavior (i.e. before they were actually members) of the congressmen aligned with the Pakistan Caucus. In this perspective, I should mention that I also consider it quite ambiguous that some members are aligned with both caucuses.

The method I applied was as follows. I compiled a list of the members of both the India as well as the Pakistan Caucus, indicated which members belong to both caucuses and then checked whether the members voted pro or contra India or Pakistan, abstained from voting or did not participate in the voting at all. It is important to note that some resolutions were withdrawn before they were even voted on and other resolutions never came to the *full* House for voting.

5.1. The selected resolutions

1) The HIRC Kargil Resolution (House International Relations Committee, June 1999). This resolution was brought to the fore in June 1999 in the House International Relations Committee (HIRC). The HIRC opposed Pakistan's support for the incursion into Kashmir. Prior to the July 4, 1999 meeting between President Clinton and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, when the latter pledged he would take concrete steps to restore the Line of Control in Kashmir, the House International Relations Committee (HIRC) had approved a resolution (The Gilman-Ackerman Kargil Resolution) calling on the Clinton Administration to oppose Pakistan's support for the incursion into Kashmir and to block loans from international financial institutions until Islamabad withdrew its forces from the Kargil-Drass-Batalik areas. Since it was overtaken by events, the resolution did not come to the full House for voting.

Gilman was the chairman of the Committee on International Relations and Ackerman (D-NY) the Democratic co-chair of the India Caucus. The Resolution was passed by 22 votes in favor, 5 opposed and 1 abstaining in the HIRC.

2) The Goodling Amendment (House of Representatives, July 21, 1999). The Goodling Amendment, defeated in the House on July 21, 1999 by a vote of 169-256, would have prohibited foreign military assistance (but not humanitarian aid or developmental assistance) to countries (like India) that failed to support the U.S. at least 25% of the time in the U.N. General Assembly.

Prior to the voting the co-chairmen of the India Caucus Ackerman (D-NY) and Greenwood (R-PA) sent a "dear colleague" letter to all 435 lawmakers in the House. It stated: "We do not believe that a nation's voting record on recorded votes in the U.N. is a fair way to assess whether a country shares our values or our positions in the General Assembly. In the General Assembly, 78% of resolutions were adopted by consensus and when those votes are taken into consideration, India supports the U.S. position 84.2% of the time; on votes designated as important by the State Department, India's voting coincides with the U.S., including consensus, is 75%. Unlike Libya, Laos, Vietnam, Syria, Cuba and North Korea, countries similarly affected by the Amendment, and that have consistently demonstrated their hostility toward U.S. interests, India has sought to expand relations with the U.S. on a broad range of economic, security and cultural issues. India clearly does not belong in the company of these other nations targeted by this ill-advised proposal." The letter also added: "India is a thriving sister democracy, which has recently celebrated its 50th year of independence. There is much in common that we share with the world's most populous democracy. There are many issues that bind our relations with India, including the important contributions made by the well-educated and productive Indian-American community. U.S. assistance to India, and elsewhere, serves our national interests and is provided because it promotes our policy ends, not because it is a reward."

The voting record on the Goodling Amendment was: 256 (Democrats-201; Republicans-54; Independent-1) rejected the amendment, 169 (Republicans-161; Democrats-8) voted in favor and 9 (Republicans-7; Democrats-2) did not participate in the voting.

After the floor vote, Ackerman issued a statement saying " We were privileged once again in being victorious over those who are senselessly bashing India for whatever reason of their own...The irony of this Amendment was that it would penalize India while holding Pakistan harmless at a time when the world community had just caught Pakistan red-handed in the commission of terrorist acts and acts of aggression, while India conducted itself in a statesman-like fashion using admirable restraint as a nuclear power. Because of our efforts, members (of the House) understood this reality and helped us in defeating this short-sighted amendment." In his extended remarks Ackerman also explained: " India is making continued progress on human rights and even with successive coalition governments, is pursuing economic liberalization which will promote economic growth and provide U.S. companies with economic opportunity."

3) The Burton Amendment (House of Representatives, August 2, 1999). This amendment was never put to a vote on the House floor because it was withdrawn by its supporter Dan Burton (R-IN), currently the republican co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus. The proceedings in the House of Representatives on the Burton Amendment however make an interesting reading. Twenty-one representatives spoke in favor of India. Only three, including Rep. Burton, spoke against India, before the Amendment was withdrawn. In order to make an assessment of this amendment, I will analyze its proceedings.

4) Support of Congress for recent elections in the Republic of India (H. Con. Res. 211, House of Representatives, November 16, 1999). On November 16, 1999 the House of Representatives passed by an overwhelming vote of 396 to 4 a resolution affirming strong support for India. The House lauded India as "a shining example of democracy for all of Asia to follow" and urged President Clinton to visit India and "broaden our special relationship

with India into a strategic partnership". The resolution stressed that India and the U.S. "share a special relationship as the world's most populous democracy and the world's oldest democracy, respectively, and have a shared commitment to upholding the will of the people and the rule of law."

The resolution was introduced by the democratic co-chair of the India Caucus Ackerman (D-NY), and cosponsored by Sam Gejdenson (D-CT), Tom Lantos (D-CA), Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and Alcee Hastings (D-FL).

5) The House's condemnation of the Taliban's move against minorities (House of Representatives, May 25, 2001). On May 25, the U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Committee unanimously condemned the Afghanistan Taliban's move to require Hindus to wear symbols identifying their religious identity. The concurrent resolution was referred to the Committee on International Relations. On June 13, the House passed the Resolution, which was cosponsored by over 80 lawmakers, by a vote of 420 to 0.

6) Commending India on its celebration of Republic Day (H. Con. Res. 15, House of Representatives, January 27, 2003). The concurrent resolution on the commending India on its celebration of Republic Day stated: "Whereas the Republic of India is the world's largest democracy; Whereas on January 26, 1950, India adopted its Constitution, which formalized India as a parliamentary democracy; Whereas the celebration of India's republic Day on January 26th is the second most important national holiday after Independence Day; Whereas the framers of India's Constitution were greatly influenced by the American Founding Fathers James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Adams; Whereas among the rights and freedoms provided to the people of India under its Constitution is universal suffrage for all men and women over the age of eighteen; Whereas India's Constitution adopted the American ideals of equality for all citizens, regardless of faith, gender, or ethnicity; Whereas the basic freedoms we cherish in America such as the freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of religion are also recognized in India; Whereas Mohandas

Mahatma Gandhi is recognized around the world as the father of India's nonviolent struggle for independence; Whereas people of many faiths, including Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians, were united in securing India's freedom from colonial rule and have all served in various capacities in high-ranking government positions; Whereas the Republic of India has faithfully adhered to the principles of democracy by continuing to hold elections on a regular basis on the local, regional, and national levels; Whereas the people of the United States and the Republic of India have a common bond of shared values and a strong commitment to democratic principles; and Whereas President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee are elected leaders of the world's two largest democracies and are actively cultivating strong ties between the United States and India: Now, therefore, be it resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress (1) commends India on its celebration of Republic Day; and (2) reiterates its support for continued strong relations between the United States and India." The concurrent resolution was referred to the Committee on International Relations (H.R. 171).

7) Lauding Indian Americans (H.R. 352, House of Representatives, May 12, 2004). For the first time ever, the House of Representatives passed 415 to 2 a resolution lauding the contribution of Indian Americans. The resolution noted that "people of Indian origin, who have for decades immigrated to the United States, have made extraordinary contributions to the United States, helping to make the United States a more efficient and prosperous country." It praised, "The generations of doctors and nurses, scientists who have helped in defense, space, medical and computational research." It highlighted their participation in the space shuttle program, "at great personal sacrifice", a reference to Kalpana Chawla who died in the Columbia space shuttle disaster in 2003 along with six of her colleagues. Additionally, it asserted, "people of Indian origin have shared and integrated their rich culture into the fabric of American daily life."²²⁴

²²⁴ Haniffa, A., May 28, 2004

8) Amendment to Homeland Security Act (H.R. 4567, House of Representatives, June, 2004). This amendment introduced by Tom Tancredo (R-CO) sought to make state security authorities responsible in some matters to the Immigration Service, a step that Joe Crowley (D-NY), co-chair of the India Caucus, said was “mean spirited” and “forced local state and police officers into positions of federal immigration agents.”²²⁵

The amendment stipulated that none of the funds in the Act may be made available to any state or local governments who refuse to share information with U.S. Immigration and Customs officials as required by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility of 1996 -- 8USC1373(a) or to any state government that has enacted legislation allowing persons *not legally present* in the U.S. to obtain drivers licenses because according to Tancredo "drivers licenses are in fact domestic passports." According to Tancredo "the refusal of local governments to share information with federal immigration authorities often results in local law enforcement arresting, and then releasing criminal aliens -- who may then move on to commit crimes in other parts of the country rather than being deported. *The Washington Times*, for example, reported in June of last year that in, '[a] December rape of a woman in [New York,] four of the five men charged in the case were illegal immigrants and three had prior convictions that, in keeping with federal law, would have allowed their deportation.' [Yet], New York City's sanctuary policy prevented that from happening."²²⁶

As this citation shows, the amendment links immigrants in general to crime. It would also promote persecutions and deportations of families that are already integrated in the American economy.

²²⁵ *Amendment seeking change in immigration service security defeated*, June 18, 2004

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

The amendment was defeated by a vote of 259 to 148 with 146 Republicans supporting the measure and 68 Republicans opposing it. Among Democrats, 190 opposed the amendment and two supported it.²²⁷

5.2. Analysis of the resolutions and the voting behavior

1) The HIRC Kargil Resolution: the disposition of this resolution is international in the sense that it holds opinions about foreign relations between the U.S., India and Pakistan. Since the main goal was to block loans for Pakistan from international financial institutions, it is obvious that voting in favor of the resolution is voting against Pakistan. Additionally, it implies that it is a pro-India vote because the resolution also called on the Clinton administration to oppose Pakistan' support for the incursion into Pakistan.

The resolution never came to the full House for voting but was only passed in the House International Relations Committee. Of the 22 votes in favor of India 13 members were members of the India Caucus. One of these 13 is now also a member of the Pakistan Caucus. This means that in this case this representative favored India instead of Pakistan.

Among the 5 who cast a vote against the resolution were two representatives who are currently leading members of the Pakistan Caucus. They were Dan Burton (R-IN), the republican co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus and Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA).

One representative, William Goodling (R-PA), abstained and that is quite surprising since he introduced the Goodling Amendment about a month later (cf. resolution #2).

2) Contrary to the HIRC Kargil Resolution, the Goodling Amendment did come to the full House for voting. It is thus essential to analyze the voting behavior of all the members of both the India as well as the Pakistan Caucus.

Again the amendment's stance is international. It calls for the prohibition of foreign military assistance to countries that failed to support the U.S. at least 25% of the time in the U.N. General Assembly. The resolution also affects other countries besides India such as

²²⁷ *Ibid.*

Cuba, Vietnam, Libya, Syria, Laos and North Korea. Therefore, I believe that Ackerman's comment that "We were privileged once again in being victorious over those who are senselessly bashing India for whatever reason of their own." is somewhat exaggerated or too India-centric, since the amendment might just as well been introduced to "bash" other countries. I want to underscore that voting in favor of the amendment (and thus against India) would not have implied simply bashing India but simultaneously also other countries. And vice versa, voting against it might have meant favoring India but could also have meant favoring Libya, North Korea, etc. One could question whether it even makes sense to analyze these votes. I think it does for two reasons. First, it is one of the few selected resolutions that came to the full House for voting. Second, I consider it imperative in this case that the members of the India Caucus voted against the resolution in order to 'prove' their 'true interests' in the country and of course, the opposite (i.e. voting in favor) counts for members of the Pakistan Caucus.

It is apparent in the general voting record²²⁸ regarding this issue that a strong Republican-Democrat divide took place. The majority of the members (131) of the India Caucus participated in the voting. Hundred and five members voted against the amendment (i.e. pro-India). Among the 105, there are 8 members that are now also members of the Pakistan Caucus. This does not mean that the latter voted explicitly against Pakistan because - as explained earlier- this amendment would not have affected Pakistan in a malignant way. Nevertheless, 26 members of the India Caucus voted in favor of the amendment; 7 (all Republicans) among them are now members of the Pakistan Caucus. Interesting about the India Caucus members who voted against India, 25 of them are Republican. This might be an indicator that these representatives were not as much driven by their 'India-connection' as by their Republican affiliation. Two India Caucus members did not participate in the voting.

²²⁸ 256 (Democrats-201; Republicans-54; Independent-1) rejected the amendment, 169 (Republicans-161; Democrats-8) voted in favor and 9 (Republicans-7; Democrats-2) did not participate in the voting.

An overwhelming majority of the Pakistan Caucus members cast their vote. Only 14 of the 55 did not participate. This matter however is irrelevant since I used the list of members of the 108th Congress in order to look at an event that took place in the 106th Congress. This means that some of the non-participating members might not have been a representative at that time.

More than half (28) of the Pakistan Caucus members voted against the resolution and thus pro-India (but also other countries), but let's not forget that 8 of these are also members of the India Caucus; among them the Democratic co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX). Thirteen Pakistan members voted in favor of the amendment and thus against India (but also other countries), but more than half (7) is aligned with the India Caucus. Again the Republican-Democrat divide pops up, because all the members of the Pakistan Caucus who voted in favor of the amendment are Republicans.

Can we make a general assessment with this information? The question is what happened with the large bulk of India Caucus members who did not cast their vote? And, what is the explanation of the two India Caucus members who did not participate? Clearly party-affiliation (i.e. whether one is a Republican or Democrat) is paramount to the fact that one is a member of one of the caucuses.

Finally, in addition to their membership of one or two caucuses, and to their being Democrat or Republican, we should mention motivations that transcend these partisanships. As an example, principles of international collaboration and respect of the equality and freedom of all nations to decide for themselves, should condemn the “punishment” of an “evil” nation that was only exerting its rights to vote. Analysis of arguments brought forward in the House by individual representatives would reveal such considerations.

3) The Burton Amendment. As mentioned before, the sponsor withdrew this amendment before representatives could cast their ballot. The Burton amendment was obviously important regarding U.S.-Pakistan as well as U.S.-India relations. Previously in

1997, a similar amendment was offered by Burton and it was rejected by a vote of 342-82. The proceedings are nevertheless interesting. Therefore, I decided to highlight the remarks of those who spoke in favor of India and thus clearly against Pakistan and those who spoke against India and in favor of Pakistan.

Twenty-one representatives spoke in support of India. Almost all of them are aligned with the India Caucus. Among them were also Ben Gilman (R-NY), the chairman of the Committee on International Relations and Doug Bereuter (R-NE), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. However, two of them are now also members of the Pakistan Caucus, i.e. Rep. Davis (D-IL) and Rep. Jackson Lee (D-TX). The latter -not to forget- is now the Democratic co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus.

Those who spoke against India are the current Republican co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus, Dan Burton and two other members of the current Pakistan Caucus, i.e. Major Owens (D-NY) and Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA). However, both Owens and Rohrabacher also made positive remarks about India.

In order to defend his case Rep. Burton kept on stressing India's human rights violations: "We have been concerned about human rights around the world on a very selective basis in this country." Adding: "India also wants to help Iraqi rehabilitate some Iraqi oil refineries and a lubricant oil plant...So India wants to help one of the worst tyrannical regimes in the world, Saddam Hussein's, at a time when we are participating in a U.N. embargo."

In reply to Burton's human rights violation-argument, Rep. Berman (D-CA), a member of the India Caucus argued: "According the latest State Department report on human rights practices, India is making real progress."

A prominent Pakistan Caucus member Rep. Rohrabacher pointed to the major errors that India has such as Kashmir: "When it comes to the Kashmir and the Punjab and Jammu, the Indian Government might as well not be a democracy. For people in those areas, India

might as well be Nazi Germany." Acknowledging the democracy in India, he declared: "First of all, and again let me go back to, India is a democratic government. I would hope people would invest in India, and I hope that the United States has closer ties to India in the future. Nothing would make that more likely than for them to seek peace in Kashmir by permitting the people there to have a vote of plebiscite which India, because of ego, continues to say no, no, no. And as long as that happens, India will be spending tens of millions if not hundreds of millions of dollars on weapons. Mr. Chairman, think of this. Today we are only talking about decreasing the foreign aid to India by \$11 million, when the Indians themselves are spending hundreds of millions on conventional weapons and at least tens of millions, probably hundreds of millions, on nuclear weapons as well. That makes no sense at all for us to be subsidizing the weapons program of India. Instead, we should be sending this message to convince them to solve this long-festering problem in Kashmir and permit some of the democratic reforms to take place in Punjab and Jammu."

Rep. Clayton (D-NC) speaking in defense of India, proclaimed: "Any action by the United States to stigmatize India on inaccurate human rights allegations will likely complicate our efforts to create a lasting and meaningful friendship in a very dangerous part of the World. It should also be noted that the aid we provide to India goes to very important projects. The aid we provide to India goes to the control of AIDS, to population control, disease control and rural development. These are important and worthy causes, causes that not only benefit India, they benefit us and the rest of the world." Similar comments were made by a number of representatives.

The current Democratic co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus had only one remark: "Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Burton amendment."

Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ), a former co-chair of the India Caucus found it "so sad to listen to my colleagues in support of this Burton amendment spread inaccurate information about India which has tried so hard to deal effectively with human rights problems within the

country. The true human rights problem in Kashmir is that of a violent separatist movement supported by outsiders, supported by Pakistan, carried out by the followers of bin Laden and other extremist terrorist leaders destroying the homes and lives of thousands of peace-loving Hindus and Muslims." Rep. Burton denied the fact that he was spreading inaccurate information and added: "My colleagues are obviously concerned about constituents of theirs who lobby them hard. I understand that." And some time later: "I think India unleashed all of its resources that they possibly could to lobby this body so that we would not ever do it again. They evidently have been fairly successful."

Rep. Hastings (D-FL) opposed the amendment for economic reasons: "The United States is India's largest trading partner and largest investor. U.S. Investment has grown from \$500 million per year in 1991 to more than \$12 billion in 1999. Many large American companies have seen the economic opportunities in India and have invested heavily there. We clearly need to sustain and further strengthen the momentum that has been gained in U.S.-Indo relations. Instead of proposing legislation that merely alienates an important ally, I suggest the esteemed member from Indiana [Rep. Burton] first take the time to travel to India and see its progress first-hand." Rep. Burton replied: "I would just like to point out that there are seven multilateral and 13 bilateral donors that provide assistance to India. The United States is the seventh largest donor after the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Union, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom. So there is a lot of people that are giving money to India. But nobody is sending any kind of a message to them that they ought to clean up their act as far as the human rights tragedies that are going on."

Others stressed the fact that: "Democratic India is in a tough neighborhood. China occupies Tibet to India's north. China sells nuclear and ballistic technology to Pakistan on India's west, and China has sold over \$1 billion worth of arms to the drug-running Burmese military junta to India east. Our Nation should be strongly supporting India, the only truly democratic nation of the subcontinent. Passage of the Burton amendment would undercut our

strategic goals of supporting peace and stability through the promotion of democratic governments in the region."

I highlighted these pieces of the debate to show what kind of rhetoric is used in this discussion. While Rep. Burton kept stressing India's human rights violations in order to defend his proposal (his only argument in fact), others contested his statements by pointing out the economic advantages of a strong U.S.-India relationship, by lauding India's democratic government, by bashing other countries such as China and by proclaiming that cutting aid would imply cutting aid for the control of AIDS and rural development programs.

4) The House Resolution that expresses the Congress' support for the recent elections in the Republic of India is from a different nature than the previous three resolutions I discussed. Where the former three resolutions clearly involved or would have involved a 'substantive' impact on India or Pakistan (meaning that they all dealt with some sort of financial assistance or withdrawal), this resolution can be called symbolic only. This is not to say that it does not have any impact on foreign relations between India and the U.S. On the contrary, I believe that these sorts of resolutions can have a significant impact on foreign relations *in the long run* and that they are often a launch pad for closer ties between countries. The resolution, for example, called on "the President to travel to India as part of any trip to South Asia" and also urged "the President to broaden our special relationship with India into a strategic partnership."

This resolution in particular stressed that India and the U.S. "share a special relationship as the world's most populous democracy and the world's oldest democracy, respectively, and have a shared commitment to upholding the will of the people and the rule of law." Simultaneously, the Congress wanted to congratulate "the people of the Republic of India on the successful conclusion on their recent national elections and the Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on his reelection." I think it is not unjust to state that the congratulation on behalf of Vajpayee's reelection is at the same time an endorsement of his leadership. Much

of the rhetoric used in the congressional proceedings is very similar to the rhetoric that was used in opposition of the Burton amendment and comes across quite repetitive.

The resolution was voted on in a full House. Some of the representatives who spoke in favor of it, did not refrain from making comparisons between India and Pakistan and make use of the situation to resort to some 'Pakistan bashing'. Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA) said: "While India undertook this monumental free and democratic election, there was a military coup in Pakistan where the democratically elected government was thrown out of office and its leaders imprisoned. I think it is important for all of us, Members of Congress and presidential candidates, to understand that a military coup is not something that should be applauded by the American people or Members of our Congress or any political figure." Also Rep. Sam Gedjenson expressed his frustration about Pakistan by saying that "apparently we are not going to be able to bring forward the resolution on Pakistan because I think it is important for this Congress to speak clearly about the importance of democratic institutions. India and the United States have a strong relationship that is going to continue to grow."

What is remarkable about this resolution's proceeding is that quite a number of the representatives use their speaking minutes to condemn other countries and China in particular. Rep. Sherrod Brown (D-OH) refers to China by exclaiming "our State Department, our U.S. Trade Representative's Office and the Republicans in this Congress should quit lavishing all their attention on the People's Republic of China and start working with our sister democracy in India to bring stability to South and to East Asia."

Surprisingly, one of the more active members of the Pakistan Caucus, Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) (who supported the Burton amendment, cf. #3), also spoke in favor of India. He exclaimed: "I rise in strong support of this resolution commending India for having yet another free election which again underscores India's commitment to democracy. Over the last four decades, however, let us recognize that India has not, and I repeat, not been a friend of the United States. During the Cold War, India consistently voted against the United States,

consistently condemned everything that they could about the things we were doing while overlooking misdeeds of the Soviet Union. They were, in fact, a friend of Russia and the Soviet Union and not a friend of the United States. However, with that said, the Cold War is over and India's commitment to democracy, as demonstrated by this free election, I think should bring the United States and India closer together in the future. Yes, we should forget any disagreements we had in the past and work on those things that bind us together with this great, huge democracy. I agree with the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown). Our businessmen and people of the United States should look to India, this democracy, in terms of investment and in terms of trying to work together economically and politically rather than with the world's worst human rights abuser in China."

Let me now turn to the voting records. Since this resolution solely deals with India as its subject, voting for this resolution definitely means voting pro-India. However, voting pro does not automatically signify a contra-Pakistan stance, but we should keep in mind that some malicious remarks about the country were made in the congressional proceedings.

The motion was agreed to by a vote of 396-4 (Republicans 200-2, Democrats 195-2, Independents 1-0, 34 representatives did not participate in the voting). Not so astonishing, a tremendous majority of the India Caucus members (i.e. 145) voted in favor of the resolution; none voted against it, but quite a high number (10) did not cast its vote. It is obvious from this voting record that the India Caucus members consistently voted pro-India.

None of the members of the Pakistan Caucus voted against the resolution, not even the infamous "India-basher" Dan Burton (R-IN). Forty-one members cast their vote in favor of India of which 23 are also members of the India Caucus. Two members refrained from voting.

The four representatives voting against India were Rep. Bonior (D-MI), Rep. Helen Chenoweth-Hage (R-ID), Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA) and Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX). Bonior's Press Secretary explained his vote by stating that Bonior voted against the resolution

"primarily because it made no mention of the problems in Kashmir." Rep. Chenoweth-Hage agreed with the primary message of the resolution, which congratulates the Republic of India for its successful national elections and election of the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. However, she felt that the resolution was very vague in defining what a "strategic partnership" might entail between the United States and India. An aide to Rep. Markey said: "Part of the resolution expressed congratulations to Prime Minister Vajpayee. His Administration was the one that broke the moratorium on nuclear testing and the Congressman did not want to support the Administration that had gone forward with a nuclear test." Rep. Markey is now ironically enough a member of the Pakistan Caucus. According to Rep. Paul's Chief of Staff: "Rep. Paul votes against things that praise or condemn foreign governments. Mr. Paul believes that it is not a constitutional function of our government to comment on other countries' internal policies. That's their business, not ours." In an aside, he mentioned that hypothetically, if there had been a previous resolution condemning India, the congressman would have voted against that as well for the same reason.

5) The resolution that condemns the Afghanistan's Taliban move to require Hindus to wear symbols identifying their religious identity is to a large extent a human rights issue but also expresses a sentiment about U.S. foreign relations.

The concurrent resolution was introduced by Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY) and co-sponsored by 62 representatives. Since the vote came to a vote in a full House and was passed by a vote of 420-0, it is unnecessary to analyze the India and Pakistan Caucus members' voting behavior. Clearly, all the members voted in favor of the resolution.

Interestingly, 40 of the co-sponsors who introduced the concurrent resolution are also members of the India Caucus. Among these 40, 13 members are aligned with the Jewish Caucus (3 are member of both caucuses). This is not so surprising since the Taliban's move to require Hindus in Afghanistan to wear symbols identifying them as Hindu is exactly what Nazi Germany forced Jews to do. This kind of rhetoric was applied in the resolution:

"Whereas on May 22, 2001, the Taliban regime of Afghanistan directed Hindus and other non-Muslims to wear a yellow identity symbol and for Hindu women to fully cover themselves in a veil; Whereas this proposal is reminiscent of the yellow Star of David that Jews were forced to wear in Nazi Germany and Nazi-occupied areas... That Congress strongly condemns the Taliban's use of Nazi tactics to force Hindus in Afghanistan to wear symbols identifying them as Hindu..."

Eleven of the co-sponsors are members of the Pakistan Caucus. Eight among them are members of both caucuses. The resolution "calls on the Government of Pakistan to use its influence with the Taliban regime to demand that the Taliban revoke the reprehensible policy of forcing Afghan Hindus and other non-Muslims to wear a yellow identity symbol." Additionally, Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA), the only Holocaust survivor in the U.S. Congress, stated that Pakistan is the one country left that can influence and affect the Taliban and yet the government of Pakistan is reluctant to use its influence with the Taliban. And also Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), aligned with the Pakistan Caucus, stated that he was happy to hear Rep. Lantos will put the Pakistan Foreign Minister on the spot, not only on Pakistan's acquiescence, but also on their direct involvement in the creation and support of the Taliban. Additionally, he declared that we need to make sure as Americans that we stand against fanaticism like the Taliban, for it is fanaticism that will bring down Pakistan and our friends in that area.

Members of the India and Pakistan Caucus are unmistakably sensitive about these kinds of human rights issues. Despite the fact that some Pakistan members might not be so warmhearted to Hindus (beware: this is a pure hypothetical statement!), not one of the Pakistan Caucus members voted against the resolution.

6) The resolution that commends India on its celebration of Republic Day is very similar to the House resolution that expressed its support for the elections in India (#4). The same rhetoric wherein the democratic ideals of the U.S. and India are underscored is used

assiduously. Again, this resolution has more a symbolic value, but -as explained before- this resolution sends an important message of warming relations between India and the U.S.

Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SC) the co-chair of the India Caucus in the 108th Congress introduced the concurrent resolution in the Committee on International Relations. Thirty of the 32 co-sponsors are members of the India Caucus, 6 of the Pakistan Caucus and 5 were members of both caucuses.

I assume this resolution was introduced by some of the members of the India Caucus to satisfy its Indian American constituents. This assumption can also be made about resolution #4. The only difference between #4 and #6 is that in the concurrent resolution of the latter representatives did not resort to bashing Pakistan or China.

7) The resolution lauding Indian Americans is quite exceptional and this for several reasons. First, the overwhelming majority of congressmen that voted in favor of the resolution (415-2) is quite remarkable (14 abstained). Second, the fact that it was introduced by a junior pro-India lawmaker Juanita Millender-McDonald (D-CA) and was expected to go nowhere. Rep. Millender-McDonald an African American had apparently a very good reason to introduce the proposal. The Indian community, particularly the Indian American Friendship Council (IAFC) supported her and that even held fundraisers on her behalf (though an Indian American was running against her). With the IAFC's backing, she clobbered Peter Mathews, who was expected to sweep the Indian American vote. It was also the IAFC that convinced her to join the India Caucus. Third, her resolution -as stated in *India Abroad*- may not have gained traction if it had not caught the attention of Rep. Tom Lantos (CA-D). Rep. Lantos himself had relied on support from the Indian American community to beat Ro Khanna in the primaries and he decided to put all his weight behind the proposal.²²⁹ Fourth, this resolution is doubtlessly symbolic. Especially if we consider the reason why this proposal was introduced. Rep. Millender-McDonald as well as Rep. Lantos made this move in order to thank their

²²⁹ Haniffa, A., May 28, 2004

Indian American constituents who supported them during their election campaigns. Furthermore, this resolution does not enjoy the power of law. Contrary to resolution #4 and #6, this one does not have an impact on foreign relations and merely focuses on Indian American citizens who hold the power to vote.

All the members of the India Caucus voted in favor of the proposal except Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-OR). He abstained saying that while he agreed with the broad message of the resolution and fully endorsed the portion lauding the Indian American community, he felt it presented an unbalanced picture of India-U.S. relations, particularly in view of concerns over outsourcing to India and consequent unemployment in the U.S. He complained: "While the resolution mentions the export of US goods to India, it fails to acknowledge the rampant export of American jobs to India. U.S. trade policies including our policy toward India have failed American workers. Around 400,000 service jobs, including 27,000 technology jobs, were siphoned off to India, China and other low-wage havens last year."²³⁰

Two representatives voted against the resolution. One of them was Rep. Paul (R-TX) who also voted against the resolution that expressed support for the elections in India (cf. #4). The second one was Rep. Sam Johnson (R-TX) who is a member of the Pakistan Caucus.

As stated before- this resolution was clearly a way for the India Caucus members to thank and reach out to those Indian American constituents who have been supporting them by means of funding and votes. While it is a valuable gesture, one should seriously question what the real value and usefulness of this resolution is. Furthermore, it is an indicator of the reasonable power that Indian Americans hold to lobby congressmen. I do not think the Pakistan Caucus members would be able to pass a resolution lauding Pakistani Americans with the same overwhelming majority of the votes. Simply because the Pakistani American population does not make up for a third of the Indian Americans in the U.S. and because they are less efficiently organized.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

8) The Tancredo amendment came to a vote in a full House and can be considered completely different from all the previous resolutions I discussed. This proposal is not symbolic nor has it an overt influence on U.S. foreign relations. It belongs to the sphere of U.S. domestic politics and is important for this research because it involves the treatment of immigrants and therefore it affects Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans. One might think it is not relevant to both the Indian American and Pakistani American community in the U.S. because it focuses on illegal immigrants, but this is not the case. Primarily because a segment of Indian and Pakistani immigrants in the U.S. is illegal, although a reliable estimate of their numbers is not available. Second, while this proposal might affect illegal immigrants, it can be considered as a starting point for other restricting immigration laws that could affect legal immigrants. According to Ralph Nurnberger a very active member of the Indian American Center for Political Awareness (IACPA), proposals dealing with immigration reform have enormous consequences for the Indian American and Pakistani American community.²³¹

The reason why I included this proposal was to see whether India Caucus and Pakistan Caucus members are also paying attention to matters that can affect the Indian American and Pakistani American population. Let us not forget that the official names of both caucuses are the Caucus on India and Indian Americans and the Caucus on Pakistan and Pakistani Americans. In other words: all representatives who voted in favor of the amendment voted against the lot of Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans.

Again, I believe it is important to keep the noticeable Republican-Democrat divide (cf. #2) vis-à-vis this issue in mind. All the members (except 6) of the India Caucus participated in the voting. Hundred twenty-three members (22 Republicans, 101 Democrats) opposed and 49 (all Republicans) approved the Tancredo-amendment. Seven Democrats and one Republican abstained. Among those opposing the amendment 22 members (3

²³¹ Nurnberger, R., January 30, 2004

Republicans, 19 Democrats) are also members of the Pakistan Caucus, among those approving 8 members are connected to the Pakistan Caucus.

All 55 members of the Pakistan Caucus cast their ballot. Nineteen (all Republicans) were in favor of the amendment, while 34 (5 Republicans, 29 Democrats) opposed it and 2 members abstained. Among those 34 who voted against the resolution 22 (3 Republicans, 19 Democrats) are members of the India Caucus; and among those 19 who favored it 8 are members of the India Caucus.

This voting record shows again that their Republican party-affiliation triumphs over the fact that a representative is a member of a certain caucus. Republicans favored this amendment and that is apparent in their voting behavior despite the fact that they are members of the India or Pakistan Caucus. Evidence for this statement can be found in the fact that both the Republican co-chair of the India Caucus Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SA) as well the Republican co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN) voted in favor of the Tancredo-amendment, while the Democrat co-chairmen of both caucuses voted against it.

The reason why 8 members of the India Caucus and 2 of the Pakistan Caucus abstained from voting is not clear, nor the fact that 6 members of the India Caucus did not participate at all. I should point out that the latter have a very low voting participation in general (as tested on all 8 resolutions) concerning India-related issues.

	HIRC Kargil Resolution	Goodling Amendment	Burton Amendment	Support for Elections in India	Condemnation of Taliban	Commending India on Republic Day	Lauding Indian Americans	Tancredo Amendment
General Voting Record								
In favor	22	169	-	369	420	32	415	148
Against	5	256	-	4	0	-	2	259
NP/A	1	9	-	-	-	-	14	-
India Caucus members								
In favor	13	26 (R 25)	-	145	-	30	185	49 (R)
Against	-	105	-	0	-	-	0	123
NP/A	-	2	-	10	-	-	1	6
Pakistan Caucus members								
In favor	-	13 (R)	-	41	-	6	54	19 (R)
Against	2	28	-	0	-	-	1	34
NP/A	-	14	-	3	-	-	-	2
India Caucus -Pakistan Caucus members								
In favor	1	7 (R)	-	23	-	5	30	8
Against	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	22
NP/A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

5.3. A general conclusion

It is almost impossible to make a synthesis and general interpretation of the voting behavior of the caucuses' members. It is even questionable whether if those would be possible if more resolutions were examined. Nevertheless, to a certain extent some conclusions can be made.

Some of the resolutions introduced in the House undeniably display the vigor of some of the members of the India Caucus to show their commitment to India and Indian Americans in the U.S. However, many of these resolutions can be categorized under the 'symbolic' type. Second, there appears to be a core of active, committed members (about 25 to 30 maximum) who always speak in favor of India or consistently vote pro-India, but there is a huge bulk of members who seems to be voting randomly and a significant portion that hardly ever participates in the voting. Furthermore, members of the India Caucus vote pro-India only when this does not conflict with their party-affiliations. The same conclusion can be made about the members of the Pakistan Caucus.

Members who are aligned with both caucuses tend to have a shifting opinion and defend India on one occasion and Pakistan on the other. Personally I consider it quite troubling that the Democratic co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus is also a member of the India Caucus. Consequently, Rep. Jackson-Lee's voting behavior is far from consistent. We should hope that such double membership will favor respect for the common interests of the population in both India and Pakistan (and thus also Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans), instead of perpetuating feelings of antagonism and hostility. Joseph Crowley, the Democratic co-chair of the India Caucus, said he did not see overlapping membership as "conflicting, because of the movement in peace talks between the two nations." Confident that the presence of members in both caucuses would not undermine the work of the India Caucus, he also believed "the India Caucus advocates many different issues, and supporting both India and Pakistan should not be viewed as a conflict. In addition the caucus focuses on Indian

Americans and their concerns of better education, healthcare, hate crime legislation, many issues which Pakistani Americans and other new Americans are also concerned about.¹²³²

Personal opinions or secondary aspects may also triumph over a member's affiliation with a caucus. This is clear from the fact that Rep. DeFazio voted against the resolution lauding Indian Americans because he was concerned about the outsourcing problem.

When 'symbolic' resolutions are introduced such as the one lauding Indian Americans, members of the Pakistan Caucus do not really display such an enormous 'grudge' against India that it compels them to vote against it. Simultaneously, this might be an indicator that these kinds of resolutions are not deemed influential.

When it comes to human rights issues (cf. #5), members of both the India Caucus and Pakistan Caucus consistently defend human rights. On the other hand, one can also say that for some members human rights are more important than for others. This is clear from the discussion about the Burton amendment.

It remains to be seen whether members of the Pakistan Caucus in the future will introduce similar bills as the members of the India Caucus; one lauding Pakistani Americans for example. Questionable is whether it would pass with the same overwhelming majority vote as the one lauding Indian Americans. The hard core of Pakistan Caucus members (around 2-3) is not comparable in size with the one of the India Caucus, but this of course might change over time. Especially the Republican co-chair Dan Burton has in the past been very active on Pakistan-issues and also Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) should be given some credit. Further, I believe one of the main hurdles the Pakistan Caucus should overcome is the problem that 55% of its members are also aligned with the India Caucus and this will elicit conflicting opinions in the future, unless -of course- the relationship between both countries improves.

²³² Sen, A.K, September 22, 2004

Broadly, these resolutions can be categorized as either 'symbolic' or 'substantive'. Issues surrounding the symbolic resolutions (#4, 6 and 7) are rather vague or amorphous and involve lauding and ceremonial acts. Lauding Indian Americans or India on the celebration of its Republic Day do not directly affect foreign relations between the U.S. and India but are nevertheless a clear sign of warming relationships. They do not have further implications for India as a country. They do have a certain value as examples of these resolutions are often hailed by Indian Americans in order to show off their growing influence on U.S. congressmen and increasing visibility in U.S. society. Conversely, the symbolic resolutions are an easy way for the India Caucus members to prove that they are in fact committed to the Indian cause.

Substantive resolutions with a real impact on India or Pakistan often involve matters of military or economic assistance. In my opinion these are much more valuable. They can actually affect India or Pakistan, either positively or negatively. Another sort of substantive resolutions evolves around migration issues, thereby not so much focusing on foreign relations but on the Indians and Pakistanis in the U.S.

6. Issues of concern

In order to present a complete picture of the political activities of the Indian American and Pakistani American communities in the U.S., we need to ask ourselves what their issues of concern are. What kinds of issues move the diaspora communities? What sorts of matters ignite them to organize themselves or become politically active and mobilize congressmen to defend their causes? As is clear from the resolutions discussed in the previous chapter, their issues of concern cover a broad range of matters, from symbolic to substantive. However, in the previous chapter I only highlighted those issues that actually made it to the House floor. I assume the fact that they are raised on the House floor is a consequence of lobbying efforts of the diaspora communities, but let us keep in mind that this might not be the *only* cause.

In this chapter, I want to detect through the analysis of articles written in ethnic community newspapers such as *India Abroad*, *India West*, *Pakistan Link*, etc. and emails I received from numerous diaspora associations the issues raised by the diaspora communities themselves. It is hard to find any consistency among these. One should keep in mind that as the world changes from day to day, the context surrounding these issues is constantly changing as well and thus the matters of importance change too.

I decided to start with the most recent issues of concern and to go back in time; I focus particularly on 2004 and 2003. Again, it was more difficult to examine the Pakistani side of the question because the newspapers of the Pakistani American community are far less widespread. Overall the Pakistani American community is far less efficiently organized than the Indian American. Additionally, I believe there is a lack of thorough and in-depth research about the Pakistani American community.

The latest major issue of concern to both communities has been the upsurge in anti-immigrant legislation, in particular the 9/11 Commission Recommendations legislation containing alarming provisions that would hurt immigrants and that mirror elements of the Patriot Act. The South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow (SAALT) called for a national

call-in day for the South Asian community on December 2nd, 2004. The organization urged the members of the community to "take ten minutes to express your thoughts to decision makers in Congress and the White House". The main reason why this is so important to both communities is that there is a possibility that the final bill that will be sent to the White House will contain anti-immigrant provisions, as well as measures that could threaten civil liberties. While the 9/11 Commission legislation went through many changes over the previous three months, some of the alarming provisions appeared in its various versions have included measures that would: (1) make it difficult for judges to review deportation decisions made against non-citizens, (2) limit the ability of people to obtain political asylum in the U.S., (3) make non-citizens with valid, un-expired visas that are revoked subject to deportation and (4) deport non-citizens to countries that won't accept them. Second, if the bill would become law and contains anti-immigrant provisions, South Asian immigrants and their families may be affected. Since 9/11 there has been continuous reporting of immigrant families being torn apart due to policies that are having a negative impact on South Asians and other immigrants.²³³ Previously, similar concerns have been expressed by means of highlighting harassments that Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans have faced since 9/11.²³⁴

I believe one of the main concerns for both communities in 2004 must have been the U.S. presidential election. The elections proved to be hard choices for both communities. I received an assiduous number of emails from several Indian American as well as Pakistani American organizations urging community members to register to vote and cast their ballot. Simultaneously, members were discussing the viewpoint of both candidates toward India or Pakistan and debating which candidate would be the best president in terms of a favorable foreign policy toward their home country. Organizations generally tried to avoid endorsing a

²³³ *South Asian response to anti-immigrant legislation needed*, December 1, 2004; Anwar, I., October 3, 2004

²³⁴ *Pakistani American harassed at New York airport*, August 19, 2004; *U.S. Legislators Interact with Delegates of NFIA and AIA at the Congressional Luncheon*, June 5, 2004; *NCPA Welcomes House Judiciary Committee's "Yes" Vote on Hasan Family*, May 13, 2004

presidential candidate. There is no way to find out for which candidate Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans have voted. In the past, Indian Americans generally supported the Democratic Party whereas the party made an effort to enlist their support. The Republicans did not attract many Indian immigrants as they were hostile to India's cause (cf. Nixon's tilt in favor of Pakistan in 1971) and also made no effort to welcome the newly arrived immigrants to its fold. Especially, President Clinton's era prove to be a turning point where Indians were appointed to political jobs and were welcomed at party meetings, fundraisers and political discussions. A few Indians did also join the Republican Party but their numbers were too small.²³⁵ Certainly, it must have been a difficult choice. Some articles mentioned that John Kerry is "a keen admirer of Musharraf" and "lauded the role of Pakistani Americans in strengthening the bonds between the U.S. and Pakistan".²³⁶ Additionally, he held an openly anti-Indian sentiment on outsourcing and other business matters.²³⁷ George W. Bush failed to list India among America's allies in Asia, decided to designate Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally and announced that there "will be an infusion of sophisticated weapons into Pakistan".²³⁸ In contrast to Senator Kerry, Bush did encourage the BPO (Business Process Outsourcing) and did declare India (early on during his administration) a strategic partner.²³⁹

Some of the organizations also sent out emails to its members to educate them on the political process of voting and to call attention to their voting rights. One email laid out all the voting rights and even mentioned a phone number one could call if any problems should occur.²⁴⁰

A matter of great concern to the politically active Indian American community was obviously the creation and establishment of the Congressional Pakistan Caucus in the House of Representatives. The matter that upset some of the community members was the fact that

²³⁵ Sud, H., 2004

²³⁶ *Kerry a keen admirer of Musharraf*, September 2, 2004

²³⁷ Sud, H., 2004

²³⁸ Iqbal, A., September 2, 2004

²³⁹ Sud, H., 2004

²⁴⁰ *ELECTION DAY NOV. 2*, November 1, 2004

some of the India Caucus members joined the Pakistan Caucus and that President Musharraf came to Washington personally to inaugurate the Caucus on the Hill. A sample letter to send to House Representatives was spread among community members saying: "The law passed by Congress that says that U.S. taxpayer money cannot be provided to countries whose governments have been overthrown by military coups, is still in existence. We have overlooked this due to Pakistan's help in the war against terrorism". The sample letter went on in this kind of polemic and confrontational language to conclude with "You [the representative] have a choice before you to give the General [Musharraf] a message that he needs to bring democracy back to his country not by rewarding him with a Caucus and making a mockery of our system."²⁴¹ When a couple of months earlier, the formation of the Caucus was announced, similar emails were sent around. Indian Americans were asked to "IMMEDIATELY contact their House Representatives, if they are members of the India Caucus, and request them not to join the Pakistan Caucus if they are approached with a request. They need to be told that if they become members of both the Caucuses, **there will be a conflict of interest.**"²⁴²

In 2004, a number of symbolic issues were brought to the community fore as well. For example, community members were urged to sign a petition online or send a support letter to the Stamp Advisory Committee to issue a commemorative stamp on November 6, 2006 in honor of the first U.S. Congressman of Asian origin, the India born Dalip Singh Saund at the 50th anniversary of Saund's victory in the 1956 congressional election.²⁴³ Also events such as the India Independence Day Parade in Chicago were considered very important to the community stating that this year's parade attracted a record-breaking crowd and

²⁴¹ *SAT on Congressional Pakistan Caucus in the House of Representatives*, September 20, 2004

²⁴² *Congressional PAKISTAN CAUCUS***, July 2, 2004

²⁴³ *Stamp for Dilip S. Saund*, September 10, 2004

"provided an outstanding opportunity to the families to celebrate our cultural heritage, and cherish our time-honored values, traditions and history."²⁴⁴

Professional organizations also raised their issues of concern. The AAIP (in cooperation with IADO) tried to mobilize community members to contact their legislators in order they would vote against a Senate bill²⁴⁵ that had not been written in the physicians' interests.²⁴⁶ The India-U.S. Joint Business Council has been working on a Free Trade Agreement proposal between India and the U.S. Advantages of this proposal for the U.S. would be that American banks and insurance companies could open up as many branches as they want in India, accountants and retailers could enter India, etc. The FTA could allow Indian professionals to gain unrestricted access to the U.S. market. Additionally, it would boost outsourcing. Professionals would be able to take up jobs in the U.S. without visa hassles and U.S. investment in the Indian service industries would increase.²⁴⁷

Foreign policy matters also formed a part of the agendas of the diaspora communities. Both Indian Americans as well as Indians were concerned about the Bush administration's decision to accord Pakistan Non-NATO ally status without warning New Delhi.²⁴⁸ The Indian Ambassador Lalit Mansingh spoke of a "breach of trust" and Rep. Frank Pallone, a prominent India Caucus member called the granting of the status "particularly outrageous".²⁴⁹

²⁴⁴ *Record Breaking Crowd Converge to Witness FIA's India Independence Day Parade in Chicago*, August 19, 2004

²⁴⁵ More specifically: Senate Bill 2239. The big matter of concern was an amendment added by trial lawyers based around the idea of "personal assessment protection" as method of addressing Illinois medical litigation crisis. It meant that (1) physicians would be forced to settle non-meritorious claims which would cause liability premiums to rise; (2) asset protection would be left to the whims of the court in post-verdict proceedings; and (3) as a result, insurers would avoid Illinois, and current insurers would be forced to restrict coverage. (*Doctors are in danger of losing everything*, July 21, 2004)

²⁴⁶ *Doctors are in danger of losing everything*, July 21, 2004

²⁴⁷ *Trading Places, FTA is terrific idea*, August, 7, 2004

²⁴⁸ Haniffa, A., April 9, 2004 (b); *U.S. Legislators Interact with Delegates of NFIA and AIA at the Congressional Luncheon*, June 5, 2004

²⁴⁹ Haniffa, A., April 9, 2004 (b)

The Indian Americans have also followed the improving relationship between India and China. The fact that China endorsed India's candidature to the U.N. Security Council is considered to be a substantial upgrading of the relationship between the two countries.²⁵⁰

When in April 2004 a U.S. Senate India Caucus (cf. 11.3.) was established, this was of course a matter of great delight for the Indian Americans.²⁵¹ The creation of the U.S. House Pakistan Caucus was obviously for the Pakistani Americans a reason to celebrate.

Pakistani Americans usually raise issues that have a similar nature as the ones brought up by Indian Americans. However, they have not yet reached the same level of political activism as that of the Indian Americans. In other words, there seems to be a lot of talk and discussion but not as much action.

In October 2004, the Pakistani American community was priding itself because Senator Hillary Clinton, addressing a large number of Pakistani Americans at a reception in Los Angeles, lauded Pakistan's role in the war on terrorism. The reception was hosted by the director of the PAL-C who is a prominent Pakistani businessman. Senator Clinton also mentioned that the U.S. and Pakistan are facing several common challenges of which terrorism is the most significant one. She also recalled her meetings with President Musharraf during her last visit in Pakistan and said, "He had made difficult but right choices".²⁵² What is remarkable about these newspaper articles is that none of them mentions that the Clinton couple's visit²⁵³ to Pakistan only lasted about five hours and was part of a South Asia trip of which five days were spent in India. The articles also fail to mention that she is in fact one of

²⁵⁰ Bagchi, I., October 21, 2004

²⁵¹ Haniffa, A., April 9, 2004 (c)

²⁵² *Pakistan made difficult but right choice: Hillary*, October 18, 2004; *Long-term ties with Pakistan in US interest: Hillary*, October 18, 2004

²⁵³ The stop-over in Islamabad was quite a controversial topic in the U.S. as well as in India. India had invited President Clinton and his wife, but since it did not concern a conditional invitation, the Clinton administration was also considering a stopover in Islamabad. While India stressed this was a sovereign decision to be taken on the American side, India's Foreign Secretary did inform the American officials that a stopover in Islamabad would be frowned upon by Indian public opinion. Consequently, a number of members of the India Caucus urged the President not to go to Pakistan and circulated a "Dear colleague" letter to representatives to gather support against a possible presidential visit to Pakistan. (Haniffa, A., March 3, 2000; Haniffa, A., March 10, 2000)

the co-chairs of the Senate India Caucus. Pakistani Americans do not seem to be questioning these kinds of contradictions.

Several orators at the Annual Summit of the Pakistani American Congress in Washington on June 26, 2003, called on their community to become more involved in the political arena and to educate fellow citizens about Pakistan uttering that "by your own conduct with Americans, you can...correct misconceptions about Pakistanis." Pointing out that many young Pakistanis enter the field of engineering while few enter the fields of law and political science, they emphasized the need for more advocates in the community, especially after 9/11. Women's issues were addressed as well. Women were urged to join the Pakistani American Congress and to present themselves as "outspoken fighters for democracy".²⁵⁴ The report about the 2004 summit, however, said that the audience was constituted mainly of Pakistani males.²⁵⁵

A different focal point of the 2003 summit was General Musharraf's visit to the U.S. It was a quite controversial topic. While some speakers expressed that "Musharraf's visit has brought improvement in the [U.S.-Pakistani] bilateral relationship, others exclaimed that they do not accept Musharraf as president because he has yet to be elected while echoing a belief that the Bush administration is using Pakistan's military dictatorship to do Washington's bidding."²⁵⁶ Interesting about this report is that it shows that the opinion of some Pakistani Americans about Musharraf's leadership does not converge with the opinion of Pakistanis in the homeland who by now have largely accepted Musharraf as their President. Furthermore, the report displays the diversity of the Pakistani American community's interests and concerns ranging from U.S.-Pakistan relations, mobilizing women to Musharraf's visit to the U.S.

²⁵⁴ Rizzuto, P., September 2003

²⁵⁵ Ibrahim, M., September 2004

²⁵⁶ Rizzuto, P., September 2003

A serious matter of concern for the Pakistani American community in 2003 was the required Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) registration²⁵⁷ for certain categories of Pakistani nationals. The new U.S. immigration laws required Pakistani visitors to register regularly with the authorities about their whereabouts. The inclusion of Pakistan on the list of those countries whose nationals were to register with the INS sent shock-waves through the Pakistani community. The Pakistani Ambassador, in an open letter to his community in the U.S., said Islamabad was doing all it can to minimize the impact of the new U.S. immigration regulations. He reassured his community that embassy officers had been in touch with the INS and their main thrust was to remove Pakistan from the list. The Ambassador also said: "The Pakistani community in the U.S. is our government's biggest asset", and he urged Pakistanis in the U.S. to "use their influence with their respective Congressmen/Senators, administration officials and other American friends to sensitize them about the community's concerns on the registration process."²⁵⁸

Pakistani Americans have not been completely inoperative and have at some points tried to influence U.S. administration by mobilizing community members. In May 2002, five major Pakistani American organizations joined together to form the Pakistan American National Alliance (PANA)²⁵⁹ in order to protect and promote vital Pakistani American interests in the U.S. Immediately, after its formation, PANA launched a nationwide campaign to send letters, faxes, emails and petitions to President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell urging them to use their influence to defuse escalating tension between Pakistan and India.²⁶⁰ Also, the Pakistan American Democratic Forum made an effort to influence U.S. administration earlier that year. It urged the administration to declare India's extremist groups,

²⁵⁷ Pakistani men over the age of 16 without permanent residence status in the U.S. were added on December 16, 2002 to the list of immigrants asked to register with federal officials. Those who failed to comply faced criminal charges and immediate expulsion from the U.S. (Springer, R., December 20)

²⁵⁸ Dutt, El., January 17, 2003

²⁵⁹ PANA includes members of the Association of Pakistani Physicians of North America, Council of Pakistan American Affairs (COPAA), Pakistan American Congress (PAC), Pakistan American Democratic Forum (PADF), and PAK-PAC. (Ghazali, A.S., September/October 2002)

²⁶⁰ Ghazali, A.S., September/October 2002

Vishva Hindu Parishad and Bajrang Dal, as terrorist organizations for their activities against Muslims and Christians, pointing out that the ideology of these organizations is anti-humanist and racist.²⁶¹

Other concerns of the diaspora communities are the attempts to alleviate the suffering of men, women and children, poverty and illiteracy in their home countries. There are innumerable non-profit diasporic associations dedicated to these problems. Regularly, fund raisings are held in order to create and implement effective development policies for the unprivileged in the mother country.

Undoubtedly, the most concerning issues in U.S. domestic politics for Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans in the post 9/11 period, has been the increase in racism and the tightened immigration regulations. I believe it has affected the two diaspora communities disproportionately and it has been harder on Pakistani Americans because people tend to categorize them as Muslims/terrorists.

Of course not all Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans are concerned about the same kinds of issues and my outline is but a glimpse of what makes it to the headlines of the community newspapers. As the diaspora communities are far from homogenous in their outlook, so are their issues of concern.

²⁶¹ *US body seeks ban on VHP, Bajrang Dal*, January 3, 2002

7. U.S.- India ties

In 1996, Rubinoff wrote about the *Missed Opportunities* between India and the U.S. during the Clinton-Rao years and ascribed this failure to the fact that most Americans cherished diffused perceptions and misconceptions about India as a country that was solely "poverty-stricken and helpless" and where problems of disease and illiteracy wielded. Consequently, the Congress, most likely to be representative of public attitudes and receiving their news and impressions about India from the media, did not pay a lot of attention to India. India had a low priority in both the executive as well as the legislative branches of American politics.²⁶² Glazer & Glazer (1990) pointed out that perceptions have been paramount in shaping U.S. policy towards South Asia.²⁶³

If we highlight past relations between the U.S. and India, we bump into numerous extreme low points in this relationship: the Korean War, Pakistan's inclusion in the American alliance system in 1954-55, the sending of the carrier Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal in 1971 during East-Pakistan's liberation struggle; and more recently there were irritants centred around economic and nuclear non-proliferation issues. Additionally the State Department and Capitol Hill held on to the perception that India was on the wrong side of two major conflicts in the 20th century, i.e. World War II and the Cold War. The American attitude towards India has been described as one of "benign neglect".²⁶⁴

• The 1980s

In the 1980s, during the Reagan administration, Pakistan was constantly favoured at the expense of New Delhi. For example, the Reagan administration proposed a weakening of the 1978 Symington Amendment²⁶⁵ as a way of enabling Pakistan to meet its security needs.

²⁶² Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 500; Glazer, S.R.; Glazer, N. (Eds.), 1990, p. 1-19; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 40

²⁶³ Glazer, S.R.; Glazer, N. (Eds.), 1990, p. 1-19

²⁶⁴ Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 507-509; Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 23; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p.42

²⁶⁵ The Symington Amendment (adopted 1976, section 101 of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended) gave Congress the authority to suspend

Despite the fact that Congress declined to weaken the Symington Amendment, it did grant Pakistan a six-year exemption in the interest of national security. Further, Reagan signed in December 1981 (under public law) the waiving of the application of the Symington Amendment in the Pakistani case as long as Soviet forces were stationed in Afghanistan.²⁶⁶

After an incident in which a Pakistani citizen was arrested in Houston trying to smuggle electronic switches that trigger nuclear bombs, Congress passed the Solarz-Pressler Amendment²⁶⁷ in 1985. However, lobbyists for the Pakistani Embassy continued to be very successful on the Hill and were able to induce Congress to temporarily cut aid to India in 1987 when its own funding was in jeopardy because of embarking on a nuclear weapons program.²⁶⁸

Another indicator of the benign neglect of India is the fact that until 1991 the State Department combined South Asia with the Near East and resisted the creation of a separate bureau for the South Asian region. Attaching the South Asian region to the Near East, it was constantly overshadowed by Arab-Israeli matters. Only when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee came under the chairmanship of Stephen Solarz²⁶⁹ (D-NY) (1981-1993), the

foreign aid of arms sales to countries, which receive nuclear enrichment equipment or technology and do not accept International Atomic Energy Agency-safeguards. (Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 503; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p.43) President Jimmy Carter found Pakistan in violation of the Symington amendment in 1979 because of Islamabad's clandestine construction of a uranium enrichment plant. U.S. aid to Islamabad was possible between 1982 and 1990 only through the use of presidential waivers. (Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000)

²⁶⁶ Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 503; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 43

²⁶⁷ The Solarz-Pressler Amendment (adopted section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended) stipulated that American assistance to Pakistan would immediately be cut off if the president found that the country had tried illegally to acquire American material for making nuclear weapons. (Nayar, B.R., Paul, T.V., 2003, p. 226; Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 504; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000; Nayar, B.R., Paul, T.V., 2003, p.226)

²⁶⁸ Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 504; Lal, V., 2001, p. 189-190; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 44

²⁶⁹ During the Cold War, when New Delhi was perceived as a surrogate of the Soviet Union and Pakistan was Washington's favorite ally, Stephen Solarz was a veritable one-man India Caucus on Capitol Hill. He argued India's case and denounced Zia al-Haq's dictatorship and Islamabad's clandestine nuclear weapons program. He became a casualty of redistricting in 1992 and lost his seat in Congress. Ever since, he has worked at several consulting companies including his own (Haniffa, A., April 25, 2003; Haniffa, A., April 25, 1997). Many expected him to become the U.S. Ambassador to India in 1994 after the previous one, Thomas Pickering, was shifted from New Delhi to Moscow. However, some allegations were made that Solarz had helped a Hong Kong mobster-businessman with a criminal record to obtain a U.S. visa and this resulted in a FBI investigation which slowed down the process of Solarz's appointment as Ambassador tremendously (Haniffa, A., February 4, 1994) Most

committee's interest in South Asian issues reached an all-time high.²⁷⁰ It was Stephen Solarz as well who secured a passage of a bill establishing a separate South Asia Bureau with an Assistant Secretary in 1991.²⁷¹

● **The 1990s**

The end of the Cold War and the Soviets retreating from Afghanistan involved a slight deterioration of the U.S.-Pakistani ties. In October 1990, President George Bush refused to certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear explosive device and the Congress invoked the 1985 Pressler Amendment. In the meantime, Indo-American relations had been on the rise.²⁷² Due to India's economic liberalization and market-opening beginning in 1991, Capitol Hill suddenly discovered new South Asian markets for U.S. goods and the U.S. became New Delhi's leading trading partner and foreign investor. Consequently, congressional thinking about the region slowly began to shift.²⁷³ Especially the election of a Democratic administration in Washington (in 1992) was greeted warmly in New Delhi. Nevertheless, Clinton's administration held a contradictory agenda: some American diplomats praised India's Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's economic liberalization campaigns, others were very critical of the Indian government's violation of human rights in suppressing the ongoing Sikh rebellion in the Punjab.²⁷⁴

As mentioned before (cf. chapter 3), the appointment of Robin Raphel as Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of South Asian Affairs triggered the lack of sound and comprehensible communication between Washington and Delhi even more. In India, she was

interesting is that Robert M. Hathaway who has been publishing many articles on the political participation of the Indian diaspora in the U.S., is Solarz's former aid. Hathaway helped to craft the legislation that led to the creation of the South Asian Bureau (Haniffa, A., April 25, 1997).

²⁷⁰ Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 501; Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 28; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 38

²⁷¹ Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 505; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 38; Haniffa, A., April 25, 2003; Haniffa, A., February 4, 1994

²⁷² Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 505-6

²⁷³ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 23; Mathur, A., 2003, p.30, p. 170; Khare, R.S., 2002, p. 278

²⁷⁴ Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 505-6; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 44; Mathur, A., 2003, p. 27-28; Rubinoff, A.G., 2002, p. 536

perceived as being pro-Pakistani and she also annoyed numerous Asian Indian Americans in the U.S.²⁷⁵

Another factor that turned out to be a strain on Indo-American relations was the return to power of Benazir Bhutto in late 1993. Bhutto was well connected with Washington and perceived as pro-American. Simultaneously in November 1993, Senator Larry Pressler (R-SD) revealed that the Clinton administration was considering rescinding the 1985 legislation that had led to the cut-off of assistance to Pakistan in 1990. Also Robin Raphel claimed that the Pressler Amendment was an obstacle to improved ties with Pakistan, which again proved her "love" for Pakistan. The efforts to rescind the Pressler Amendment were vigorously resisted by Senator Pressler and John Glenn (D-OH), documenting violations of the original legislation by Pakistan, which was covertly proceeding its nuclear program. In the non-proliferators' perspective, repeal would send out the wrong message and reward Pakistan for non-compliance. Additionally, the efforts to repeal the Pressler Amendment were bolstered by Hillary Clinton's visit to South Asia in March 1995 and a visit by Benazir Bhutto to Washington in early April where she lobbied congressional leaders. Hillary Clinton pledged the Congress to show some flexibility in the Pressler Amendment so there could be some economic and military cooperation. Furthermore, Stephen Solarz's defeat in the 1992 elections immensely reduced the pro-India policy in the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House of Representatives and symbolized a decline in Indo-U.S. relations.²⁷⁶

When in 1995, Hank Brown became chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee dealing with South Asian affairs; he replicated the administration's contradictory approach toward India. He promoted the expanding commercial relationship between the U.S. and India, but simultaneously he also became the administration's point person for watering down the Pressler Amendment. In September 1995, the Brown

²⁷⁵ Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 506; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 44, Mathur, A., 2003, p. 28, p. 52; Haniffa, A., April 25, 1997

²⁷⁶ Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 506; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 45; Rubinoff, A.G., 2002, p.439

Amendment²⁷⁷ was taken up on the Senate Floor. This proposal contained a one-time waiver of the Pressler Amendment to sell Pakistan \$368 million military equipment. Again, critics of the Brown Amendment, John Glenn and Larry Pressler, were concerned that the wrong message was being sent to nuclear proliferators.²⁷⁸ The Senate voted in favour of the Brown Amendment, which was passed by a margin of 55-54. Despite heavy objections raised by the Congressional India Caucus, the House of Representatives followed suit by a vote of 348-69 and President Clinton signed the legislation on January 27, 1996.²⁷⁹ At the same time, the passing of the Brown Amendment was also a major setback for some members of the India Caucus, such as Bill McCollum (R- FL) who in November 1994 had urged the State Department to put Pakistan on its watch list of countries supporting terrorism because of Islamabad's continuing involvement in fomenting the insurgency in Kashmir.²⁸⁰ In March 1995 other members of the India Caucus, after the killing of two American diplomats and the wounding of a third in Karachi, pressured the Clinton administration to designate Pakistan as a sponsor of international terrorism and to censure Islamabad.²⁸¹ The passing of the Brown Amendment was a serious wake-up call for the Indian American community that it was necessary to develop deeper ties with congressmen.²⁸²

Weiner (1990) exclaimed in 1990 that the actual impact of the Indian community on U.S. policy toward India had been negligible compared with foreign policy impact of

²⁷⁷ The Brown Amendment exempted most forms of economic assistance from the Pressler Amendment prohibitions. (Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000; Rubinoff, A.G., 2002, p. 441-2) The passing of the Brown Amendment provided sophisticated weapons to Pakistan. Brown argued that the weapons should be delivered to Pakistan for essentially three reasons: (1) Pakistan had paid for the equipment and it would be wrong of the U.S. to take money and then not deliver the weapons; (2) the sale would reaffirm American support for the regime of Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and (3) it would lead to better cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan without upsetting the strategic balance in the region or undermining the security of India (Nurnberger, R., October 20, 1995).

²⁷⁸ Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 507; Nurnberger, R., October 20, 1995

²⁷⁹ Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 508; Nayar, B.R., Paul, T.V., 2003, p. 228; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 45

²⁸⁰ Haniffa, A., November 4, 1994

²⁸¹ Haniffa, A., March 24, 1995

²⁸² Nurnberger, R., October 20, 1995

American Jews, Cubans, Greeks and Poles.²⁸³ Rubinoff in 1996 wrote, "Since no significant segment of the American population originates from South Asia, congressional concern about the region is not constant".²⁸⁴ Nevertheless, it is quite clear that paralleling the coming of age and growing of the Asian Indian diaspora in the U.S. and also India's liberalisation, substantial changes slowly occurred in America's India-policy and its congressional attitudes about India. The new politically inspired interests in the region from 1991 onwards, reflect the significant changes that took place within the Indian American community. Boasting large numbers of professionals, the community became increasingly affluent during the last decade of the 20th century. It became more politically active, and devoted more attention to making its views known on Capitol Hill. Most strikingly, it outnumbered the Pakistani American community that was only about one-tenth the size of the Indian American community.²⁸⁵

In 1997, members of the India Caucus had learned from previous set-backs and started the new year with circulating a "dear colleague" letter urging for closer U.S.-India while pointing out India's benevolence in the India-Bangladesh water-sharing agreement and other virtues.²⁸⁶ The same week President Clinton sent out a congratulatory message to the people of India on the occasion of the country's 50th anniversary of its independence. He also said that the U.S. was eager to strengthen relations with India to foster mutual security and prosperity.²⁸⁷ That same year, a report of the American Council on Foreign Relations argued for the adoption of a new strategy towards India. It suggested that India's growing power should be acknowledged, curbs on technology transfer reduced and military co-operation increased.²⁸⁸ Eventually, after months of speculation Clinton also decided to replace the

²⁸³ Weiner, M., 1990, p. 251

²⁸⁴ Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 504

²⁸⁵ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 23

²⁸⁶ Haniffa, A., January 24, 1997 (a)

²⁸⁷ Haniffa, A., January 24, 1997 (b)

²⁸⁸ *Finding its place in the world*, October 4, 1997

controversial Robin Raphel, the first Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs; something that felt as a relief to the Indian American community.²⁸⁹

One of the first little signs of a change of attitude towards India was that Frank Pallone as co-chair of the India Caucus, on September 26, 1997 moved a resolution that backed India's case for a permanent seat in the Security Council.²⁹⁰ Although his efforts were largely ignored by the administration²⁹¹, the fact that he could make such a claim is in itself a sign of advancement and it would definitely have been unthinkable off a decade earlier.

A huge step forward in Indo-American relations was Clinton's (in 1998) announced visit to India. The president of the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce, a very powerful business association that has played a major role in adding stimulus to business relations between the U.S. and India²⁹², proclaimed prior to Clinton's visit that "this visit will demonstrate how important India is for the U.S. and enormously strengthen bilateral political and economical ties"²⁹³.

Then, India held its nuclear tests at Pokhran in May 1998. Most legislators conceded that President Clinton had little choice but to invoke the Glenn amendment²⁹⁴, which imposed extensive economic and military sanctions on New Delhi (and following Pakistan's tests, on Islamabad as well).²⁹⁵ Pakistan, however, was treated more mildly than India with respect to the curbing of multilateral assistance by international granting agencies, so sanctions would not destabilize its weak government. More importantly, Pakistan was the third-largest foreign

²⁸⁹ Haniffa, A., April 25, 1997

²⁹⁰ *Finding its place in the world*, October 4, 1997

²⁹¹ Haniffa, A., October 9, 1998

²⁹² <http://www.indous.org/>

²⁹³ *Clinton Visit*, December 22, 1997

²⁹⁴ The Glenn Amendment was adopted in 1977 (as section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly section 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended). It prohibits U.S. foreign assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon state (as defined by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) that, among other things, detonates a nuclear explosive device. President Bill Clinton imposed Glenn amendment sanctions against India on May 13, 1998, two days after New Delhi broke its self-imposed 24-year moratorium on nuclear testing. On May 30, 1998, Clinton invoked similar sanctions against Pakistan, following Islamabad's six nuclear tests on May 28 and 30. (Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000). There is also a 1994 Glenn Amendment, better known as the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, that calls for sanctions on states that engage in nuclear testing (Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 57).

²⁹⁵ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 22

purchaser of U.S. wheat at a time when the U.S. farming industry was in a desperate crisis.²⁹⁶ Yet, the members of the India Caucus began to voice doubts about the wisdom of an action their own legislation had mandated. Within 18 months, the U.S. Congress swung from applauding strict sanctions to urging the president to waive not only the Glenn amendment, but also the Pressler and Symington amendments²⁹⁷. By the end of 1999, U.S. lawmakers had completely turned their backs on sanctions as a tool of non-proliferation policy.²⁹⁸

In the summer of 1999, the Indians Americans' political influence became increasingly noticeable when the House International Relations Committee took up a resolution dealing with the Pakistani-backed incursion into the Kargil sector of Indian Kashmir. A remarkable sign of Indian Americans' political engagement is evident in the following anecdote. After the Kargil insurgency, Indian American computer professionals, urging a condemnation of Pakistani actions, organized an e-mail campaign that startled congressional offices. One staff member reported receiving 400 e-mails in a 24-hour period. Although this congressional aide was irritated rather than persuaded by the messages, the potential impact of a mobilized and technologically savvy bloc of voters did not escape notice.²⁹⁹ President Clinton, citing congressional pressure, did not only urge the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw his forces, but also unequivocally condemned Pakistan's abrogation of the Line Of Control. This is a clear sign of the political influence that

²⁹⁶ Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 57; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000

²⁹⁷ The waiving of all these sanctions happened because of the enactment of two amendments, i.e., Brownback I and II. Brownback I, adopted in October 1998, also known as The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, incorporated into the fiscal 1999 omnibus appropriations bill (Public Law 105-277), granted the authority to the president to waive all sanctions except those pertaining to military assistance, dual-use exports and military sales for one year. A year later, Brownback II (adopted 1999. Incorporated into the fiscal year 2000 defense appropriations bill (Public Law 106-79) gave the president permanent authority to waive, with respect to India and Pakistan, all the provisions of the Glenn amendment. In addition, it authorized the president to waive the Symington and Pressler amendment sanctions, which had prohibited almost all U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan since 1990. Brownback II represented an extraordinary reversal of American policy. The measure handed the president the authority to lift all sanctions imposed upon India and Pakistan as a result of their 1998 nuclear tests. (Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 47; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000)

²⁹⁸ Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000, p. 7; Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 22; Lancaster, J., October 9, 1999; Jha, N.K., 2003, p.168-169

²⁹⁹ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 24; Lal, V., 2001, p. 189-190; Lancaster, J., October 9, 1999; Chanda, N., March 30, 2000; Lal, V., 2003, p. 106

Indian Americans can exercise among American legislators.³⁰⁰ Later that year, in November, India Caucus members introduced the U.S. Support for a Democratic Pakistan Act (H.R. 3330) stating that certain actions against Pakistan cannot be waived until the President certifies that Pakistan has a democratically elected government.³⁰¹

All this activism, of course, is not to suggest that the Indian American community is any more monolithic in its views than other groups in U.S. politics. For instance, in the 1980s and early 1990s, an active Sikh presence on the Hill criticized Indian actions in the Punjab and urged Congress to adopt punitive measures toward New Delhi and to support the creation of an independent Khalistan.³⁰² Dr. Gurmit Singh Aulakh, head of the Council of Khalistan, was not an unfamiliar figure on Capitol Hill and worked closely with Dan Burton (R-ID), "The India basher", and other congressional offices to focus attention on Indian actions in Punjab. Even after conditions in Punjab returned to normal during the 1990s, Aulakh's congressional supporters continued to write letters and draft legislation denouncing Indian actions. In June 1998, 19 legislators from both parties sent a letter to Clinton condemning New Delhi's "miserable record of ethnic cleansing." Two years later, a similar letter signed by 20 lawmakers urged Clinton to place India on the U.S. "terrorism list" and declared it was time for the U.S. to support "self-determination for all the peoples and nations living under India's brutal rule."³⁰³

Nonetheless, by the end of the decade, the fissures within the Indian American community had not prevented the emergence of a reasonably unified Indian American position on most South Asia-related issues on the congressional agenda. It is worth noting that India's large Muslim population operates within this consensus and has not developed a

³⁰⁰ Lal, V., 2001, p. 189-190; Lancaster, J., October 9, 1999; Hiebert, M., March 23, 2000; Chanda, N., March 30, 2000; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000, p. 48; Kux, D., May/June 2002, p. 94

³⁰¹ *United States Support for a Democratic Pakistan Act of 1999*, November 10, 1999

³⁰² Awanohara, S., May 23, 1991, p. 34; Weiner, M., 1990, p. 252

³⁰³ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 25

competing voice within the Indian American community in the U.S.³⁰⁴ Except when it comes to the cooperation between Jewish Americans and Indian Americans, Indian Muslims do express sentiments of resentment (cf. chapter 9).

As implicitly suggested earlier - the enhancement of India on Capitol Hill in recent years certainly reflects a greater interest on the part of the U.S. business community. The Indian market has attracted the attention of Wall Street and U.S. corporate interests have responded to the efforts of successive Indian governments in the 1990s to move away from the tightly regulated economic policies of the past by expanding their operations in India. This new interest in trade and commercial opportunities has also encouraged U.S. lawmakers to reconsider their former indifference toward India. Many members of Congress are constantly on the lookout for fresh markets, more jobs for constituents and greater profits for local businesses in India. Whereas congressional trade delegations to India in the 1970s were rarities, they have now become quite popular.³⁰⁵ Economic opportunity figures clearly in congressional thinking about India. PepsiCo and General Electric, which have major investments in India, have also become important lobbyist for India in Washington. As American investment in India increases, so too does New Delhi's influence in Washington and this largely due to the efforts of the U.S.-India Business Council and the India Interest Lobby Group.³⁰⁶

The political clout of the India Caucus has been nowhere more apparent than in the House's annual consideration of the Burton amendments. Nearly every year, Dan Burton (R-ID), often referred to as an "India-basher"³⁰⁷, offers an amendment to the foreign aid bill to reduce or eliminate U.S. assistance to India. These amendments tap into anti-India or pro-Pakistani sentiment, but also appeal to the widespread distaste for foreign assistance that

³⁰⁴ *Id.*, p. 26

³⁰⁵ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 26; *India: U.S. interest group*, February 20, 1999; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000; *US to partner-country in Indiachem 2000*, November 13, 1999; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 37

³⁰⁶ Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 58; Rubinoff, A.G., 2002, p. 449

³⁰⁷ Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000, p. 7; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 38

permeates Congress. Burton usually justifies these measures as a way of compelling New Delhi to improve its human rights behavior. Burton has never succeeded in having one of his anti-India measures signed into law, but in 1992, the House did adopt a Burton amendment to eliminate development assistance to India.³⁰⁸ However, by the mid-1990s, the shift in congressional attitudes toward India made Burton's task more difficult. The first turning point occurred in 1996, when the Burton amendment lost by a resounding 169 votes. A year later, a comparable Burton measure lost by 260 votes.³⁰⁹ One of the reasons that the Pakistani-Americans are not equally influential on the Hill is that the Pakistani-American population is only one-tenth the size of the Indian American community. Pakistan had until very recently no congressional equivalent of the India Caucus. Previously, various efforts to organize a Pakistan Caucus foundered on congressional indifference and the hard political reality that publicly aligning themselves with Pakistan holds few political incentives for most members of the U.S. Congress.³¹⁰

• Entering the 21st century

In March 2000 Clinton made his widely acclaimed visit to India, representing the first presidential trip to the subcontinent in more than two decades.³¹¹ He mentioned the growing importance of the Indian immigrant community in the U.S. as one of the reasons for his visit.³¹² Six months later, the Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in his turn made an

³⁰⁸ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 28; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 59

³⁰⁹ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 28; Ramesh, M., June 5, 2000; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 59

³¹⁰ Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000; Hiebert, M., March 23, 2000; Lindsay, J.M., Winter 2002, p. 40; Basu, M., Augustus 23, 2002; Datta-Ray, S.K., 2002, p. 218

³¹¹ President Jimmy Carter was the last American president, prior to Clinton, to visit India in 1978.

³¹² Clinton: "I think one of the reasons we've been able to play a meaningful role in Northern Ireland is we have so many Irish Americans here. I think one of the reasons we've been able to play a meaningful role in the Middle East is we have a lot of Jewish Americans and a lot of Arab Americans. I think we forget that among all the some 200-ethnic groups we have in our country, Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans have been among the most successful in terms of education and income level. They have worked and succeeded stunningly well in the United States." (Shukla, S.R., 2003, p. 9)

official state visit to Washington, where he was honored by the U.S. political, economic, and entertainment elite and invited to address a joint session of Congress.³¹³

It is clear that since India became an important player in the global economy, U.S. foreign policy toward the country moved away from the nuclear proliferation issues and started to focus on trade and investment. Indian Americans are said to have played the single most important role in changing American policy toward India.³¹⁴ In 1998, Karl Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, proclaimed: "The economic and commercial investment part of our relationship should be the centerpiece of our relationship with India".³¹⁵

Security considerations also contributed to the tightening of the U.S.-India relationship. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, congressional anxieties have increasingly centered on two other potential challenges to American security: China and Islamic fundamentalism³¹⁶. Members of the India Caucus have tapped into these kinds of feelings. Prior to Clinton's visit to India and after the Pokhran tests, Frank Pallone called for an alliance with India instead of hoping for a strategic partnership with China. Pallone said: "I believe we should recognize the benefits of closer defense ties with India, a country which also in contrast to China, does not threaten its neighbors".³¹⁷ Co-chairman of the India Caucus, Ed Royce, expressed similar feelings highlighting the need to facilitate trade and investment links between the two countries and stating it would be in the long run be more profitable to invest in a country that has a democratic system.³¹⁸

The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001 had a serious impact on the U.S. foreign policy and its change in focus. The George W. Bush-administration sought not

³¹³ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 22; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 48; Kux, D., May/June 2002, p. 94; Rathnam, I., 2002

³¹⁴ Hiebert, M., March 23, 2000; Chanda, N., March 30, 2000; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 37; Nayar, B.R., Paul, T.V., 2003, p. 227

³¹⁵ Greenberger, R.S.; Kuntz, P., May 19, 1998; Melwani, L., 2000

³¹⁶ Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000

³¹⁷ Chanda, N., March 30, 2000; Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 27

³¹⁸ *US Sanctions may be lifted soon*, February 22, 2001; Rathnam, I., 2002

only to continue the latter-day Clinton legacy of seeking engagement with India, but also to deepen the relations between the two countries. Already in his election campaign George W. Bush had made some very favorable references to India; while Condoleezza Rice, his national security advisor, underlined the strategic importance of India. After the elections, Bush emphasized the theme of the common commitment to democracy as the force behind the drive of the two countries for closer relations.³¹⁹

In early April 2001, two months into the administration of Bush, India's External Affairs and Defense Minister journeyed to Washington. During his one day visit, Jaswant Singh met with the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and Condoleezza Rice, all whom emphasized that the new administration had high expectations for U.S.-India relations.³²⁰

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, India decided to offer its "unconditional and unambivalent" support for the U.S. war on terrorism, which marked a further step in the rapprochement with Washington.³²¹ But simultaneously, the conflict in Afghanistan implicated a swift reconciliation between the U.S. and Pakistan - as a major non-NATO ally - and this created anxiety in New Delhi.³²² The Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited the U.S. again in November 2001 where he met President George W. Bush Jr., held meetings at Capitol Hill with House as well as Senate leaders and members of foreign affairs committees belonging to the India Caucus.³²³

Additionally, the Bush administration's lack of emphasis on the nuclear issue helped smooth things over even more. In the wake of September 11, the U.S. lifted all remaining sanctions and eased export controls on so called dual-use technology. And in the meantime, the political muscle of the economically booming Indian American community continues to

³¹⁹ Nayar, B.R., Paul, T.V., 2003, p. 244-245; Kux, D., May/June 2002, p. 94

³²⁰ Hathaway, R.M., 2002, p. 6

³²¹ Sipress, A., November 9, 2001; Kux, D., May/June 2002, p. 94; Hathaway, R.M., 2002, p 6 and p.

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³²² Kux, D., May/June 2002, p. 96

³²³ Sipress, A., November 9, 2001

grow.³²⁴ An Indian software engineer said: "We are now playing a more active role, Indians are no longer on the sidelines".³²⁵ Simultaneously, the Bush administration also angered India by lifting U.S. sanctions against Islamabad, pledging to provide generous assistance and helping Pakistan to renegotiate its debt obligations and ignoring new Pakistani-backed terrorism in Kashmir. Many Indians concluded that the Bush administration was guilty of a double standard - calling for a war against those perpetrating violence on the U.S. territory, while ignoring terror directed at India.³²⁶

Nevertheless, the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 did draw the two countries closer together because of the belief of fighting a common enemy. Officials in both capitals today are much more aware of their common interests and shared perspectives, and are far more open in talking about them, than their predecessors of a decade ago. But the process of translating these similar concerns into joint or coordinated policies has rarely begun.³²⁷

In the meantime, India Caucus members while emphasizing major areas of concern such as non-proliferation, terrorism and democratization, tried to block or add strings to aid for Pakistan³²⁸, but have not been successful.

There are several recent actions of members of the India Caucus. In April 2004, Pallone, who appears to be one of the most active members, wrote a letter urging the Pakistani President Musharraf to allow American intelligence agencies to question scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan about his role in nuclear proliferation. Pallone expressed distrustful feelings towards Pakistan, proclaiming that despite the fact that Pakistan has been declared an ally in the global war on terror, its nuclear behavior exemplifies just the opposite. Additionally, Pallone believes that the US Department of State should work with the United

³²⁴ Kux, D., May/June 2002, p. 94-95

³²⁵ Basu, M., Augustus 23, 2002

³²⁶ Hathaway, R.M., 2002, p. 17

³²⁷ *Id.*, p. 18-19

³²⁸ Haniffa, A., July 18, 2003; Haniffa, A. November 7, 2003

Nations and appropriate agencies to enter Pakistan and monitor its nuclear program.³²⁹ Members of the Caucus also issued a joint statement in the House of Representatives, warning that if the floodgates of military aid are reopened through the 'major non-NATO ally' device, it will seriously impact on the promising efforts being made to normalize Indo-Pakistan relations. Gary Ackerman, another prominent India Caucus member, uttered: "What is truly amazing is that, in addition to giving a pass on democratic development, the administration is also giving them a pass on proliferating nuclear technology".³³⁰

Later that month (on April 25th, 2004) Pallone held a press briefing on Capitol Hill announcing the plan to introduce legislation in remembrance of the Bhopal gas tragedy that took place in December 1984 when leaking gas from the pesticide plant owned by the Union Carbide Corporation had killed thousands of people and afflicted hundreds of thousands. Pallone called upon Dow Chemical, the American corporation that now owns Union Carbide, to step forward and take full responsibility for the company's actions. The planned efforts are four-fold and quite drastic: (1) hand over Union Carbide Corporation officials and its former chairman and CEO Warren Anderson on criminal charges to face trial in Bhopal; (2) provide long-term healthcare and monitoring for survivors and their children as well as the release of information on the health impact of the gases that were leaked; (3) demand clean-up of the former Union Carbide site and the surrounding area; and (4) obtain adequate economic and social support to survivors who can no longer pursue their trade because of illness or to families widowed by the disaster.³³¹ In the meantime, the Indian government issued criminal charges against the former Union Carbide chairman Warren Anderson who is now retired and lives in New York. Last year the Bhopal city court ruled that Anderson should face charges of culpable homicide, but the U.S. has rejected India's request for Anderson's extradition.³³²

³²⁹ *Allow U.S. intelligence to question Khan: Pallone*, April 15, 2004

³³⁰ Nasir, P., April 14, 2004

³³¹ *Pallone plans legislation on Bhopal gas victims*, April 27, 2004

³³² Iype, G., Singh, O., July 30, 2004

8. U.S.-Pakistan ties

The relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan has always been very different from the U.S.-India relationship. While India initially maintained a policy of non-alignment, Pakistan needed the U.S. for its survival. With Truman in the White House, the U.S. sought good relations with both Pakistan and India and tried to avoid taking sides between the two countries. The principal American interest was in solving the Kashmir dispute in order to prevent instability in South Asia. Cold War considerations overshadowed all other issues in U.S. foreign policy. Still officials in Washington favored Pakistan's pro-Western foreign policy to the approach of neutralist India.³³³

• The 1950s

Shortly after the establishment of the Pakistani nation-state, Pakistan sought security insurance and military back-up. When Dwight Eisenhower became president in 1953, U.S. policy emphasized strengthening the collective security around the communist bloc. The U.S. saw Pakistan as a useful partner in bolstering the defense of the Middle East.³³⁴ In 1954, Pakistan became part of the U.S. alliance system and America agreed to supply Pakistan with modern arms. Up until this point, India had not considered Pakistan as a serious threat.³³⁵ By the time, Eisenhower had finished his second term as a President the U.S.-Pakistan relationship seemed solid and the U.S. was happy that Pakistan as an ally appeared to be getting on its feet under Ayub Khan and was beginning to make tangible economic progress.³³⁶

³³³ Kux, D., 2001, p. 49

³³⁴ *Id.*, p. 84

³³⁵ Cohen, S., 2001, p. 131

³³⁶ Kux, D., 2001, p. 114

● **The 1960s**

The 1950s relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan was not tenable. It collapsed because the U.S. saw its ties solely in global terms of containing the Soviet Union and China, whereas Pakistan saw the support mainly in regional terms, i.e. against India.³³⁷

With Kennedy becoming the new president of the U.S. in 1961, the alliance started to unravel because Kennedy was bent on providing long-term military aid to India. Also Lyndon Johnson, Kennedy's successor, would show less understanding of Pakistani sensitivities.³³⁸ This was laid bare when the U.S. failed to support Pakistan against India in their war of 1965. The years thereafter U.S. concern with Pakistan remained at a consistent, fairly low, level.³³⁹

● **The 1970s**

The Nixon years in the White House, marked a tumultuous and tragic time for Pakistan: Ayub Khan tumbled from power, his successor Yahya Khan blundered in crushing East Pakistan's independence aspirations and the country was split up.³⁴⁰ The U.S. became involved, albeit futilely, in giving Pakistan political support in the Indian-Pakistani war of 1971.³⁴¹ Pakistan's new leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sought friendly relations with the U.S.³⁴² Gerald Ford, Nixon's successor, maintained Nixon's policy of warm relations toward Pakistan. The only significant bilateral problems were the nuclear issue and Pakistan's efforts to match India's nuclear explosive capability.³⁴³ In the early Carter years the U.S.-Pakistani relationship deteriorated drastically over the nuclear issue, only to improve greatly in response to the invasion of Afghanistan. Each of these deviations came about not because of specific U.S. interests in Pakistan but as a result of global concerns.³⁴⁴

³³⁷ Thornton, T.P., 1989, p. 149

³³⁸ Kux, D., 2001, p. 146

³³⁹ Thornton, T.P., 1989, p. 149

³⁴⁰ Kux, D., 2001, p. 213

³⁴¹ Thornton, T.P., 1989, p. 149

³⁴² Kux, D., 2001, p. 214

³⁴³ *Id.*, p. 225-226

³⁴⁴ Thornton, T.P., 1989, p. 149

- **The 1980s**

When Ronald Reagan became President in 1981, a new U.S.-Pakistan relationship was established. The amount of aid Pakistan received in order to fight Soviet troops in Afghanistan was very large. Beginning in 1982, the U.S. provided aid in the amount of \$3.6 billion for five years, divided equally between economic and military assistance. In late 1987 Washington agreed to provide a further package of \$4.02 billion for the next six years with 57% targeted as economic aid and the remainder as military assistance, mainly for the purchase of U.S. weapons.³⁴⁵ At the end of his term at the White House, Reagan had certified for a third time under the Pressler amendment that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon.³⁴⁶ But as indicated before, American arms were provided in response to the Soviet invasion and in order to train soldiers to fight the communists. After the Soviets were overthrown, however, the U.S. lost its interest in the region.

- **The 1990s**

The Cold War, the glue that held together U.S.-Pakistan ties, was over and Washington did not only lose its strategic interest in Pakistan but saw Islamabad as a nuclear troublemaker and a source of regional instability. The U.S. decided to impose the Pressler Amendment again and in Pakistan this turn in U.S. policy was seen as evidence that the U.S. was not a true friend.³⁴⁷

In the 1990s, during the second Benazir Bhutto administration, the U.S. placed Pakistan on a terrorist watch list following increased violence in Kashmir and in India's East Punjab that was somehow linked to Pakistan. Pakistan was implicated in terrorist incidents in Europe and the U.S., which suggested an Afghan mujahiddin connection. Benazir was pressured to freeze Pakistan's nuclear program. She refused to yield to American entreaties but sought another way to deal with the issue and ordered 5000 Pakistani soldiers to Somalia,

³⁴⁵ *Id.*, p. 151

³⁴⁶ Kux, D., 2001, p. 294

³⁴⁷ *Id.*, p. 320

where they served in the U.N.'s peacekeeping force. She also sent troops to Haiti and other world trouble spots. Nevertheless, she did not receive support for Pakistan's claim to Kashmir, nor did Clinton grant her any aid that had been blocked by the previous Bush Sr. administration.³⁴⁸ However, due to the lobbying of pro-Pakistani congressmen in Congress, the U.S. Senate did vote on September 21, 1995, to lift temporarily the Pressler Amendment ban on releasing American arms to Pakistan. The vote came on an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill offered by Sen. Hank Brown (R-CO) and was in line with the promise that President Clinton had made to Bhutto that arms Pakistan had paid for would be delivered or the money returned. The passing of the amendment is attributed to the efforts of pro-Pakistan groups.³⁴⁹

Also during Nawaz Sharif's and Musharraf's administration, Pakistan was scrutinized because of its connection to Osama bin Laden and the bombing at the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.³⁵⁰ Furthermore, the U.S. condemned Pakistan's Kargil adventurism in 1999 when it crossed the LoC. During his first year of power Musharraf was not a welcome figure in Washington or Europe. The chill in U.S.-Pakistan relations was acknowledged in March 2000 when Clinton spent a full week in India but barely more than a few low-profile hours in Pakistan.³⁵¹

In June 2001, Christina Rocca (at that point incoming Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs) addressed the Pakistan American Congress and said she wanted "to recognize the efforts of your community to promote an ongoing exchange in both government and the private sector on relations between the U.S. and Pakistan." What is particularly interesting about Rocca's speech is that all of the sudden she jumps from using the term Pakistani Americans to South Asians in the U.S. stating that "*South Asians* [my emphasis] have made contributions beyond their numbers in academia, the sciences, medicine and the arts." She also added that Pakistan occupies a central place at the crossroads of Asia and that

³⁴⁸ Ziring, L., 2003, p. 235

³⁴⁹ Ali, M.M., November 30, 1995; Kux, D., 2001, p. 331

³⁵⁰ Ziring, L., 2003, p. 251

³⁵¹ *Id.*, p. 271

the new Bush administration intended to work with the government of Pakistan to promote political stability and strengthen democratic reforms as well as retard the growth of extremism.³⁵²

- **Post-9/11**

After the 9/11 attacks the Bush administration ignored nuclear and other issues (that were previously on the U.S. foreign policy agenda) and fighting terrorism became the most important matter and Pakistan became a very useful tool in doing so. Pakistani Americans became increasingly concerned about the anti-immigrant backlash that raged through the country but already in November 2001, President Bush and some senior officials took the time to meet a delegation of Pakistani Americans to discuss issues relating U.S.-Pakistan ties and matters concerning the Pakistani community in the U.S. The major items discussed were debt rescheduling for Pakistan and U.S. economic aid. Bush also assured the delegation that he was aware of the hate crimes and instances of harassment Pakistani Americans had endured since 9/11 and he asked the community to bring cases where civil rights were affected to the notice of the Attorney General.³⁵³

The decision of Pakistan to help out the U.S. in its fight on terrorism did trigger some anti-American sentiments in Pakistan. As an article in the *New York Times* testified Pakistan had hoped that Americans would reciprocate Pakistan's help by lowering limits on imports of Pakistan-made clothes. Pakistan's textile business and apparel industries, dominating the country's economy and accounting for 60% of its industrial employment, have been battered by a combination of restrictive American trade policies and repeated fears of war (first from the conflict in Afghanistan and later with Pakistan's confrontation with India). One result of these trade policies was major lay offs and this created an increasing feeling of resentment among young Pakistanis. In the fall of 2001, Pakistan asked the U.S. and E.U. to waive import duties on textiles and clothing and liberalize quotas on textile imports as a reward for

³⁵² *Rocca reaffirms importance of U.S./Pakistan ties*, June 29, 2001

³⁵³ *Pakistani Americans meet Bush*, November 28, 2001

its help against Al Quada and the Taliban. But instead, the Bush administration opted in February 2002 for a small increase in quotas while backing legislation to lower import duties on just two categories of the textile industry (i.e. leather gloved and hand-knotted carpets). In the meantime Pakistan's textile business languished and government officials in Islamabad were upset that the U.S. did not roll back import duties of more than 25% on cotton clothing from Pakistan, which would have helped Pakistani producers offer lower prices and avoid losing sales to manufacturers in other countries.³⁵⁴

In June 2004, Torkel Patterson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, addressed the Pakistan American Congress. He said that Pakistan can play a central role in broader South Asian economic development but would need to cultivate stronger trade ties with its neighbors India and Afghanistan to fully realize that potential. He reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to provide economic support to Pakistan and recalled Bush's pledge to work with Congress to secure \$5 billion in military, economic, health, education and institutional assistance over the coming three years. He also urged the Pakistani American community to use their influence to encourage the building of a strong, independent judiciary and functioning legislature in Pakistan, "We need to see how we can translate [your] success outside of Pakistan, into success inside Pakistan."³⁵⁵

³⁵⁴ Bradsher, K., June 23, 2002

³⁵⁵ *Pakistan has key role to play in South Asian development*, June 25, 2004

9. The U.S.-Israel-India triangle

An interesting and quite recent development in ethnic minority politics in the U.S., has been the rapprochement between Indian Americans and Jewish Americans. India and Israel only started about a decennium ago - after a stillborn relationship for forty years - to normalize their relationship; a process in which Indian Americans and Jewish Americans have definitely played a role. Several American Jewish associations and the U.S. Indian Political Action Committee (USINPAC) have closely been working together over the last few years in order to reach similar goals. Hathaway (2004) even designates the new collaboration between Indian Americans and Jewish communities as "Washington's new strategic partnership".³⁵⁶

Some authors also emphasize the similarities between the Jewish and Indian diaspora. Kotkin (1992) asserts that in a manner perhaps most reminiscent of the Jews before the establishment of state of Israel, the Indian diaspora has concentrated on those fields where global extension, a solid ethic of hard work and communal self-help, and the ability to think and adapt quickly to changing economic conditions are critical advantages. Indians have - to a remarkable extent - flourished in many of the very niches - garments, real estate, trading, finance, entertainment, and diamonds - where Jews have traditionally found their greatest success.³⁵⁷ Nevertheless - as Shukla (2003) points out - there is a big difference with the Jewish diaspora that is very much premised on a rehearsal of originary forms of suffering and persecution that have created dispersals, and that construct a compensatory nation.³⁵⁸

9.1. Historical background

The relationship between India and Israel was from its beginning onwards a hostile one. India's hostile attitude toward Israel started with Gandhi who did not give credence to Jewish nationalism associated with a particular territory, and continued under Nehru who

³⁵⁶ Hathaway, R.M., June 2004

³⁵⁷ Kotkin, J., 1992, p. 205

³⁵⁸ Shukla, S., 2003, p. 13

depicted the Palestine issue as analogous to the situation on the Indian subcontinent. Just as the British were employing the tactics of divide and rule between Hindus and Muslims to perpetuate their domination, he saw the English in Palestine pitting "Jewish religious nationalism against Arab nationalism, and [making] it appear that [their] presence is necessary to act as an arbiter and to keep the peace between the two." After India's independence, India was appointed to a special U.N. committee charged to consider the appropriate solutions for Palestine. New Delhi recommended a federation of two autonomous Arab and Jewish states.³⁵⁹

Despite India's anti-Zionist stand, Israel cultivated India in its attempt to gain acceptance in Asia and establish legitimacy in the world. However, New Delhi never reciprocated, and when Israel became a reality in 1948, India still felt the need to take into account Muslim opposition to its creation. Nehru did not recognize the Israeli state and in 1949 India opposed U.N. membership for Israel. It was only in September 1950 that the Indian government accorded recognition, but still no exchange of ambassadors took place³⁶⁰ and in 1953 no more than the opening of an Israeli consulate was allowed in Bombay.³⁶¹

The following decade, India remained a defender of the Arab countries and after Israel invaded Sinai in 1956, Nehru exclaimed that Israel was "a source of continuous trouble". After Nehru's death Indian hostility even increased and so New Delhi refused to accept Israeli assistance in redeveloping the barren wastelands of Rajasthan. Similarly, in 1966 the Indian government for "political reasons" declined an Israeli offer of famine relief.³⁶²

A decline in Indo-Arab relations as a consequence of an outright endorsement of Pakistan's stance on the disputed area of Kashmir by most of the Arab states, Israel's full support of New Delhi's stand on Kashmir and its supplying of heavy mortars to India in the

³⁵⁹ Rubinoff, A.G., May 1995, p. 488-489

³⁶⁰ *Id.*, p. 490

³⁶¹ Inbar, E., 2004, p. 90

³⁶² Rubinoff, A.G., May 1995, p. 494

1965 war between India and Pakistan, urged Indian intellectuals to rethink the country's West Asia policy. In this period, the Indian Friends of Israel was founded to promote better relations between the two countries.³⁶³ Despite the divergence of views about Israel between the government and people of India, New Delhi kept backing the Arab countries and sought actively punitive sanctions against Israel in the U.N. and supported the PLO in international meetings including vigorous endorsement of the PLO's bid for observer status at the U.N. in 1974. Also, in the 1980s under the leadership of Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv, New Delhi kept perceiving Israel as a "relentlessly expansionist" state.³⁶⁴

For years India's overt hostility toward Israel had formed an impediment in its relations with the U.S. It had especially alienated many of India's most ardent supporters in U.S. Congress who were Jewish. Ironically, cooperation with Israel's lobby in Washington started the process of normalization when the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee helped the Indian embassy campaign against the sale of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) planes to Pakistan in 1987.³⁶⁵

The coming to power of the Janata Dal government in 1989 ended the official anti-Israel rhetoric and marked the beginning for a change of policy. The ascendance of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the Indian political system removed some hesitations about Israel. To the BJP, with its nationalist, Hindu outlook, the Jewish state was not so much a burden as a potential ally against Pakistan and radical Islam.³⁶⁶ An important development took place when India allowed the refueling of American combat aircrafts during the Gulf War of 1991. Especially in the early 1990s, New Delhi found the Israeli lobby useful in Washington on such issues as Kashmir. Due to the rise of Islamic-inspired terrorism in that Muslim-majority state, a parallel way of thinking on terrorism in New Delhi and Tel Aviv came into being. However, it remained for the Congress government of Narasimha Rao

³⁶³ *Id.*, p. 495

³⁶⁴ *Id.*, p. 501-502

³⁶⁵ *Id.*, p. 502-503

³⁶⁶ Inbar, E., 2004, p. 91

(coming to office in 1991) to complete the process of normalization. Rao, determined to correct what he regarded as an "unnecessary aberration in our foreign policy", convened a meeting of four former foreign secretaries who agreed that India should vote to rescind the 1975 "Zionism as racism resolution" that it had co-sponsored in the General Assembly. This set the stage for the next step toward an exchange of embassies. In March 1992 a diplomatic office was established and in August an embassy opened its doors in New Delhi. Since then a steady stream of Israeli notables has visited India, most prominently Simon Peres who signed economic, tourist and trade agreements in May 1993. India's union ministers of Agriculture, Human Resources, Commerce, Science, and Tourism as well as chief ministers of various Indian states have visited Israel. As a result, financial transactions have increased dramatically; bilateral trade surpassed \$400 million in 1995³⁶⁷ and by 2002 it had reached \$1.5 billion.³⁶⁸ Besides its traditional export of diamonds, Israel now sells potash, phosphate fertilizers, and agrochemicals to India in return for textiles, yarn, rice, and leather goods. Israel has also targeted India as a market for health services, environmental technology, and armaments. In addition to a number of bilateral governmental agreements, joint ventures have been established that will enable India to act as a middleman to West Asian countries with which Israel has no links.³⁶⁹

By the late 1990s the two countries had discovered their common outlooks on disputes in their regions, as well as a common strategic agenda. The American decision in January 1999 to lift the sanctions it imposed after India's May 1998 nuclear tests removed a serious obstacle in Jerusalem's relations with New Delhi, paving the way for achieving even closer ties. September 11 and the war on terror appeared to create a climate even more conducive to Indo-Israeli collaboration. This whole normalization process is an indicator that

³⁶⁷ Rubinoff, A.G., May 1995, p. 502-505

³⁶⁸ Inbar, E., 2004, p. 92

³⁶⁹ Rubinoff, A.G., May 1995, p. 502-505

in the international circumstances of the 1990s, a common stand against fundamentalist terrorism is a better basis for relations than shared democratic institutions.³⁷⁰

India and Israel cherish a similar outlook towards their regional disputes. India, like Israel feels beleaguered in its own region. Within their respective regions the two states are involved in protracted conflict characterized by complex ethnic and religious components. The threat for the two nations is the same: radical offshoots of Islam in the greater Middle East. Both states want the U.S. to confine itself to the role of mediator in the disputes.³⁷¹

The Indian defense establishment has always been less hostile toward Israel than the Indian government has. The defense ties between the two countries include weapon procurement, plans for co-producing military equipment, and cooperation in counter-terrorism and low-intensity conflict. Lately, they have also developed ties in the area of space activities. Israel has become India's second largest defense supplier after Russia.³⁷²

9.2. The Washington dimension

A dozen years ago, *India Abroad* publisher Gopal Raju asked Rep. Stephen Solarz for advice on how the Indian American community might increase its political clout in Washington. Solarz recommended Raju to hire someone from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.³⁷³ Already in 1993, *India Abroad* featured articles about "the Jewish Americans' Path to Influence" in which similarities between the Jewish American and Indian American community were highlighted and how the political involvement of the American Jewish community could serve as a useful model for the Indian American community.³⁷⁴

The nascent Indian-American relationship, in particular after 9/11, has not been enough to bring India into the American fold. New Delhi continues to suspect Washington of being a false friend because of its continued cordiality with Pakistan and China. It is believed

³⁷⁰ Inbar, E., 2004, p. 92

³⁷¹ *Id.*, p. 93

³⁷² *Id.*, p. 94

³⁷³ Hathaway, R.M., June 2004

³⁷⁴ Nurnberger, R., December 24, 1993

that New Delhi's link with Jerusalem might have the potential to smooth over some of the Indo-U.S. issues.³⁷⁵

America's Jewish lobby is quite powerful, unquestionably much more than the Indian American one. American Jewish organizations were politically astute enough to understand India's importance to the U.S. and Indian community in the U.S. Cooperation between the two diasporas has the potential to magnify the voices of the two communities (small in number: about 5.2 million Jews and 1.8 Indians) that is highly educated, affluent, and attached to democratic homelands. The American Israel PAC, the American Jewish Committee, the Jewish Institute on National Security Affairs, and the Jewish American Congress nourish ties with India and with the Indian lobby in Washington. Many members of USINPAC are blunt about their desire to emulate American Jewish groups and are interested in building a long-term relationship.³⁷⁶

The two lobbies' relationships are excellent. Increasingly, senior Indian leaders meet with American Jewish groups whenever they visit the U.S., and the past two years India's ambassador has hosted Hanukkah celebration at his residence.³⁷⁷ The two lobbies are working together on a number of domestic and foreign affairs issues, such as hate crimes, immigration, anti-terrorism legislation, and backing pro-Israel and pro-India candidates. The Jewish-Indian alliance worked together to gain the Bush administration's approval for Israel's sale of four Phalcon radar planes to India. Moreover, in July 2003 they were successful in adding to a U.S. aid package for Pakistan an amendment calling on Islamabad to stop Islamic militants from crossing into India and to prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

³⁷⁸

Since its inception in 2002, USINPAC has been remarkably successful in establishing a presence on Capitol Hill and in forging friendships with key U.S. legislators. The PAC has

³⁷⁵ Inbar, E., 2004, p. 102

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁷ Hathaway, R.M., June 2004

³⁷⁸ Inbar, E., 2004, p. 103; Hathaway, R.M., June 2004; Gupta, A., September 2004, p. 8

worked closely with a variety of Jewish groups to promote ties between Indian Americans and U.S. Jews.³⁷⁹

In July 2003, a first joint reception between the USINPAC, the AJC and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) for U.S. lawmakers on Capitol Hill was held. Joe Wilson, co-chair of the Congressional India Caucus, announced that it was "appropriate to make this bond." Gary Ackerman, former co-chair of the Caucus, said: "The problem for the two nations was that Israel was surrounded by 120 million Muslims, while India has 120 million within."³⁸⁰

Another joint endeavor between AJC and USINPAC involved the presentation of a memorial plaque to the American space agency NASA to commemorate last year's Columbia space shuttle tragedy, in which an Israeli astronaut and an Indian American scientist died.³⁸¹

USINPAC also collaborated with the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) to organize a conference in Washington on terrorism in India. Conversely, the AJC has also made some serious efforts in order to improve relations between India and Israel.³⁸² Allegedly, the AJC helped to establish the Congressional India Caucus.³⁸³ It has sponsored trips to Israel by Indian American community leaders and organized several trips to India for prominent U.S. Jews. AJC even opened an office in New Delhi.³⁸⁴

JINSA has been particularly active in working to foster trilateral cooperation among India, Israel and the U.S. In 2003, it organized a conference in New Delhi on national security, intelligence, and counter-terrorism. Among the conference speakers were retired FBI and CIA experts, the former head of Mossad, and a former Israel Defence Force Deputy Chief of Staff. A follow-on trilateral conference was held in Israel in 2004.³⁸⁵

³⁷⁹ Hathaway, R.M., June 2004

³⁸⁰ Zahir, J., October 2003

³⁸¹ Hathaway, R.M., June 2004

³⁸² *Ibid.*

³⁸³ *India and Israel weigh*, May 22, 2003

³⁸⁴ Hathaway, R.M., June 2004

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

Indian American groups have invited Jewish organizations to give seminars and other means of maximizing their political effectiveness.³⁸⁶ One of the techniques of political empowerment that Indian American organizations have borrowed from their Jewish allies is a systematic program to place young interns in congressional offices on Capitol Hill.³⁸⁷

Interestingly - as I have pointed out before (cf. Chapter 3) - a substantial number of Jewish members of Congress are aligned with the House as well as the Senate India Caucus. Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA) a Jewish House India Caucus member, declared that the two communities "have been drawn together by our joint fight against mindless, vicious, fanatic Islamic terrorism".³⁸⁸

The two communities have also worked together during the 2002 elections to defeat Georgia Congress-woman Cynthia McKinney (D)³⁸⁹ who was viewed as openly hostile to both India and Israel.³⁹⁰ Rep. McKinney was unseated by Rep. Denise Majette (D-GA) with the American Jewish and Indian American community heavily backing Majette because of McKinney's strongly anti-Israel and anti-India opinions.³⁹¹

On July 23, 2002, Frank Pallone wrote Secretary of State Colin Powell, a letter urging the secretary to support the sale of the jointly developed US-Israeli arrow theater missile defense system to India, as a move to "solidify" defense ties between the U.S. and India. Pallone noted in his letter that he understood Powell objected to the deal while "there is [reported] support within the Pentagon and support from Israel to make this sale a reality." This is clearly an indicator of the warming Indo-Israel ties between Israel and the role of U.S. congressmen as catalysts in this evolution.³⁹²

³⁸⁶ Hathaway, R.M., June 2004; Nurnberger, R., February 15, 2002; Ramer, L., October 11, 2002

³⁸⁷ Hathaway, R.M., June 2004; Nurnberger, R., February 15, 2002

³⁸⁸ Hathaway, R.M., June 2004; Cooperman, A., July 19, 2003

³⁸⁹ McKinney was said to be famous because of her unsubstantiated attacks on India and her unstinting report for Muslim causes. She introduced a statement into the Congressional record that called for the breakup of India and voted consistently for anti-India legislation introduced by Dan Burton (R-ID). (Dutt, E., September 6, 2002) In the meantime she has been re-elected.

³⁹⁰ Hathaway, R.M., June 2004; Cooperman, A., July 19, 2003; Feagans, B. October 22, 2004,

³⁹¹ Berger, M.E., October 22, 2004; Dutt, E., September 6, 2002; Haniffa, A., October 11, 2002

³⁹² Boese, W., April 2003

And in March 2004, the Israel Forum urged members to sign a petition that was intended to stop Pakistan from being designated as a major non-NATO ally. This endeavor took place in cooperation with USINPAC.³⁹³

Despite many positive feelings about the Indian American-Jewish American partnership, there are some activists in both communities who worry that USINPAC and, by extension, the Indian American community have allied themselves too closely with the American political right wing. Others are concerned that USINPAC is affiliated too closely with the Indian embassy in Washington and thus previously, with the government of the BJP³⁹⁴, stating that USINPAC is an unrepresentative, radicalized group that ignores the BJP's extremist ideology of Hindutva and thus rule out Christians and Muslims.³⁹⁵ It remains to be seen whether USINPAC's orientation will change now the BJP is no longer the leading party in India after the 2004 elections.

Additionally, the partnership might threaten to enlarge the already significant divisions within the Indian American community. The partnership may be widely embraced among Indian Americans who are Hindu, but Indian American Muslims as well as many Sikhs find it disturbing. While the AJC has a history of reaching out to Indian Muslims in the U.S., recently AJC leaders have been stung by the sharp complaints of Indian Muslims.³⁹⁶

Pakistani Americans have also been angered by this new alliance viewing it as directed specifically against Pakistan. These sorts of resentments may serve to perpetuate old antagonisms and to make cooperation more problematic between Pakistani Americans and Indian Americans who have similar interests in the domestic arena.³⁹⁷

Skeptics see the new partnership as nothing more than a cynical marriage of convenience built on the "lowest common denominator" of anti-Muslim sentiment and

³⁹³ *Stop Pakistan from being designated a "major non-Nato U.S. ally"*, Israel Forum

³⁹⁴ Hathaway, R.M., June 2004

³⁹⁵ Zahir, J., October 2003

³⁹⁶ Hathaway, R.M., June 2004

³⁹⁷ Hathaway, R.M., June 2004

anxiety over terrorism. At the moment, it is also something of a one-sided partnership. Indian Americans get more from the relationship, and also value it more highly than the Jewish community. For example, Israeli officials visiting NY or Washington - in contrast to the Indians - do not routinely meet with Indian-American groups. When asked why he valued the partnership, one Jewish leader referred to a joke circulating among American Jews that together, Hindus and Jews make up one-fifth of humanity. In other words, Israel may find India a useful partner on the international scene, even if at the moment most of the domestic benefits of the partnership flow to the Indian-American community.³⁹⁸

A trilateral alliance could result from the new U.S.-Indian-Israeli convergence on strategic issues such as counter-terrorism, missile defense, and preemption. On an official visit to the U.S. in May 2003, India's national security adviser Brajesh Mishra specifically proposed an antiterrorism alliance between the three nations. "Such an alliance would have the political will and moral authority to take bold decisions in extreme cases of terrorist provocation," he said in an address to the American Jewish community in Washington.³⁹⁹ Additionally, he added referring to the U.S.-India-Israel triad: "We are all democracies, sharing a common vision of pluralism, tolerance and equal opportunity." He also pointed out that all three countries uniquely confronted by the scourge of terrorism were "main targets of international terrorism", and "should form an viable alliance against terrorism".⁴⁰⁰ As to U.S. support for this, the U.S. ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, often clashed with Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca in his support for Indian-U.S. defense relations and the inclusion of Israel in a strategic triad. If the U.S. warms up to the idea, this trilateral relationship might become attractive to India and Israel.⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁹ Inbar, E., 2004, p. 103

⁴⁰⁰ Hathaway, R.M, June 2004

⁴⁰¹ Inbar, E., 2004, p. 103-104

10. Efforts of the Indian and Pakistani nation-states in reaching out to their diasporas

Both the Indian as well as the Pakistani nation-state have realized that their expatriate communities possess great potential to uplift the respective mother countries and have consequently encouraged them to invest in the mother countries and have granted them favorable interest rates etc. Many Indian and Pakistani leaders have also lauded their respective diaspora communities and urged them to become political active in their host countries in order to have a hand in the host country's foreign policy making. India and Pakistan both thus actively reach out to their diasporas and this is only likely to increase in the future. Furthermore, both states have also tried to influence U.S. foreign policy through efforts of their ambassadors and by means of hiring lobbying companies active on Capitol Hill.

In the 1970s, India created the terms PIO and NRI, respectively meaning 'Person of Indian Origin' and 'Non Resident Indian'. The latter are Indian citizens, holding Indian passports and residing abroad for an indefinite period, whether for employment, or for carrying on any business or vocation, or for any other purpose. A PIO is applied to a foreign citizen of Indian origin or descent.⁴⁰² Already in 1973, the Indian Foreign Exchange Regulation Act discussed the "person not resident in India," and by 1975 members of the Indian Investment Center had begun to hold seminars for immigrant associations in the U.S., with the purpose of soliciting monies for new Indian industries.⁴⁰³ Since April 1999, India has been issuing the PIO-card for the sum of \$1000. The card enables Indians in the diaspora to visit India without visa, own property, buy government bonds and apply to universities in India for a period of 20 years. The divergent justifications of public officials for the program

⁴⁰² Technically, the term can be applied in three cases: (1) a person who, at any time, has held an Indian passport; (2) anyone, either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents or great grandparents was born in and was permanently resident in India as defined in the Government of India Act of 1953; and (3) the spouse of a citizen of India or a person of Indian origin covered in the previous two categories (*Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian diaspora*, December 2001, p. viii).

⁴⁰³ Shukla, S., 1999/2000, p. 22

reflect a link between the more cultural yearnings for the homeland and the economic agenda of the state. Home Minister Advani from the BJP, noted: "I have seen the hunger of Indians abroad to have their children linked to their country of origin," while chief commissioner for Investments and Non-Resident Indians at the Indian Investment Center of the government, pronounced: "I hope the new card will encourage more investment."⁴⁰⁴ The concept of the PIO-card has been criticized because of its elite nature (i.e. expensive price tag) by Indians residing in other countries than the U.S. and the U.K. who are not nearly as affluent as the Indian communities in North America and the U.K.⁴⁰⁵ Also the NRI-category was created by the Indian state to repatriate investment from abroad. The NRI receives benefits that normally would not be available to a person living outside the state, such as the right to own property within its borders.⁴⁰⁶ The reason to create these categories was India's economic crisis and Indian officials believed in the importance of outside investors. Investments of Indians abroad were considered as a less threatening source of funds and so the state began actively seeking financial remittances from abroad.⁴⁰⁷

Despite the fact that categories as the PIO and NRI were created in the 1970s, it is interesting to note that the Government of India did not initially regard overseas Indians as potential (political) ambassadors.⁴⁰⁸ In 1947, Nehru panicked when he thought about the overseas Indians. He was afraid if India showed interest in them, they would be accused of divided loyalty, of loving India more than the country in which they had settled.⁴⁰⁹ However the picture began to change in the early 1990s when the Indian economy went practically bankrupt and the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi called Indians abroad a bank "from which one could make withdrawals from time to time."⁴¹⁰ Ever since, there has been a more

⁴⁰⁴ *Id.*, p. 19

⁴⁰⁵ Shukla, S., 2003, p. 17

⁴⁰⁶ *Id.*, p. 10

⁴⁰⁷ *Id.*, p. 59

⁴⁰⁸ Lall, M.C., 2001, preface

⁴⁰⁹ Parekh, B., 2003, January 8, 2003; Gupta, A., September 2004, p. 6

⁴¹⁰ Wucker, M., 2004, p. 37; Gupta, A., September 2004, p. 6

concerted Indian effort to court overseas Indians in the interests of overcoming some of the traditional constraints of India's development.⁴¹¹

Most recently, on January 9th, 2003, the Indian parliament unanimously adopted the Dual Citizenship Bill⁴¹² and approved dual citizenship to PIOs from 16 countries. In reality, dual citizenship is said not to offer much more than the PIO-card does. The basic difference is that it is for life while the PIO card is only for 20 years. Dual citizenship is believed "to raise the comfort level psychologically and to connect the PIO with India intensely." The 16 countries where Indians can obtain dual citizenship are the U.S., the U.K., Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, France, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Switzerland, Israel, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand. These countries were chosen on the basis of two criteria: their legal systems are compatible and explicitly admit dual citizenship; and PIOs living in those countries have demanded the facility.⁴¹³ Dual citizenship will not entitle overseas Indian citizens equal opportunities in matters of public employment to contest for election as President or Vice President. They cannot become a member of the House of the People (Lok Sabha) or the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) or any legislative assembly, nor can an overseas Indian become a Supreme Court or high court judge. Overseas citizens do not have the right to vote or be registered as a voter. Further has the Government of India the right to cancel dual citizenship if an overseas citizen of India "has shown himself by any act or speech to be disloyal or disaffected toward the Constitution of India as by law established."⁴¹⁴ When India's ambassador-at-large Bhishma Agnihotri in July 2002 announced the decision of the Indian parliament at the annual AAIP convention, he urged the Indian Americans to continue influencing the India-U.S. relationship.⁴¹⁵

⁴¹¹ Lall, M.C., 2001, preface

⁴¹² Dual citizenship is granted to NRIs and PIOs up to the fourth generation (Ghosh, D., Makhijani, V., May 16, 2003).

⁴¹³ Josy, J., January 2, 2004

⁴¹⁴ Bhatt, S., July 11, 2003

⁴¹⁵ Dutt, E., July 12, 2002

Besides offering dual citizenship, the Indian state has also set up a High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora that was constituted in September 2001. This committee published in 2001 a report that is a systematic outline of the different Indian diaspora communities in the world.⁴¹⁶ What is more, the Indian diaspora has now also an ambassador from the Indian nation-state to look after its concerns.⁴¹⁷

As far as Pakistan is concerned, it has taken similar initiatives to reach out to its diaspora communities. Overseas Pakistanis number over 4 million and have a combined income of \$600 billion (beware: this is an estimated number!). This income is equal to the GDP of Pakistan. Thus, the 3% of Pakistanis abroad earn over half the combined income generated by people of Pakistani origin. Successive Pakistani governments have ardently wooed this group for remittances, long-term investments, as well as political support, especially in the U.S. and other Western countries. Also the Pakistani diaspora is not homogenous. The temporary migrant worker in the Gulf can hardly compare his lifestyle with that of the Pakistani professionals and businessmen in the U.S. and the U.K. or even in the Gulf for that matter. Allegedly, many of the permanently settled Pakistanis in North America however hardly ever send any remittances, the bulk of which still comes from the Gulf.⁴¹⁸

For Pakistani, dual citizenship seemed possible, and many obtained U.S. citizenship as others had obtained British citizenship earlier. While the U.S. and Pakistan do not have a dual citizen agreement this is not problematic. Since one does not physically surrender the Pakistani passport when swearing allegiance to the U.S., the passport is retained and used to revisit Pakistan without getting a visa. In 1996, Pakistan decided to issue a "residency card" or national identification card for Pakistanis who had become U.S. citizens. The card allows its bearer all rights except voting in Pakistan.⁴¹⁹

⁴¹⁶ *Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian diaspora*, December 2001

⁴¹⁷ Shukla, S., 2003, p. 251

⁴¹⁸ Naseem, S.M., *The Diaspora View of Economy*

⁴¹⁹ Leonard, K., 1997, p. 73

Furthermore, many Pakistani officials have been urging the Pakistani community in the U.S. to get more involved. This was also the message of Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri who asked them in May 2004 "to get more involved in mainstream American issues". He underlined the need for "political activism" and also stated that Pakistan "pays special attention to the Pakistani American community and its causes, because it plays a critical role in Pakistan-U.S. relations."⁴²⁰

The embassies in the U.S. of both countries continuously try to influence U.S. foreign policy and often organize events to which legislators are invited in order to make them aware of issues of importance to the diaspora communities. In 1995, the Pakistani ambassador actively lobbied Senators to win support for the Brown Amendment and urged Pakistani Americans to write their legislators asking them to vote for the administration's initiative.⁴²¹ The Fall 2004 Conference of the Pakistani-American youth organizations, Rising Leaders and the National Pakistani Students Association, was organized with the support of the embassy of Pakistan in Washington. This event also portrays the embassy's efforts to mobilize second generation Pakistani Americans.

Last but not least, both countries hire professional lobbying firms as well. These lobbying firms are public relations giants with connection to the highest level of the U.S. political establishment. The firms are also expected to deflect criticism against their client country, if and when the U.S. Congress takes note concerning violations of human rights or infraction of trade regulations and the like.

⁴²⁰ Bughio, K.R., May 19, 2004

⁴²¹ Haniffa, A., August 11, 1995

11. Future Prospects

11.1. The second Bush administration

We need to ask ourselves of what issues we should be attentive in the near future. The first question is what the prospects for Indo-U.S. and Pakistan-U.S. relations are under a second Bush administration. During the first Bush administration India's biggest gain has been the new view in Washington that India must be treated as an emerging global power. Most probably, relations between India and the U.S. will keep on growing. The Indian foreign policy establishment has been nothing but smiles at the appointment of U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice as the next Secretary of State. And it has also applauded the appointment of Stephen Hadley as the next National Security Advisor. Rice and Hadley have both been described as "India's most trusted interlocutors over the last four years." Already in 2000, Rice argued that America "should pay closer attention to India's role in the regional balance."⁴²² Bush has denied the claim that the designation of Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally automatically means that there will be an infusion of sophisticated weapons into Pakistan. Notwithstanding this statement, it has been understood that the Bush administration has in fact decided to provide F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan. The Bush administration is thus apparently going ahead with rewarding Musharraf for his contribution to fight against Al Qaida⁴²³, while serving a U.S. aircraft manufacturer. It will, therefore, be interesting to see how India's new government, the United Progressive Alliance, addresses the issue of relations with the U.S. and also Israel and Palestine (cf. Chapter 9).

If the second Bush administration decides to follow the recommendations of *The 9/11 Commission Report*, then the U.S. will make a long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan. The U.S. will most likely sustain the current scale of aid to Pakistan, support

⁴²² Mohan, R., November 17, 2004; Srivastava, S., November 18, 2004; *Rice is positive on India*, November 16, 2004

⁴²³ Narayanan, R., November 7, 2004

Pakistan's government in its struggle against extremists and give military aid.⁴²⁴ The U.S. is most likely to maintain its strategic partnership with Pakistan. Washington will keep determining its policies according to calculations of its own interests.

Another concern of the entire South Asian immigrant community are the legal rights, working conditions and relative absence of social protection of low-income immigrants such as the New York City yellow taxicab drivers.⁴²⁵ It seems unlikely that the present administration will give priority to such lamentations over projects in the realm of nuclear warfare or business opportunities abroad.

11.2. India's IT Business

Another issue that requires attention is India's booming IT (Information Technology) business and the outsourcing-problem. The last 5 years, India's IT business has reached unmeasured heights. This evolution has attracted numerous U.S. businesses. As mentioned by Christina Rocca⁴²⁶, Assistant Secretary for South Asia Affairs, both Bush and Vajpayee have acknowledged the importance of the IT trade, sharing a vision of exchange of high technology and IT experts. Simultaneously, it has created anxiety in the U.S. as a consequence of outsourcing jobs to India. Several U.S. states are currently trying to outlaw outsourcing to India. It will definitely be interesting to see whether or not members of the India Caucus will try to prevent such potential legislation.

11.3. U.S. Senate India Caucus

A very important advancement for the Indian American community has been the creation of a U.S. Senate India Caucus. Founded on April 29, 2004, it has been projected as "the big push to Indo-U.S. relations". The first-ever grouping of its kind in the U.S. Senate was formed along the lines of the House India Caucus. The idea of a Senate India Caucus has

⁴²⁴ *The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 369

⁴²⁵ Roels, B., Fall 2003

⁴²⁶ Rocca, R.B., April 21, 2004

caught on with as many as 35⁴²⁷ senators signing up for it (cf. list of members in Appendix). Democratic Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) and Republican Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) are the first co-chairs of the bipartisan caucus. It is a political formation that promises to be a powerful club.⁴²⁸

According to Senator Cornyn, who allegedly is the "moving spirit behind the caucus", the bipartisan coalition will expand areas of agreement between the U.S. and India, but simultaneously discussions over areas of disagreement will also be held. The Caucus' primary goals are to cooperate in the war on terrorism, advance peace and stability, deepen defense relations between the two countries and create opportunities for trade and investment in order to give a big boost to economic ties.⁴²⁹ Additionally, Cornyn stated: "As the world's two largest democracies, it is particularly important that we maintain a strong strategic relationship. The United States and India share a commitment to freedom, representative government, free market principles and the war against terror.⁴³⁰ India and the U.S. have nothing to fear from one another. We have great potential."⁴³¹ He even addressed India as "one of our greatest allies and a nation that shares the deepest convictions of democratic freedom."⁴³²

The Caucus is meant to provide a forum for U.S. Senators as well as Indian leaders. It will also cover matters affecting Asian Indian Americans.⁴³³ Cornyn did stress the fact that "important differences do remain concerning; such as India's nuclear weapons program and the pace of India's economic reforms and trade."⁴³⁴

⁴²⁷ List from Washington, D.C., June 8, 2004;

http://www.usinpac.com/NewsContent.asp?CONTENT_ID=122&SEC_ID=14

⁴²⁸ Rajagopalan, S., April 30, 2004; *Senators to announce*, April 28, 2004; *Senate caucus*, April 28, 2004; *US Senate launches*, April 30, 2004

⁴²⁹ Rajagopalan, S., April 30, 2004; *Senators to announce*, April 28, 2004; *Senate caucus*, April 28, 2004; *US Senate launches*, April 30, 2004

⁴³⁰ *US Senate launches*, April 30, 2004

⁴³¹ Krishnaswami, S., April 29, 2004

⁴³² *Senate caucus*, April 28, 2004; *US Senate launches*, April 30, 2004

⁴³³ *US Senate launches*, April 30, 2004

⁴³⁴ Rajagopalan, S., April 30, 2004; *Senators to announce*, April 28, 2004; *Senate caucus*, April 28, 2004; *US Senate launches*, April 30, 2004

Senator Clinton, claiming to represent approximately 250,000 Asian Indian Americans in the NY-area⁴³⁵, said she looked forward to play a key role in stimulating stronger economic relations between the two countries. Concerning the nuclear proliferation issue, Senator Clinton visualized a new era of cooperation between the two countries. She hopes to address issues like halting proliferation and preventing rogue states like North Korea from holding out threats.⁴³⁶

The Caucus is thus overall meant to bring Republicans and Democrats together to strengthen the relationship between the U.S. and India and work toward common goals, including increasing trade and improving security "in an age of global terror".⁴³⁷

The launching of the U.S. Senate India Caucus occurred simultaneously with the retirement and birthday of the 63-year old Indian ambassador to the U.S., Lalit Mansingh. He exclaimed that the Caucus is "the best birthday gift I have ever been given in my life".⁴³⁸ Earlier this year at a dinner party of the American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin in March, Mansingh attributed the formation of the U.S. Senate India Caucus to "all the Indian leaders of the Indian American community that finally made this happen."⁴³⁹

It is believed that the Senate Caucus should be more effective than the House Caucus. The clout of the Senate body is traditionally considered to be far greater than the one of the House of Representatives. There are only 100 senators - as against 435 congressmen; and while a senator is elected for six years, a congressman's term lasts only two years.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁵ cf. www.census.org

⁴³⁶ *Senators to announce*, April 28, 2004; *US Senate launches*, April 30, 2004

⁴³⁷ *Senators to announce*, April 28, 2004; *US Senate launches*, April 30, 2004

⁴³⁸ *US Senate launches*, April 30, 2004

⁴³⁹ Haniffa, A., March 31, 2004

⁴⁴⁰ Raghavan, B.S., April 2, 2004

Conclusion

Many American and Indian ambassadors, U.S. as well as Indian officials have described the Indian American community in the U.S. as a bridge or as catalysts between the two countries. Amit Gupta (2004) argued that the claims about the community's political power are overstated.⁴⁴¹ It is quite clear from my account that the Asian Indian community's power has not yet unfolded itself completely, but seems to be continuously on the rise. Nevertheless, the community faces a range of challenges in the near future in order to increase and retain its little power of influence. Although Pakistani officials have been deploying the same kind of rhetoric about its diaspora, the Pakistani American community has not nearly reached the same level of political influence as the Indian Americans have.

The main reason why Pakistani influence is lagging behind might purely numerical. The Indian American community is about tenth times the size of the Pakistani American - according to the latest estimations. This means that they are much more visible in U.S. society than their Pakistani counterparts. Second, Pakistani Americans are less efficiently organized. While Indians were already debating in the early 1990s on how to become politically active and how to assert themselves in U.S. politics, the Pakistani Americans have just recently started doing this. So Pakistani American organizations are about ten years behind. Third, there is the question of the ethnic community newspapers. *India Abroad*, the most widespread ethnic newspaper among South Asians, does not particularly exclude Pakistanis or Bangladeshis but they do feel alienated from this paper.⁴⁴² It is undeniable that *India Abroad* targets Indian Americans more than other South Asians. This newspaper regularly features editorials of congressmen and senators and has without a doubt taught the Indian American community a lot about the American political system. Leonard (1997) writes that there is a marked contrast between the representation and discussion of generational differences in the Indian and Pakistani ethnic presses. Pakistani Muslim American papers and journals such as

⁴⁴¹ Gupta, A., September 2004, p. 2

⁴⁴² Shukla, S., 2003, p. 210

Pakistan Link and *The Minaret* have columns on Children and the Family, Career Counseling, and occasional special features on the second generation, but these are limited in the range of subject matter and in writings by people compared to *India Today*, *India-West*, *India Tribune* and *India Currents*. In the latter publications, Youth Pages or spotlights on youth regularly feature young people writing about dating, homosexuality, marriage out of community, and even living together before marriage. There are numerous observations about first-generation parents and relatives back in India, whereas a typical second-generation quote from the Pakistani press is: "We associate closely with our family traditions rather than the country we're in."⁴⁴³ Pakistani American newspapers are not only less widespread, but also reflect a more conservative attitude and moreover, an absence of desire to assimilate in the U.S. society. Fourth, the Pakistani Americans only recently set up a House Pakistan Caucus, while the House India Caucus has been in effect for about ten years now. In those ten years Indian Americans have established valuable relations and have been able to change the 'bad' image of India that once pervaded congressional thinking. Therefore, I believe one of the main challenges for Pakistani Americans is to change the 'terrorist' image of their country as a dangerous and rogue state.

Despite the Indian Americans' head start, they also have challenges to overcome. First, they need to abandon their weak sense of national identity. Many Indians choose to identify with their different regional, linguistic, and religious groupings and this impedes the presence of a uniform political agenda. The community seems to be united when it comes to a Diwali stamp or some other emotive issue, but is divided on many of the other, more substantive matters. The pull of religious and ethno-linguistic ties leads to a diffusion of mobilization efforts. There is a need for a public policy agenda that works to provide leadership and guidance on policy issues in the U.S.⁴⁴⁴ Secondly -as Huntington (2004) has argued- for institutions to survive they must be able to withstand a generational change. The

⁴⁴³ Leonard, K., 1997, p. 154

⁴⁴⁴ Gupta, A., September 2004, p. 3-4; Lal, V., 1999, p. 45

question then pops up whether the next generation of Indian Americans will have the same type of affinity for their roots and with the home country that their parents have?⁴⁴⁵ It has been stated that the children of the 1965-immigrants generally constitute their politics on the basis of their own challenges as young people within the U.S.⁴⁴⁶ Additionally; diaspora groups tend to support the home country as long as it fits into the interests of the host nation. When these interests diverge, the diaspora groups tends to side with its country of domicile rather than its country of origin.⁴⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the Indian American community is well on its way. Politically, it has been a banner year for the community: a maximum number of members of the community contesting in polls nationwide (28); maximum number to win in an election cycle (8); maximum number of Indian Americans in state legislatures (5) and, of course, the big one - India's first Congressman in 46 years, and only second in U.S. electoral history. Additionally the community is learning from and cooperating with what is said to be the most influential lobby group on the Hill. As Hathaway (June 2004) argued - Indian Americans will flourish to the extent that the larger American body politics continues to believe that India is an attractive partner for the U.S. On the other hand, I believe this might change if continuous economic development of India into a world power would be perceived as too competitive by American business circles. As a comparison, U.S.-European political relations have changed from love between master and vassal, towards conditional agreements and notorious disagreements (Iraq for example) concomitant with repetitive trade conflicts with a powerful European economic community as reflected in reciprocal sanctions.

Besides examining the successes and/or failures of both diaspora communities, it is necessary to question the true effectiveness of informal caucuses such as the House India Caucus and Pakistan Caucus and the effect it can really have on foreign policy making.

⁴⁴⁵ *Id.*, p. 12

⁴⁴⁶ Prashad, V., Mathew, B., 1999/2000, p. xii

⁴⁴⁷ Gupta, A., September 2004, p. 15

The main obstacle to efficiency is the bipartisan nature of both caucuses. As is clear from the sample survey (cf. Chapter 5), a congressman's party affiliation triumphs over his/her caucus affiliation. Hathaway (2001) notices that finding bipartisan consensus is often difficult, especially regarding domestic issues. He claims the India Caucus has been most effective on foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, the bipartisan nature often creates difficulties. Nearly three-fourths of the members of the India Caucus are Democrats, and Democrats over the years have tended to support pro-India measures more often than Republicans. Nonetheless, some of New Delhi's harshest critics also come from the Democratic side of the aisle.⁴⁴⁸

Secondly, up till April 2004, the India Caucus was a creature of the House of Representatives only. Members of the Senate are usually more apprehensive aligning themselves with a certain ethnic group. It is yet to be seen whether this Senate India Caucus will be capable of exerting more power in foreign policy issues concerning India.

Hathaway (2001) also points to the informal nature of one's membership of the caucus. Whereas the India Caucus claims to be the biggest of its kind in U.S. politics with more than 170 members, only a couple dozen of these members take an active interest in the affairs of the Indian American community. Although most India Caucus members cast pro-India votes, their activities on behalf of the community do not extend much beyond that. Moreover, some legislators are said not to know that their staffs have signed them up for caucus membership.⁴⁴⁹

Apparently, personal rivalries have also undercut the India Caucus effectiveness, although by its very nature this development is difficult to document. In early 1999, Pallone was forced out as Caucus co-chair and replaced by Ackerman. Allegedly this was because a number of Caucus members had come to feel that Pallone had used the organization too much

⁴⁴⁸ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 29

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

as a vehicle for his personal ambitions and hoped to garner for themselves some of the recognition Pallone had gained through his activity.⁴⁵⁰

What then can a caucus do to increase its power? The first option is to abolish the bipartisan nature of the formation, but I believe that is not the right solution. The size of a caucus does not seem to matter that much either. Indian Americans always pride themselves that the India Caucus is the biggest one on the Hill, but that does not imply that it is the most powerful. The caucuses should abandon their informal nature. This would mean that the congressman or -woman signing up would have to ascertain and display the real motives and genuine interests for joining the caucus. His/her previous voting records should be examined and some sort of pledge that he/she will work *actively* for the caucus' causes should be taken.

The real power of Congress in general should also be questioned. Both Hathaway (2000) and Rubinoff (Spring 2001) claim that when it comes to foreign policy, Congress is better at obstructing executive branch desires than at fashioning a policy of its own. When the Congress does play a constructive role, it is almost always on the "margins of policy". There are very few examples in modern U.S. political history where Congress has successfully launched a major foreign policy initiative in the face of executive opposition. As far as my account of the caucuses' actions showed, it has merely been successful in preventing or softening sanctions to be imposed on India or Pakistan or in suggesting to impose sanctions on some of their rivals. Sanctions are often considered to be a blunt instrument, but we must acknowledge it is better than no instruments. More importantly, sanctions can represent a legitimate effort to warn foreign governments not to take particular actions or cross certain lines and sometimes reflect a congressional distrust of the executive branch. Congress might legislate non-proliferation sanctions, for instance, because it believes that the White House is not giving this issue sufficient priority.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁵⁰ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 29; Haniffa, A., October 16, 1998

⁴⁵¹ Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000, p.14; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 49

In other words, the strength of the India Caucus - in particular - is often overstated and its true accomplishments have been limited to passing (sometimes very ceremonial/symbolic) resolutions rather than hardcore substantive legislation. For example, one of the recent resolutions (March 10, 2004) proposed by members of the India Caucus was to commend India on its celebration of Republic Day (H.CON. RES.15). This congressional address did not give a comprehensive discussion of U.S.-Indian ties. Instead, it was marked by an outpouring of praise of "the more than 2 million Indian Americans in the U.S. who have become a living bridge between our two great democracies." Other gracious rhetoric was used stating "there is no stronger relationship between the U.S. and India than our shared commitment to democracy and civil society. We are truly natural allies."⁴⁵²

To finish, there is this question about the cash flowing out of the pockets of both diaspora communities and arriving at the hands of U.S. politicians. Does American politics welcome or exploit the Indian American and Pakistani American community? Many authors have suggested that the community is being manipulated by politicians far more interested in raising campaign funds than in promoting the interests of Indian Americans or Pakistani Americans. Probably, the community has yet to develop a political maturity sophisticated enough to distinguish between its effective advocates and those lawmakers whose commitment is mainly verbal dependent on the size of the political donations they receive. More than 25% of all the representatives belong to the India Caucus. To put that in perspective: 0.6% of the population is Indian.⁴⁵³ For example, I wonder how the Pakistani American community in New York that in 2000 raised \$50,000 to support Hillary Clinton's Senate campaign⁴⁵⁴, reacts to the fact that she has now become one of the co-chairmen for the Senate India Caucus. Conversely, how does the Indian American community react if she

⁴⁵² Congressional Record, House, Page H982, March 10, 2004, Congressional Quarterly Inc.

⁴⁵³ Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 30; *AdLib: Struggle for empowerment*, April 1, 1999; Schroeder, M., November 13, 2003; Gopakrishna, S., January 15, 2003

⁴⁵⁴ Bonner, R., March 14, 2000

lauds Pakistan's role in the war on terror. In fact this must not necessarily be harmful to the populations of either Pakistan or India who have also common interests.

A question relating to this problem is whether economic empowerment (which both communities in the U.S. have certainly achieved.) ultimately leads to political empowerment. In the meantime, the visibility of Asian Indian and Pakistani American legislators in U.S. politics has remained fairly low to non-existent.

To conclude, we can definitely state that the presence of the Indian American community in the U.S. has led to an increase of congressional interest in the country and has been to a small, but significant extent been able to influence U.S. policy, both domestically and internationally. The image of India as a poverty-stricken country clearly does no longer pervade congressional thinking about the country. Jaswant Singh, India's current External Affairs Minister expressed similar perceptions during his visit to the U.S. in 2002: "Americans of Indian origins have acted as a catalyst to Indo-U.S. relations that even I did not see ten years ago."

However, it is clear that despite these positive processes, the Indo-American community does still suffer from several other handicaps. Their percentage among the overall population is still small as compared to the Jews for example. Given their relatively small number, they are just not yet able to influence the American policy-makers significantly. Although the previous outlined developments have constructed a somewhat new political dimension and a desirable political beginning, I believe it will take a few more years of dedicated Indian American political engagement before it will be able to influence U.S. foreign policy significantly.

So what to expect for the future? We shall probably see a groundswell of the second generation Indian Americans running for U.S. Congress positions as already numerous young Indian Americans work or interns in the offices of congressmen and senators, giving them

hands-on experience with the American political process. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether they will be able to be more influential in steering U.S. foreign policy toward India.

As far as the Pakistani American community is concerned: they have just started to organize themselves effectively and they have without a doubt a long and hard struggle ahead of them in order to come to the level where Indian Americans are now. Political empowerment is a very slow and gradual process and without dedicated and charismatic community leaders who ardently believe in their success, it will take even longer to achieve an actual voice in U.S. politics.

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Appendix

Members⁴⁵⁵: Caucus on India and Indian Americans in the U.S. Senate
(108th Congress elected in November 2002)

Eight members of the U.S. Senate India Caucus are Jewish Congressmen. There are 11 Jewish Senators in the 108th Congress. Among these 6 are Democrats and 2 Republicans.

(list from Washington, D.C., June 8, 2004)⁴⁵⁶
18 Democrats, 17 Republicans, Total 35

Senator Cornyn (R - TX) –Co-Chair		Senator Clinton (D - NY) –Co-Chair	
Senator Hutchison (R - TX)		Senator Lott (R - MS)	
Senator Lautenberg (D - NJ)	JC	Senator Santorum (R - PA)	
Senator Lieberman (D - CT)	JC	Senator Specter (R - PA)	JC
Senator Daschle (D - SD)		Senator Stabenow (D - MI)	
Senator Bingaman (D - NM)		Senator Cochran (R - MS)	
Senator Frist (R - TN)		Senator Corzine (D - NJ)	
Senator L. Graham (R - SC)		Senator Schumer (D - NY)	JC
Senator Wyden (D - OR)	JC	Senator Coleman (R - MN)	JC
Senator Chambliss (R - GA)		Senator Bayh (D - IN)	
Senator Durbin (D - IL)		Senator Breaux (D - LA)	
Senator Crapo (R - ID)		Senator Levin (D - MI)	JC
Senator Fitzgerald (R - IL)		Senator Grassley (R - IA)	
Senator Bennett (R - UT)		Senator Boxer (D - CA)	JC
Senator Nickles (R - OK)		Senator Stevens (R - AK)	
Senator Mikulski (D - MD)		Senator Rockefeller (D - WV)	
Senator Landrieu (D - LA)		Senator Hatch (R - UT)	
Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA)			

⁴⁵⁵ ● : Democrats

● : Republicans

underlined: member of House India Caucus AND House Pakistan Caucus

JC ● : Jewish affiliation:

⁴⁵⁶ http://www.usinpac.com/NewsContent.asp?CONTENT_ID=122&SEC_ID=14

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